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Introduction  Theories that help to explain party organisations can, broadly speaking, be divided into  two  strands,  depending  on whether  they  stress  the  importance  of  contextual factors,  or  rather  focus  on  the  political  actor.  Several  scholars  of  political  parties have in the past more or less explicitly made reference to this highly unsatisfactory stand‐off  between  these  two  seemingly  contradictory  interpretations  of  party  for‐mation and adaptation. Probably the clearest description of the current situation of theory‐building in the field of party organisation comes from van Biezen, who points out  that  it  is  yet  not  clear  “how much  structure  actually  matters  and  how much room  it  leaves  for parties  as  active  agents”  (2003a: 179).  Similarly, Müller  (1997) distinguishes between an “environmentalist” and a “purposive‐action” approach to 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the problem of how to explain different forms of party organisation. Less explicitly, this debate is also reflected in the concepts of party organisational “change” and “in‐novation”, with change defined as the “difference found between two points in time in the way a party operates”, whereas innovation is understood as “the part of that change which is intentionally brought about by some agents inside the party” (Hei‐dar and Saglie 2003: 223; emphasis added). Likewise, Harmel (2002) makes a dis‐tinction  between  the  “life‐cycle”  approach  and  “system‐level  trends”  approach  on the one hand and the “discrete change” approach on the other. Although he argues that the three primarily differ as to the type or pattern of change they are aiming to explain, he acknowledges that the former puts more emphasis on internal and envi‐ronmental factors respectively, while the latter sees the interests of party actors as the prime source for organisational change. Although this structure‐agency divide seriously  limits our understanding of  the processes of party formation and change, the relevant literature has not yet offered any  ways  to  transcend  the  obvious  tension  between  the  different  theoretical  ap‐proaches  to  party  organisation.  Therefore  this  thesis  will  develop  an  analytical framework, which, based on the central ideas of historical institutionalism, acknow‐ledges the explanatory power of both structures and agency. In particular, it will be argued  that,  although structural  contexts  favour certain strategies over others,  ac‐tors  are  able  to  develop  divergent  strategic  responses  to  the  opportunities  pre‐sented by a particular context. In other words, although political parties within the same environment will tend to exhibit certain regularities in their organisation, the 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outcome of any given decision on how to organise a party is unpredictable, since ac‐tors  are  always  able  to  choose  alternative  courses  of  action.  As  a  result,  because there can be more  than one strategy  to respond to a particular context,  the devel‐opment of political parties is best seen as a constant conflict between different party internal groupings, all offering different organisational strategies.   The framework will then be applied to study the organisation of political parties in  the newer democracies of South Korea, Taiwan,  the Philippines and  Indonesia.1 The  selection  of  cases  was motivated  by  the  fact  that  –  in  contrast  to  other  geo‐graphical  regions hit  by  the  “third wave” of democratisation2  – political parties  in East Asia have not yet been the subject of any systematic analysis. While the study will  thus  contribute  to  our  understanding  of  party  formation  and  change  in  East Asia, we hope that the analytical framework itself will prove useful as a general tool for party scholars with very different geographical areas of expertise. Most notably, we hope that the analytical framework will make a contribution to study of Western European parties, which still forms the basis for most existing theories of party or‐ganisation. In order  to achieve these objectives  the study will be structured  into  two main parts. The first half will be devoted to the development of the analytical framework. 
                                                1 The terms ‘South Korea’ and ‘Korea’ will be used interchangeably throughout the text. 2 Huntington (1991) distinguishes between three historic waves of democratisation, which were separated by two reverse waves of authoritarian setback. The “first wave” (1828‐1926) had its origin in the American and French revolutions and slowly weakened after the coming into power of Mus‐solini in Italy. With the end of the Second World War the “second wave” (1943‐62) was initiated by the victory of the allied forces, but it came to an early end when military coups in Latin America brought down a number of democratically elected governments. Finally, the third and last “wave” has been set off by the fall of the Portuguese right‐wing dictatorship in 1974. 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This,  first  of  all,  requires  reviewing  the  existing  literature  on  party  organisation along  the  structure‐agency  divide,  which  will  show  that  the  strengths  of  one  ap‐proach are the weakness of another approach and vice versa. Having established the need for a more integrative perspective on party organisation, we will then use the dialectical  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  structures  and  agency  sug‐gested by historical institutionalism to integrate existing theories of party organisa‐tion from different levels of analysis into a single model. This will be followed by a methodology  chapter,  in  which,  most  importantly,  we  put  forward  a  new way  to conceptualise party organisation, since existing typologies are too closely connected to structuralist theories of party formation and change. The analytical  framework developed in this  first section will  then be applied to political parties in the newer democracies of East Asia. In each country chapter we will outline  the main properties of  the particular context, discuss how political ac‐tors  develop  different  electoral  strategies  within  this  context  and  finally  demon‐strate how these strategies translate  into party organisation. As will be shown, we are not witnessing the emergence of particular type of party organisation across all countries or within single polities – as structuralist  theories would want us  to be‐lieve – nor are we confronted with a confusing multiplicity of different types of party organisation, as the agent‐centred theories would expect. Rather, the organisation of political  parties  in  East  Asia  is  the  product  of  strategic  decisions made  by  know‐ledgeable and reflexive actors within a context that  favours certain strategies over others. 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The development of political parties in Western Europe  Existing theories of party organisation can be grouped into two strands, depending on whether  they attribute more  importance  to  structures or  agents. However,  the theorisation on party organisation not only suffers from a divide between structural and voluntarist approaches, but also from a geographical and cultural bias. Most, if not almost all theories of party organisational change and adaptation have been de‐veloped  in  the  context  of  the  established  democracies  in Western  Europe. With  a few exceptions, the study of political parties in newly democratising polities in other parts  of  the world has not  generated new  theoretical  insights. Rather,  analyses  of party organisation  in the “third wave” of democracy tend to employ existing party models. Hence, before outlining the different theories that have been offered to ac‐count  for  the organisational  formation and adaptation of political parties,  it  seems necessary  to  briefly  summarise  the  historical  development  of  political  parties  in Western Europe, which serves as the empirical underpinning of these theories. Of the many typologies of political parties (see Krouwel 2006), the historical nar‐rative will follow the classification by Katz and Mair (1995), which has proven to be the most influential. One central characteristic of this classification is that each party type takes a previously existing one as reference point. Hence, the historical narra‐tive would be  incomplete  if  it did not  include  the  factors  that  caused  the develop‐ment  of  an  existing  type  into  a  new  type.  Obviously,  these  factors will  reflect  the specific structuralist approach associated with the writings of Katz and Mair, which 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will  be  critically  assessed  later  in  this  chapter.  At  the moment,  however,  this  ap‐proach  serves  as  a  heuristic  device  to  paint  a  coherent  picture  of  party  organisa‐tional development in Western Europe. The general trajectory of party organisational development in the industrialised democracies of the West has frequently been described as in decline. Several schol‐ars  argue  that political  parties have  lost many of  their  core  functions  to other or‐ganisations of interest representation and hence portray political parties in a severe crisis from which they will almost certainly never recover.3 The main problem with this gloomy picture is that it is based on the idea of parties as unitary actors. If we instead distinguish three different elements – or faces – of party organisation, it be‐comes clear  that only  the  “party on  the ground” has become  less  important, while the “party in central office” and particularly the “party in public office” have in fact been strengthened (Mair 1994; Katz and Mair 2002; see also Webb 2002). The trend in  party  development  in  Western  Europe  should  therefore  not  be  interpreted  as general decline, but more accurately as organisational change and adaptation (Bar‐tolini and Mair 2001). Hence, it makes sense to describe the historical development of Western parties  along  the  changing power  relations between  the  three  faces of party organisation. Moreover,  as our analytical  framework will  be  centred around party  internal  power  relations  as  the  central mechanism  to  explain political  party 
                                                3 Arguments presented in order to support the thesis of “party decline” differ markedly in their level of generalisation. Whereas some authors interpret the weaker role of parties in the political process as a universal trend (for example Schmitter 1999), others insist on a more nation‐specific approach (for example Reiter 1989; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995). 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development, this historical discussion will serve as an important reference point to integrate our findings into the existing literature on party organisation.  Broadly  speaking,  the party on  the ground  refers  to  the membership organisa‐tion of a party. Members can be distinguished from the general electorate as to the obligations and privileges that they have been assigned by the party (Heidar 2006: 301).  The  party  in  central  office,  on  the  other  hand,  is more  difficult  to  define.  In very simple terms it can be described as the national headquarters of the party con‐sisting of  two different groups:  (1)  the party  leadership and (2)  the party bureau‐cracy (Katz 2002: 98). Finally, the party in public office is self‐explanatory, encom‐passing those party members who hold office as members of parliament or cabinet ministers. Although  they have never been  clearly  stated,  a number of different  indicators can be drawn from the literature that scholars have used to measure the power rela‐tions between the  three  faces of party organisation. Certainly,  the most  frequently analysed indicator is the size of party membership. In fact, the arguments of the ad‐vocates of the “party decline” thesis are mostly built upon the decreasing number of members in West European parties during the past decades. Another indicator used to determine the distribution of power within political parties is intra‐party democ‐racy. The procedures used to elect the party leadership and to nominate candidates for  public  elections  are  a  valuable  gauge  to draw a  general  power‐map of  a  party (Katz 2001). Finally, the distribution of resources relevant to electoral competition 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is also employed  to uncover  the party‐internal balance of power  (Katz 1996). The most important resources include money, staff, and access to media.  According to these  indicators,  the dominant organisational  face of the first par‐ties to emerge in proto‐democratic Europe in the 18th and 19th century was almost certainly  the  party  in  public  office.  Although  it  is  questionable  whether  one  can really talk of a dominant  face, since, as a matter of  fact, what has been termed the “cadre  party”  (Duverger  1964)  or  the  “party  of  individual  representation”  (Neu‐mann 1956) was nothing more than a loose alliance of notables with the aim of get‐ting their candidates elected into parliament. An extra‐parliamentary party was vir‐tually non‐existent, and the party in public office thus tended to be the only group in the party that had “the need or the opportunity to make collective decisions” (Katz and Mair 2002: 115‐116).  The cadre party was not based on an enduring local membership organisation, but if the party required people to help in mobilising votes it would primarily rely on  the  personal  networks  of  friends  and  clients  of  its members. Membership was restricted to those with independent and personal access to politically relevant re‐sources. In the words of Duverger (1964: 64), adherence to the cadre‐party type is   a completely personal act, based upon the aptitudes or the peculiar circumstances  of  a  man;  it  is  determined  strictly  by  individual qualities. It is an act that is restricted to a few: it is dependent upon rigid  and  exclusive  selection.  If  we  define  a  member  as  one  who 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signs an undertaking to the party and thereafter regularly pays his subscription, then cadre parties have no members.  The only function of the small elitist circle of party “members” was to nominate can‐didates for election. In‐between elections these local alliances of notables would be dormant,  leaving  the  party’s  representatives  in  parliament  with  an  absolute  free mandate and in every respect responsible only to their own consciences (Neumann 1956: 404). The selection of candidates was a highly informal process, with the pat‐rons usually nominating one of themselves (Katz 2001: 283). Taking all this in mind, it is not difficult to understand why the cadre party had no  need  for  a  strong  party  in  central  office.  Since  the  individual  members  could themselves  provide  the  resources  necessary  for  electoral  success  (i.e. money  and votes), they were not dependent on central resources, and therefore felt no need to defer to a central authority (Katz and Mair 2002: 115). The crucial  context  for  the emergence of  the elitist  cadre party was  the régime 
censitaire with  its  restrictive  suffrage  requirements  linked  to wealth and property (Daalder 2001: 42). As the number of people who could meet these requirements in the early stages of the process of industrialisation was relatively small, political par‐ties only had  to mobilise a  small number of  votes  in order  to get  their  candidates elected. This did not require highly sophisticated electoral campaigns, but sufficient votes  could  simply  be  secured  through personal  contacts  held  by  the  party mem‐
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bers. In other words, the personal influence of the members in public office made an extra‐parliamentary organisation redundant. This  all  changed when  restrictions  on working‐class  organisation,  which were increasingly seen to be incompatible with liberal  ideas, became more relaxed, thus allowing social groups locked out of the political decision‐making process to organ‐ise their own parties “outside” parliament. As these groups lacked the resources of the ruling elite parties, they tried to attract as many members as possible, thereby substituting  individual  quality  with  quantity  (Duverger  1964:  23).  Members  not only provided a source of income for the party by having to pay regular membership dues, but they also contributed free labour both during and between election cam‐paigns. Moreover, since the “mass party” – alternatively “party of social integration” (Neumann 1956) – usually represented a particular and clearly defined social or re‐ligious  segment  of  society,  thus  embodying  an  ideological  vision of  a  better  social order,  members  represented  a  valuable  basis  for  spreading  that  ideology  (Ware 1996: 66). In return for their contributions, the mass party gave members a say in internal matters, such as the election of leaders, the nomination of candidates for public elec‐tions, and the formulation of policy goals. Decision‐making was organised in a hier‐archical system of delegation, with the lower levels electing representatives on the next higher level. The idea behind this was that the party leadership and the mem‐bers  of  the  party  in  public  office  should  act  as  agents  of  the masses.  At  the  same time,  the  party  tried  to  insulate  its  members  from  counter‐ideologies  through 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propaganda, party press, and party‐organised activities in all spheres of life from the cradle  to  the grave (Neumann 1956: 405). Like  the participatory rights granted  to members,  these activities,  such as sport clubs,  reading groups et cetera, also  func‐tioned as incentives for people outside the party to enlist as a member. All  this,  the  administration  of  the  membership  registry,  the  collection  of membership  dues,  the  management  of  voluntary  work,  the  publication  of  party newspapers, and the supervision of ancillary organisations created the necessity for a  strong party  central  office  staffed by  full‐time professionals. However,  given  the symbiotic relationship between the party on the ground and the party in central of‐fice – the former supplying the party with the resources necessary for  its survival, while  the  latter  provides  central  co‐ordination  –  it  is  difficult  to  determine  the dominant  organisational  face  of  the  mass  party  (Katz  and  Mair  2002:  117).  The party  in  public  office,  on  the  other  hand,  was  clearly  subordinate  to  the  extra‐parliamentary organisation. With  progressing  industrialisation,  which  meant  that  more  and  more  people were able to meet the requirements of the régime censitaire, and the increasing elec‐toral success of socialist and denominational parties, the classic cadre parties were forced to mobilise votes beyond their traditional constituencies in the upper socio‐economic strata of society. This made it necessary to emulate the mass party as an organisational  type,  and  to  open membership  to  the wider  electorate. As  a  conse‐quence,  a  stronger  central  organisation  became  indispensable,  which  would  co‐ordinate campaign activities and administer the growing party on the ground (von 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Beyme 1985: 161). The prototype  for a permanent central party organisation was the much  cited  Birmingham  Caucus  of  the  British  Liberals,  established  by  Joseph Chamberlain in 1877.  However, as Katz and Mair (1995: 11‐12) argue, it was unappealing to the lead‐ers of the cadre party to copy the mass party model in every respect. First of all, or‐ganisationally encapsulating clearly defined segments of society seemed ineffective, since the groups that would have been left to them were permanent minorities (for example farmers, industrialists). Secondly, the idea that the extra‐parliamentary or‐ganisation ought to be dominant went against the interests of those already estab‐lished in government. And finally, as the parties of the upper and middle classes, and as the parties in government, they were not so dependent on the material resources provided by party members. Consequently,    the  leaders of  the traditional parties tended to establish orga‐nizations that  looked  like mass parties  in  form (regular mem‐bers,  branches,  a party  congress,  a party press),  but which  in practice often continued to emphasize the independence of the parliamentary party.  (Katz and Mair 1995: 12)  In doing so, they created a new organisational form, which the mass parties would then feel pressured to imitate from the 1950s on: the “catch‐all party” (Kirchheimer 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1964)  or  “electoral‐professional  party” model  (Panebianco  1988).  Although  these parties were still based on large membership organisations, the role of party mem‐bers  was  downgraded  considerably.  This  showed  primarily  in  three  ways  (see Krouwel  2003:  28).  First  of  all,  one  could  observe  stagnation  in  the  size  of  party memberships. In addition,  instead of being limited to a specific segment of society, the social profile of party membership became more balanced. And last but not least, parties offered far fewer opportunities for membership activity, as they closed down many of the ancillary organisations.  Simultaneously,  the  party  in  public  office  witnessed  a  significant  increase  in power – vis‐à‐vis both the party on the ground and the party in central office. Hav‐ing  gained  a  taste  of  office,  the  parliamentary  leaders  of  the mass  party  naturally wanted to get re‐elected, and hence developed an interest in broadening their elec‐toral appeal beyond their original class gardée (Mair 1997: 102). However, in order to be able to pursue a catch‐all strategy, the party in public office needed to free it‐self from the control of the party on the ground. In achieving this, the party in public office profited from two developments. Firstly, technological innovations in systems of mass communication revolutionised electoral  campaigning. Parties put  less em‐phasis on labour‐intensive campaigns stressing individual contact with voters at the local level, but campaigns became more standardised at the national level, as televi‐sion brought politicians  closer  to  the people  (Farrell 1996).  Secondly,  through  the introduction  of  public  subsidies  for  political  parties  the  party  in  public  office  ob‐tained its own source of  income (Katz 1996: 121). Taken together,  this meant that 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the party in public office became less dependent on the resources provided by party members – free labour and money. The balance of power within the catch‐all party can be described as a conflict be‐tween the party on the ground and the party in public office that was played out in the party in central office (Katz and Mair 2002: 122). Broadly speaking, the conflict revolved around  the question of whether  the party  in  central  office  should be  the agent of the party on the ground in controlling the party  in public office, or rather the agent of the party in public office in organising and directing their supporters in the party on the ground. Eventually, the party in public office won the struggle for party‐internal power, because  the  trends mentioned above have become even more apparent. More and more people now make use of new communication  technologies  in  their everyday lives, and the  level of state subventions  for political parties has steadily  increased. The resulting dominance of the party in public office with respect to the other faces of party organisation led Katz and Mair (1995) to diagnose the emergence of a new party type, the “cartel party”, which is believed to be the dominant party organisa‐tional form in contemporary Western Europe.  The cartel‐party thesis claims that established political parties seek to monopo‐lise the access to political power by limiting the intensity of inter‐party competition through informal agreements. They create an oligopolistic cartel within which they allocate state resources to themselves, giving them a significant electoral advantage in relation to outside challengers. Clearly, this also has a large impact on the distri‐
POLITICAL PARTY ORGANISATION IN EAST ASIA    
 – 15 – 
   
bution  of  resources within  the  parties  themselves,  as  it  is  principally  the  party  in public office that negotiates the terms of the party cartel. Not only does the party in public office tend to be the prime beneficiary of state subventions, but, in addition, it heavily profits  from the growing number of publicly  funded staff  in parliamentary offices (Katz and Mair 2002: 123). Together, these crucial organisational resources ensure  the  party  in  public  office  a  more  or  less  undisputed  position  of  privilege within the party organisation. Given the increasing self‐sufficiency of the party in public office, party members have become much less important for electoral success. This  is reflected in the de‐clining  levels  of  party membership  that  can  be  observed  throughout Western  Eu‐rope (Mair and van Biezen 2001). The party elite in parliament increasingly seems to perceive party members as a disadvantage rather than an asset, and political par‐ties  seem much  less  interested  in  recruiting  new members.  At  the  same  time,  the remaining membership  has  been  atomised,  meaning  that members  exercise  their participatory  rights  as  individuals  rather  than  through  delegates  (Katz  and  Mair 1995: 21). This becomes particularly apparent in the methods used to select candi‐dates for public elections, where more and more parties are following the principle of  “one member,  one  vote”.  The  causal mechanism  identified  behind  this  trend  is again the desire of the party in public office to maintain electoral success. In order to enjoy  the  necessary  autonomy  to  pursue  aggressive  electioneering,  party  leaders give each member an individual vote, thereby leaving no power to the intermediary party  structures,  which  are  usually  crowded  with  the  most  ideologically  radical 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members (Katz 2001; Scarrow, Webb and Farrell 2000). In fact, many parties have opened  their  processes  of  candidate  selection  to  the  general  electorate,  thereby making a distinction between members and non‐members difficult.  
TABLE 1:  THE ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN 
EUROPE    Cadre party  Mass party  Catch­all party  Cartel party 



















   
The  organisational  development  of  political  parties  in Western  Europe  is  summa‐rised in Table 1. It was important to outline the historical trajectory of party organi‐sations in the established democracies because the great majority of theories to ex‐plain  different  types  of  party  organisation  have  been  developed  in  this  particular empirical  context.  However,  as  the  next  section will  show,  the  history  of  political parties in Western Europe is much more complex than the above table suggests and full of cases that existing theories fail to account for. This failure results from the fact that existing theories pay too much attention to either structures or agency, without acknowledging the dialectical relationship between the two. In short, the historical development of political parties in Western Europe just outlined will help us, first of all, highlight the weaknesses of existing approaches towards party organisation and, secondly, demonstrate how the analytical framework developed here can contribute to our understanding not only of political party formation and adaptation in newer democracies but also political party development in Western Europe.   
Structuralist approaches to party organisation  Theories that emphasise structural factors in order to account for different forms of party  organisation  have  been  arranged  into  three  distinctive  groups  (van  Biezen 2005; see also Bartolini and Mair 2001: 328‐330). These can be distinguished on the 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basis of how much importance they attribute to external or internal factors respec‐tively. While the “life‐cycle” approach conceives party formation and adaptation as an endogenous process of maturation that will always unfold  in  the same way, re‐gardless of the context around the party, the “period effect” approach – used above to outline the historical development of Western European parties – argues that the organisational structures implemented by parties will, in contrast, tend to reflect the environmental circumstances  in which these parties compete. Finally,  the “genera‐tion effect” approach maintains that the type of party organisation is very likely to be indicative of the contextual factors that formed the setting for the party’s initial formation. In other words, the formation of a political party will be determined by external structural factors, whereas the further development will be constrained by the internal party structures originally adopted.     
The “life‐cycle” approach 




   
a small number of leaders. This is summarised in his famous dictum: “Who says or‐ganization, says oligarchy” (Michels 1962: 365). The  causal  mechanism  underlying  Michels’  argument  involves  two  different stages. First of all, Michels establishes the necessity of leadership in large organisa‐tions,  arguing  that  beyond  a  certain  size  technical  specialisation  and  a  division  of labour become indispensable. This will force the party to replace direct democracy by a system of delegation, which, in turn, will give rise to a distinction between lead‐ers and followers. Although this first step in the argumentation seems almost banal, it nevertheless forms the crucial basis for the second stage in Michels’ line of reason‐ing, when he contends that this newly emerged leadership will necessarily become oligarchic. Michels offers two different sets of factors that will encourage leaders to act oli‐garchically. To begin with, exercising power has a number of psychological effects on those in leadership positions, since, according to Michels, the desire to dominate is inherent to human nature. It follows from this that   […] every human power seeks to enlarge  its prerogatives. He who has acquired power will almost always endeavour to consolidate it and  to  extend  it,  to multiply  the  ramparts which  defend  his  posi‐tion, and to withdraw himself from the control of the masses. (ibid.: 206) 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Moreover, leaders will seek oligarchical control of the party, because of the material benefits  attached  to  their  status  within  the  party  organisation.  These  would  de‐crease in value if they had to share them with a larger group of people. After having answered the question of why party leaders would try to centralise power within their elitist circle, Michels goes on to explain how this is achieved. The principal cause he identifies in this regard is the mere technical indispensability of leadership:   The  technical  specialisation  that  inevitably  results  from  all  exten‐sive  organisation  renders  necessary what  is  called  expert  leader‐ship.  Consequently  the  power  of  determination  comes  to  be  con‐sidered one of the specific attributes of leadership, and is gradually withdrawn from the masses to be concentrated in the hands of the leaders  alone.  Thus  the  leaders,  who  were  at  first  no  more  than executive organs of the collective will, soon emancipate themselves from the masses and become independent of its control.  (ibid.: 70)  In other words, as the party organisation becomes more sophisticated, so will lead‐ers become more expert  in running  the organisation. This will make  it hard  to re‐place  them, which,  in  turn, makes  leaders  feel more secure and  less  responsive  to rank‐and‐file influence: The leaders’ monopoly of expertise in many areas will mean 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that ordinary party members have to depend on their judgement, exposing them to the leaders’ control. Tools used by the party leadership to maintain control over the party  on  the  ground  include  the manipulation  of  party  finances,  control  over  the party press, and particularly the “tactic of resignation”.  While Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy”  is without doubt the most prominent ex‐ample  of  the  life‐cycle  approach,  other  authors  also  perceive  the  development  of party organisations as a single common trajectory that all parties will be forced to follow. One example is the study of parties in Norway and Denmark by Harmel and Svåsand (1993), in which it is argued that the “entrepreneurial issues parties” found in  these  two  countries did  all  go  through  the  same  three phases of  organisational progression. Each stage,  the authors argue, required particular  types of  leadership skills to deal with its special challenges. During the first phase, building a party or‐ganisation  is  less  vital,  but  the  emphasis  is  on developing a message and drawing attention  to  the  party.  This  will  be  more  successful  to  the  extent  that  the  leader draws attention to him‐ or herself. In the second phase, on the other hand, establish‐ing routinised procedures and developing an electoral apparatus will enjoy highest priority. Hence, the leader first and foremost requires organisational skills. Finally, during the third phase the primary focus is on solidifying a reputation as a reliable partner  in  government,  which  calls  for  a  “moderator”  and  “stabiliser”  as  party leader. What this approach has in common with Michel’s thesis is that they both explain different types of party organisations with different stages in a party’s life. Similar to 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living  organisms,  proponents  of  the  life‐cycle  approach  argue,  political  parties  go through  a  process  of  maturation,  and  their  organisational  structures  will  reflect their  current  developmental  stage.  In  other words,  just  as  a  human  being  experi‐ences  different  phases  of  physical  development  (baby,  child,  adolescent,  adult), which are all associated with particular changes in the body, a political party is per‐ceived to grow up along a universal path that can be divided into different segments. Hence,  all  parties  on  the  same  stage  of  development will  be  characterised  by  the same  type of organisation. This means  that  if  two parties  are established  simulta‐neously in very different contexts, totally isolated from each other, they will display very similar organisations, simply because they are both “new”. Moreover, they are then predicted to run through the same phase of maturation, eventually both reach‐ing the final stage of organisational maturity. Unlike living organisms, however, po‐litical parties are not perceived as having a maximum life expectancy. Accordingly, we  should  expect political  parties  in  young democracies  to  follow the same trajectory as parties in Western Europe did, developing from cadre parties to mass parties, and subsequently adopting the catch‐all party type, followed by the cartel‐party  type.  However,  while  such  a  scenario  can  probably  be  dismissed  on mere empirical evidence (cf. van Biezen 2005: 153), this should not lead us to disre‐gard  the  life‐cycle  approach  completely.  In  fact,  speculations  about  more  general trends  in  the development of party organisations,  such as oligarchic  tendencies  in internal  decision‐making,  are  much  less  easy  to  falsify.  It  does  indeed  require  a 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much more abstract argument to tear down the deterministic theories developed by Michels and his disciples. Certainly  the main weakness of  the  life‐cycle approach  is  its  general neglect of party actors and their interests. Picturing party organisational formation and adap‐tation as a process of maturation  similar  to  those of  any  life  form denies  the  sub‐stantial  differences  between  the  natural  and  the  social  world.  Unlike  the  entities studied by natural scientists, social actors do not always react in the same manner to a specific stimulus. Rather, the objects of analysis in social science are capable of learning and acting differently under the same conditions. This can be exemplified by looking at the development of Green parties in West‐ern Europe, which instituted highly transparent and inclusive structures of decision‐making. In fact, it could be argued that – knowing about Michels’ iron law of oligar‐chy – these parties deliberately tried to counter the oligarchical tendencies found in established political parties (cf. Kitschelt 1988). For instance, in the case of the Ger‐man Greens (Die Grünen), which is probably the best documented example, the or‐ganisational philosophy of Basisdemokratie was clearly aimed at preventing the de‐velopment of a professional party  leadership that would then become increasingly indispensable and thus difficult to control (Poguntke 1993: 138). Several rules were implemented  to  put  this  democratic  ideal  in  practice.  To  begin  with,  the  original party charter provided  for a system of midterm rotation of parliamentary seats  to those  lower  in  the  party  list.  Moreover,  it  embraced  the  idea  of  the  “imperative mandate”,  which  ruled  that  deputies  who  deviated  from  the  policy  resolutions 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passed by the party assembly could be removed from office. Regarding the party in central  office,  it was  decided  that  party  posts  should  not  be  salaried, while  party leadership tenure and re‐eligibility were limited.  In short, contrary to Michels’ iron law, many grassroots members in Green par‐ties deeply distrust  leadership, and do not follow them blindly. And although most Green  parties  have,  since  their  formation,  crafted  considerable  organisational  re‐forms  that  abolished  several  of  the  sacred  “new  politics”  principles  of  intra‐party democracy,  there  is widespread  consensus  among  scholars  that Green parties  are still far away from conventional parties in terms of their organisation (for example Rihoux  2006;  Burchell  2001).  Put  differently,  the  oligarchical  trends  in  Western European Green parties are much weaker than the  life‐cycle approach wants us to believe. Hence, Michels  is wrong when he says  that  “historical evolution mocks all the prophylactic measures that have been adopted for the prevention of oligarchy” (1962: 368). Rather, anticipating the oligarchical tendencies of organisations, actors are not restricted to sitting back and watching the process of maturation unfold, but they can indeed consciously work against these tendencies. Moreover,  the  life‐cycle approach does not only deny any role  to agents within the party, but  it also  ignores  the environment around the party. Even  if we accept the idea that party formation and adaptation can be understood as an endogenous process  of  maturation,  we  need  to  make  certain  assumptions  about  the  external conditions  (cf. Harmel 2002: 121).  Similar  to  any  living organism, political parties need a certain input from the environment in order to move on to the next stage of 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their  organisational  development.  In  other words,  progress  in  the  life‐cycle  is  not only dependent upon  internal dynamics,  but  these dynamics,  in  turn,  are  the pro‐duct of external factors. Similarly, the speed of party organisational change will also be determined by the environment surrounding the party. Having  outlined  the weaknesses,  it  is  necessary  to  point  out  that  the  life‐cycle approach also has  its  strengths.  In  fact, what  it does,  it  stresses  the  importance of internal factors in order to understand different forms of party organisation. In par‐ticular, the possible effects of party size have in the past motivated much research. For instance, Tan (1998), disintegrating Michels’ iron law of oligarchy into measur‐able  variables,  tests  the  impact  the  number  of  party members  has  on  intra‐party participation and the distribution of power within party organisations. His findings only partly support Michels’ hypotheses. While, on the one hand, large membership decreases meaningful  participation  by  party members  and  encourages  free‐riding behaviour, organisational  complexity  (resulting  from  large membership  size) does not necessarily  result  in a  centralisation of power at  the  top of  the hierarchy. The first relationship has been confirmed in a more recent study by Weldon (2006). Re‐garding  the  second  relationship,  Lundell  (2004)  comes  to  a  conflicting  conclusion when he identifies a correlation between party size and the procedure of candidate selection  for public elections: The  larger  the party,  the more centralised  the selec‐tion of candidates will tend to be. To sum up, similar to the ageing of living organisms, the life‐cycle approach per‐ceives party organisational formation and adaptation as a uni‐directional process of 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maturation.  In doing so,  it  totally denies any explanatory power to agency and the external environment around the party. However,  the  life‐cycle approach deserves to be acclaimed for drawing our attention to the possible impact of internal factors when explaining different forms of party organisation.   
The “period effect” approach 
 While  the  life‐cycle  approach  focuses  exclusively  on  endogenous  dynamics  to  ac‐count  for  different  forms of  party  organisation,  the  “period  effect”  approach  gives sole  attention  to  the  external  environment.  Particular  types  of  party  organisation are said to derive from competition with other parties, which all have to participate in  democratic  elections  under  the  same  external  circumstances.  The  basic  thesis claims that if a party is going to compete successfully with other parties, it needs to look and act like them. However, advocates of this approach are still undecided on which  level of analysis matters most  in explaining party organisational  structures. One  group  –  nowadays particularly  associated with  the writings  of Katz  and Mair (1995)  –  argues  that  political  parties  are  converging  towards  a  common  type  of party organisation, since they likewise have to respond to universal trends that are observable in all modern democracies. Others, on the other hand, claim that parties 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are diverging as to their organisation, thus stressing explanatory factors on the do‐mestic level (for example Detterbeck 2005; Gallagher 1988a). The  first  argument  goes back  to  the much  cited debate between Duverger  and Epstein revolving around  the question of which organisational  structure would be most  likely to dominate democratic politics after the Second World War. Duverger (1964)  argued  that  the  mass  party,  with  its  large  membership  and  its  extensive network of  local branches, was  superior  to  the  cadre party,  as  it provided a more effective apparatus to secure large quantities of resources needed for electoral com‐petition.  Consequently,  there  would  be  a  “contagion  from  the  left”,  meaning  that other parties would feel forced to copy the organisational form of socialist parties in order to attain a higher level of competitiveness. In contrast, Epstein (1980) claimed that American‐style parties, which shared many similarities with the classical cadre party in proto‐democratic Europe, were much more suited to cope with the challen‐ges of modern  election  campaigns.  Epstein maintained  that  the  large membership organisation  and  the  encapsulation  of  specific  social  groups would  cost  the mass party  the necessary  flexibility  to  react  to  social  changes  in  the  electorate. He  thus suggested party  leaders  cut down on party members,  and  instead mobilise  voters directly  through mass media.  Only  then would  the mass  parties  be  able  to  retain their competitiveness. In other words, Epstein did not expect a “contagion from the left” to characterise the development of party systems in Western democracies, but rather a “contagion from the right”. 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Scholars  who  accept  that  the  cartel  party  is  now  the  dominant  organisational type in Western Europe, would argue that neither Duverger nor Epstein were right in  their  predictions.  As  has  already  been  outlined  further  above,  both  the  “leftist” mass party and  the  “rightist” cadre party  felt  compelled  to craft organisational  re‐forms that led to the emergence of a new common form of party organisation. While the  leaders of  the cadre party established organised membership branches similar to those of the mass party, without giving up the independence that they previously had enjoyed, the leaders of the mass party made organisational choices that would limit  the  influence  of  the  party  on  the  ground, without  completely  abolishing  the membership organisation (Katz and Mair 2002: 120‐121). Factors  that  facilitate  the  rise  of  the  party  in  public  office  as  the  dominant  or‐ganisational  face of a party, advocates of the cartel‐party thesis argue, are broader historical developments that affect all democracies in the same way. As social identi‐ties are weakening due to the general improvement of living standards, the expan‐sion of the welfare state and better education, voters are increasingly conceived as free  floating.  An  encapsulation  of  the  electorate  through  grassroots  organisations has therefore become largely inefficient. Rather, the most promising electoral strat‐egy is to make a catch‐all appeal to the wider electorate. Pursuing such a strategy is now  possible  because  party  leaders  have  become  largely  independent  from  con‐straining opinions expressed by the party on the ground. As a result of the techno‐logical  progress  in  the  field  of mass  communication  and  the  availability  of  public funding for political parties, party members no longer enjoy the same powerful posi‐
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tion within the party organisation as they did during the era of the mass party. Party leaders can now address voters directly via television or the internet, without hav‐ing  to  rely  on  door‐to‐door  canvassing  or  leafleting  carried  out  by  unpaid  party members. In addition, subsidies paid by the state mean that membership dues have become a much less important source of income.  In order to explain why the cartel party nevertheless still maintains a member‐ship organised into local branches, a number of enduring benefits have been identi‐fied  from the party  leadership’s perspective. While voluntary  labour and member‐ship dues have not  lost all  their value as organisational  resources,  in  recent  times other functions of party members are perceived to have become relatively more im‐portant for electoral success (see Katz 1990; Scarrow 1996: 42‐45). To start with, a large membership organisation gives voters the impression that the party is popular and strongly  rooted  in  society. Moreover, members  themselves are assumed  to be most loyal voters in elections, and through their everyday contacts they may advise other people how  to vote.  In addition, members provide a  channel of  communica‐tion, which keeps  the party  leadership  in  touch with popular opinion. And  finally, the party membership can be used as a recruitment pool for future political leaders. To put it briefly, advocates of the cartel‐party thesis argue that despite the decreas‐ing importance of volunteer work and financial contributions by members, political parties still regard a membership organisation as an advantage in the electoral con‐test. 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In  order  to  attract members,  contemporary  parties  –  similar  to  the  traditional mass party – grant their members rights of democratic participation. However, un‐like leftist parties in the early 20th century, the cartel party does not organise inter‐nal decision‐making  in a hierarchical system of delegation, but decisions are made by vote of the full membership. This highly inclusive organisation of party internal democracy assures the party leadership the necessary freedom of action to pursue aggressive electoral strategies, since, due to their often disaggregated nature, grass‐roots  party members  are not  very  likely  to mount  a  serious  challenge  against  the positions adopted at the top.  All  parties,  the  cartel‐party  thesis  goes,  will  display  the  organisational  trends just  outlined:  Party  membership  will  decrease  in  size  –  without  vanishing  com‐pletely, intra‐party democracy will become increasingly inclusive, and resources will more and more be provided by  the state. Altogether,  these  trends will give rise  to party  in public office as  the dominant organisational  face of any party. Concerning the development of political  parties  in  young democracies, we  should  then expect parties to make an “evolutionary leap” (Smith 1993) over previous stages of organi‐sational development, and to converge towards the cartel party type. In fact, this is the scenario numerous studies suggest (for example Puhle 2001; Olson 1998). The argument  is  that  political  parties  in  young  democracies  compete within  the  same environment as parties in contemporary Western Europe: Stable political identities have  only  developed weakly,  state  funding  for  political  parties  has  been  available 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instantly, and party leaders can communicate their messages directly to the elector‐ate through mass media.   However, based on contradicting empirical evidence from both Western Europe and new democracies, the perception of party development as a more or less simul‐taneous transformation of all party systems during particular periods in history has come  under  heavy  criticism.  Rather,  a  second  group  within  the  period‐effect  ap‐proach argues, factors capable of explaining different types of party organisation are to  be  found  on  a  lower  level  of  analysis  than  universal  trends  and  developments. Consequently, we should not expect all political parties to converge towards a com‐mon organisational type. For instance, von Beyme (2000: 202) claims that the catch‐all party never emerged in the Anglo‐Saxon and Scandinavian democracies. Factors identified by other scholars as having a determining effect on whether parties will adopt the cartel party model include political institutions (Detterbeck 2002), politi‐cal  party  funding  laws  (Young 1998)  and  the  ideological  polarisation  of  the  party system (Yishai 2001).4  While most studies within the “period effect” refer to these established models of political  party  organisation,  there  is  also  a  small  number  of  studies  that  develop their own typologies to account for different forms of party organisation that can be found across modern democracies. One example  is Kitschelt’s (1995)  investigation of parties in post‐communist Eastern Europe, which distinguishes the “charismatic”, the  “clientelistic”  and  the  “programmatic  party”.  Although  this  typology  is mainly 
                                                4 See also Table 3 on page 54. 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based  on  the  criterion  of  how  parties mobilise  voters,  it  also makes  reference  to party organisation. Broadly speaking, both the programmatic party and the clientel‐istic party make high investments in organisational structures, whereas the charis‐matic party avoids high costs of organisation‐building. However, while the organisa‐tion of the programmatic party usually rests on abstract rules and regulations, clien‐telistic parties tend to be built on highly informal personal networks that ensure a constant flow of resources to the party following. Kitschelt lists several factors that help to predict which party type is likely to emerge within a new democracy. These include  the  type of  the pre‐democratic authoritarian regime,  the process of demo‐cratic  transition,  the  institutions  implemented  at  the  end  of  this  process,  and  the time passed  since  the  first  free  and  fair  elections. Moreover, Kitschelt  claims,  it  is also necessary to consider more historical  factors such as whether the country ex‐perienced  democratic  government  before  autocratic  rule  and  the  timing  of  ind‐ustrialisation. A  somewhat different method  that has been used  to  study differences  in party organisation is to focus only on certain elements rather than to apply a broad typol‐ogy. In particular, the selection of candidates for public office has received much at‐tention,  probably because  the degree  of  intra‐party democracy  is  seen  as  a  useful indicator for how well parties fulfil their function as intermediary institutions. Cor‐responding  to  the study of party organisation more generally,  the most significant variables that have been identified as having an impact on the procedure of candi‐date selection are the socio‐political context, the institutional setting, and the party 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system. Two basic causal mechanisms can be identified behind these variables. The first one is based on the notion of ideas: Political parties will open candidate selec‐tion  to broader participation,  if mass political  culture or  the party’s  own  ideology understands parties  as  an  important  institution  to promote democracy within  the wider society –  in other words,  if  intra‐party democracy  is perceived as an end  in itself  (Gallagher 1988a; 1988b). On  the other hand,  the second mechanism of cau‐sality is centred around more outcome‐oriented expectations towards political par‐ties.  Scholars  have  isolated  numerous  factors  that  will  allow  a  political  party  to justify a greater degree of leadership control over candidate selection. All these fac‐tors have in common that they are positively correlated with higher levels of uncer‐tainty as to political and electoral outcomes, and thus require political parties to en‐ter into agreements and coalitions, which, in turn, requires elite selection of candi‐dates  in  order  to  increase  party  discipline  and  enforce  the  necessary  inter‐party understandings. Factors that have been found to  increase the need for such agree‐ments  are pacted  transitions  (Field 2004),  strategically  complex  electoral  systems (Siavelis  2002;  Thiébault  1988),  parliamentarism  (as  opposed  to  presidentialism) (Gallagher 1988a; 1988b), and highly fragmented party systems (Field and Siavelis 2006). Conversely,  there are  factors  that will  force political parties  to  adopt more inclusive procedures of candidate selection. One such factor is inter‐party competi‐tion: If there is space for successful splinter parties, party leaders will be willing to delegate candidate selection to larger groups in order to increase the likelihood that resourceful contenders will stick to the party (Poiré 2003). 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In  sum,  the period‐effect  approach  sees different  party  organisations  as  a  pro‐duct  of  their  environment.  Parties  competing  under  the  same  conditions  are  ex‐pected to adopt the same organisational features. The underlying causal assumption is that under a certain set of contextual circumstances there is always a type of party organisation  that  will  yield  the  best  results.  Hence,  similar  to  Darwin’s  theory  of evolution, political parties are perceived to find themselves in a struggle for survival of the fittest, adjusting to the environment in order to be as competitive as their op‐ponents. Parties that do not follow the logic of competition will be punished by the electoral market. Although they might not share the same destiny as extinct species such as the dodo bird or the Tasmanian tiger, parties that refuse to adapt to the en‐vironment will eventually become politically  irrelevant. However, advocates of  the period‐effect  approach  do  not  agree  on which  environment  should  be  considered the most important. While one group argues that political parties all over the world are increasingly competing under the same circumstances of a modern society, thus converging  towards  the  cartel  party,  another  group  stresses  divergence  between party organisations, contending that the most  important explanatory variables can be found on the domestic level. Disregarding  their differences, both camps would probably dismiss  the view of party formation and adaptation as an evolutionary process as too harsh. In fact, they point out themselves that there are always exceptions to the general trend. For in‐stance, while Katz and Mair  (1995) admit  that  the cartelisation process  is uneven, with not every party adopting the organisational characteristics of the cartel party, 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Gallagher, studying candidate selection across industrialised democracies, observes some “residual variance” that contradicts what could theoretically be expected from the context (1988b: 265). However, proponents of the period‐effect approach do not seem to be aware of the wider theoretical implications of these exceptions. If the ex‐ternal environment fails to explain differences in the organisation of political parties competing within the same environment, we need to look for possible explanations at lower levels of analysis – either at the party level or even at the individual actor’s level.  Hence,  by  admitting  that  there  are  a  number  of  empirical  exceptions  to  the theoretical  assumptions,  the  period‐effect  approach  hints  at  its  own  weaknesses, namely the negligence of both internal and agential factors. The development of the Italian party system is an excellent example to illustrate this,  as  different  party models  have  always  existed  next  to  each  other within  the same environment (Bardi and Morlino 1994: 244). Up until its implosion in the early 1990s, the Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) was the only ma‐jor party that could organisationally be characterised as a catch‐all party. The other two main parties followed the model of the mass party: Both the Communist Party (Partito Communista Italiano, PCI) and to a lesser extent the Socialist Party (Partito 
Socialista  Italiano, PSI) were structured according  to Leninist principles of worker and peasant mobilisation. The mass‐party idea also reflected in the organisation of the neo‐fascist Social Movement Party (Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI), which had abandoned the traditional fascist militia model, but was based on a dense network of territorial branches. Although these parties went through considerable organisa‐
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tional change in the early 1990s, they have retained certain characteristic elements of  the  mass  party  (Bardi  and  Morlino  1994;  Pamini  1998).  Simultaneously,  new party  types  emerged,  such  as Berlusconi’s Forza  Italia  (Go  Italy!), which has been described as a “business firm party” (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999) with only rudimen‐tary organisational structures and an insignificant membership. The multiplicity of different party organisation that have coexisted in Italy at any given time hints at the explanatory power of factors which are largely ignored by the period‐effect approach. For instance, it has been suggested that “the maintenance of organisational structures has been easier  for parties with stronger  identities,  such as extreme or radical parties” (Morlino 2001: 135). This could be an indication that the goals and ideas of actors within the party play an important role in accounting for different types of organisation. Moreover, the combination of traditional organi‐sational  elements  of  the  mass  party  with  modern  electoral  communication  tech‐niques,  as  in  the  PCI‐reestablishment  Partito  Democractico  della  Sinistra  (Demo‐cratic Party of the Left, PDS) (see Giannetti and Mulé 2006: 471) – or Democratici di 
Sinistra (Democrats of the Left, DS) as it has been called since 1998 – suggests that party actors are not at the mercy of the environment, but they are able to develop diverging courses of action to react to new opportunities presented by the context. In addition to agential  factors,  it has also been claimed that  the organisational dif‐ferences between Italian parties can be explained by  internal dynamics. The many enduring characteristics of the typical mass party within the DS, Pamini (1998: 152) argues,  are due  to  the  strength of  the extra‐parliamentary party: Thus  far,  the de‐
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mands of the party leadership for a greater freedom of action in order to formulate an inter‐class electoral platform have been successfully restrained by the powerful position of the party on the ground. However, while the period‐effect  thus suffers  from a neglect of agential and  in‐ternal  factors,  it  highlights  the  importance  of  the  environment  around  parties  in order  to understand different  forms of party organisation – a variable  that has no place in the life‐cycle approach. As has already been argued above, internal dynam‐ics cannot be understood without taking into account contextual factors around the party. Moreover, it is impossible to see how party actors should make organisational decisions  without  paying  any  attention  to  the  opportunities  and  constraints  pro‐vided by  their  environment.  For  instance,  going back  to  the  above  example of  the Italian party system, it was impossible for the leaders of the traditional mass parties to ignore the technological progress in mass communication as well as the shrinking of  the social classes  they claimed to represent.  In other words, environmental  fac‐tors always have an important influence on the decisions made by party managers. In conclusion, the period‐effect approach understands party formation and adap‐tation as a process of evolution, with all parties having to adapt to the environment in  the  same way  in  order  to maintain  their  competitiveness.  Thereby our  focus  is drawn to external variables around the party. Yet, advocates of the period‐effect ap‐proach do not agree on the question of which environment should be considered the most important one. While one group argues that parties are increasingly competing under  the  same  conditions,  another  group  argues  that  domestic  factors  constitute 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the crucial environment  to explain different  forms of party organisation. Nonethe‐less,  as  both  approaches  ignore  internal  as  well  as  agential  variables  they  suffer from the same weaknesses.    
The “generation effect” approach  The  third  structuralist  approach  to party organisation, which  is  closely  associated with the writings of Panebianco (1988), can be labelled “generation effect”. It differs from  the  two  approaches  already discussed by  clearly  distinguishing  between  the phase of  formation and the subsequent phase of adaptation, stressing the explana‐tory power of either external factors or internal dynamics. Regarding the formation of a party,  the organisational configuration of a party  is believed to be determined by the environmental circumstances. The particular power pattern reflected in the organisation of  the party will  then drive  the  further development.  In other words, the capacity of a party to adapt to its environment will be heavily constrained by its internal dynamics. Although Panebianco is primarily interested in party institutionalisation, defined as  the  process  through which  an  organisation  “becomes  valuable  in  and  of  itself” (ibid.:  53), we  can  still  infer  important  theoretical  ideas  for  the  study of party or‐ganisations.  Essentially,  Panebianco  argues  that  different  levels  of  institutionalisa‐tion are due to how a party was formed, its “genetic model”: 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A party’s organizational characteristics depend more upon  its his‐tory,  i.e.  on  how  the  organization  originated  and  how  it  consoli‐dated,  than upon any other  factor. The  characteristics of  a party’s origin are in fact capable of exerting a weight on its organizational structure even decades later. Every organization bears the mark of its formation, of the crucial political‐administrative decisions made by its founders, the decisions which “molded” the organization.  (ibid.: 50)  The organisational decisions taken by the party’s founders, according to Panebianco, are the product of the founders’ interests and goals as well as the environmental fac‐tors surrounding the formation of the party:    During  the  organization’s  formative  phase,  the  leaders,  whether charismatic  or  not,  normally  play  a  crucial  role.  The  spell  out  the ideological aims of the future party, select the organization’s social base, its “hunting ground”, and shape the organization on the basis of  these aims and this social base –  taking  into account, of course, available  resources,  different  socio‐economic  and  political  condi‐tions in different parts of the country, etc.  (ibid.: 53) 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Panebianco names three central factors to describe a party’s genetic model. The first one  concerns  the  party’s  construction,  which  can  either  occur  through  territorial 
penetration or territorial diffusion.  Territorial penetration means that a party estab‐lishes a network of local branches throughout the country, while in the case of terri‐torial diffusion the party is founded by independent groups of local elites who come together  at  the  national  level.  The  second  principle  determining  a  party’s  genetic model  is the presence or absence of an external “sponsor”  institution. Accordingly, Panebianco  distinguishes  between  externally  legitimated  parties  and  internally  le­
gitimated parties. Finally, the third factor to take into account is the role of charisma in a party’s  formation.  It  is necessary to answer the question of whether the party was essentially created by, and as a vehicle for, a charismatic leader. Each of these elements of parties’ genetic models is related to certain degrees of institutionalisation.  Whereas  the  organisational  construction  through  penetration tends to produce a strong institution, construction through diffusion will rather lead to a weak  institution, because the organisational resources are  in  the hands of  the many  competing  elites,  thus  forcing  the  organisation  to  develop  through  compro‐mise and negotiation. Similarly, the presence of an external sponsoring organisation generally results in a weak institutionalisation, as the external sponsor should have no  interest  in  strengthening  the party  for  this would  inevitably  reduce  the party’s dependence upon it. In contrast, internally legitimated parties are much more likely to become strong institutions. Finally, in order for a party to reach a higher level of institutionalisation,  it  should  not  be  built  on  charisma,  since  a  charismatic  leader 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will – similar to an external sponsoring organisation – resist strong institutionalisa‐tion but keep the party under his personal control.    In other words, the level of party institutionalisation will very much depend on the distribution of  power within  a  party. A party  can be  expected  to  reach  a  high level  of  institutionalisation,  if  organisational  resources  are  monopolised  at  the “centre”  of  the  party within  a  cohesive  coalition  of  leaders.  On  the  other  hand,  if power is diffused among local elites, or if the party is dependent either on an exter‐nal  sponsoring organisation or on  a  charismatic personality,  institutionalisation  is very unlikely. In principle, change to the organisational structures  initially established  is pos‐sible.  Identifying the causes for change, Panebianco adopts a seemingly integrative approach when he says that change is   the  result  of  deliberate  choices  (made within  the  dominant  coali‐tion)  influenced by bounded rationality and anonymous pressures (e.g.  resistance  to  change,  environmental  changes,  technological changes  etc.) which  interact with  the  choices  to produce both de‐sired innovations and counter‐intuitive effects.  (ibid.: 242)  Organisational change happens in three phases. First of all, an organisational crisis must be unleashed by strong environmental pressure, such as electoral defeat. This 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will unavoidably harm the reputation of the dominant coalition which was unable to handle the crisis, and the party will then – in the second phase – witness the forma‐tion of new alliances and the replacement of  the  leading group. Finally, during the third phase the rules of party internal competition are changed. However, as Pane‐bianco points out, “no institution can […] entirely escape from its past” (ibid.: 261). In other words, the freedom of choice of the new leading group in designing organi‐sational innovations is severely limited by existing internal structures. Hence, traces of the party’s genetic model will always remain visible in the party’s organisation. It is probably this emphasis of a party’s initial formation and the continuing con‐straining power of the organisational structures initially implemented, which is the main weakness  of  the  generation‐effect  approach.  Although  Panebianco mentions the  role of  agency  in  the  construction of party organisations,  he denies  the  actors within  the party much  freedom to substantially alter  the organisational configura‐tion. Moreover, Panebianco untenably underestimates the need for political parties to adapt  to a changing environment  in order  to remain electorally competitive (cf. Ware 1996: 104). Rather, in his understanding, the organisation of political parties will always reflect the choices made by the party founders within the environmental circumstances  that  surrounded  the party’s  founding,  as  the organisation  is  able  to endure despite changes  in the same environment or despite changes  in the actors’ interests. However, there are many empirical examples of political parties that have been able to shed historical baggage, effectively erasing the traces of their organisational 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past.  Two  interesting  cases  in  this  regard  are  the  Austrian  Freedom  Party  (Frei­
heitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) and the French National Front (Front National, FN). In  contrast  to  Panebianco’s  predictions,  although  extremely  dependent  on  their leaders’ charisma – Jörg Haider (up until 2000) and Jean‐Marie Le Pen respectively – both these extreme right‐wing parties have achieved relatively high levels of institu‐tionalisation  (Pedahzur and Brichta 2002). Put differently,  judging  from their con‐temporary institutional strength, it would be extremely difficult to imagine that both the FPÖ and the FN were originally founded as a personal vehicle of power for their charismatic  leaders.  Certainly,  as  charismatic  leadership  still  plays  a  role  in  both parties,  the  genetic model  undeniably matters  to  explain different  party  organisa‐tions. However, the constraining effect of party’s origin on its organisational devel‐opment is exaggerated.  Yet, this should not lead us to overlook the strengths of Panebianco’s work. Not only does the “generation‐effect” approach stress the importance of contextual fac‐tors to explain the initial formation of a party, and the effects of internal structures to understand the further organisational development, but by clearly distinguishing between the stages of formation and change it teaches us that we must not simply analyse a snap‐shot of party organisation at present, since this might produce wrong results. Rather, we also have to investigate under which circumstances these organi‐sational regulations were established in the first place. The problem is that since the time  of  the  original  founding  of  the  party  the  environment  might  have  changed, while  the party organisation has remained unaltered. Studying the party organisa‐
OLIVER HELLMANN   
   – 44 – 
 
tion only at the present stage, we would then conclude that it is a product of the con‐temporary context, while,  in  fact,  the organisational decisions were  taken within a much earlier environment. The party organisation retained  its original  form, how‐ever, because internal dynamics and the interests of the actors within the party im‐peded environmental change to translate into organisational change. To sum up, the generation‐effect approach maintains that the initial formation of a party will be driven by environmental  factors. The subsequent development will then be constrained by the internal structures. Similar to a living organism, the de‐velopment of the party organisation is limited by the available genetic pool, meaning that  the  internal  structures  only  offer  the  party  actors  a  very  limited  number  of choices  as  to  organisational  reform.  However,  by  perceiving  party  organisational development  in  such  a way,  the  generation‐effect  approach  overrates  the  import‐ance of internal dynamics, and neglects agential and external factors to understand different  types  of  party  organisation.  Its main  strength,  on  the  other  hand,  lies  in making a distinction between the stages of  formation and adaptation, which  is  im‐portant in order to identify the correct causes behind the development of a particu‐lar party organisation. The three structuralist approaches are again summarised in Table 2. While they all have their own specific strengths, they all share the same weakness, namely the negligence of agential factors. As this chapter has thus far show shown, party inter‐nal  actors  should not  be  excluded  from any  theory of  party  organisation.  It  is  not conducive to our understanding of party formation and change if we treat political 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parties as living organisms, and describe their organisational development as matu‐ration or evolution, or as limited by their genetic pool. Rather, as the many empirical examples have demonstrated, parties are able to react differently to the same stimu‐lus, since the individuals who comprise the parties are knowledgeable and reflexive.   




Strenghts  stresses the importance of internal factors  stresses the importance of external factors  makes a distinction be‐tween the stages of for‐mation and change 
Weaknesses  neglects external and agential factors  neglects internal and agential factors  overrates the explana‐tory power of internal structures 
 
  
Voluntarist approaches to party organisation  In  stark  contrast  to  the  strictly  structuralist  approaches  just  presented,  other authors stress  the  independent  role of political actors  in  the construction of party 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organisations. That is to say, it is not environmental conditions and internal dynam‐ics  that  shape  the  organisational  structures  of  a  party,  but  the  deliberate  will  of those individuals acting within the party. Broadly speaking, it is argued that actors within the party can play two possible roles in the process of party change. On the one hand, they play an intervening role – deciding on which external changes will be transformed into organisational responses – while on the other hand also being able to shape the organisation of the party more pro‐actively without the need for an en‐vironmental  stimulus.  Therefore,  party  change  can  either  be  goal‐motivated  or power‐motivated (Harmel and Janda 1994). Goal‐motivated change happens as a response to external “shocks”. However, in contrast to the period‐effect approach, which explains party organisation as a pro‐cess of the best possible adaptation to the environment, in the view of the volunta‐rist approach, the party will only consider new organisational alternatives if the ac‐tors within the party perceive a need for organisational change in the light of their interests  and  strategies  (Wilson  1994;  see  also  Appleton  and Ward  1997).  Party leaders and their goals are thus seen as the key intervening variable between envi‐ronmental  pressures  and organisational  adaptation.  In  order  to be  translated  into reforms to the party organisation, changes in the party’s environment must be per‐ceived as a shock by the party leadership. What constitutes such a shock will depend on the party leadership’s primary goal (Harmel and Janda 1994: 269‐271). Borrow‐ing  from the  literature on coalition  formation (see Strom 1990; Budge and Keman 1990;  Laver  and  Schofield  1998)  the  voluntarist  approach  to  party  organisation 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usually distinguishes  four different goals  that can be held by  the party  leadership: (1)  votes,  (2)  office,  (3)  policy,  and  (4)  intra‐party  democracy.  The most  obvious shock  for  vote‐maximisers  would  be  electoral  failure.  Office‐maximisers,  on  the other hand,  understand  such developments  as  a  shock  that  are directly  related  to their  participation  in  government.  The most  significant  shock  to  policy  advocates, who are neither interested in winning votes nor in gaining access to office, would be related to the party’s policy positions, while those leaders trying to maximise intra‐party  democracy  would  see  any  major  alteration  to  the  party  membership  as  a shock. Power‐motivated organisational change,  in contrast, happens without an exter‐nal stimulus. In other words, party internal actors and their interests are themselves the ultimate cause for change. The voluntarist approach claims that we should thus expect reforms to the party organisation if there has been either a leadership change or  a  change  in dominant  faction. A new  leader  is  likely  to  alter  the organisational structures he inherited from his predecessor for several reasons (Harmel, Tan and Janda 1995: 5). First of all, different leaders have different abilities and orientations, and will therefore evaluate situations differently. Secondly, leaders will usually want to leave their mark upon the organisation, assuring themselves a visible place in the party’s  history.  Thirdly,  organisational  reforms  are  an  important  strategy  to  con‐solidate the newly achieved power. And fourthly,  leadership changes are generally destabilising  events.  However,  the  extent  to which  changes  of  leader will  actually result in party change will depend on a number of additional factors. Most import‐
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antly,  the extent to which the new leader’s desires and strategies for the party are different from those of the predecessor will have a decisive impact on the scope of organisational  change. Moreover, we need  to  take  into  consideration  the personal abilities  of  the  leader  to  answer  the  question  of  whether  he  will  be  able  to  fully realise his  ideas  (see also Harmel and Svåsand 1993). Finally,  the extent  to which the party is willing to follow the leader is also part of the equation. This latter factor consists of  two components: First,  advocates of  the actor‐centred approach argue, extensive organisational change is more likely in parties where the leadership posi‐tion is equipped with far‐reaching powers. Second, the likelihood of organisational change  is  greater  if  leadership  change  goes  together with  a  change  in  the  party’s dominant faction. It has also been suggested that dominant faction change itself can be a source of significant  party  organisational  change  (Harmel  and Tan 2003). However,  as with leadership change, the strength of the relationship between change in dominant fac‐tion and reform of the party organisation is subject to several intervening factors. To start with – and very similar  to what has been said about  leadership change –  the extent  of  party  change  after  the  emergence  of  a  new  dominant  faction  will  very much depend on the intensity of factional rivalry. The greater the distance between factions and their organisational preferences, the more extensive the organisational change will be. Second, the ability of the newly dominant faction to fully enforce its organisational preferences rests on whether  the change  in  the  internal power dis‐tribution has  resulted  in  the complete,  rather  than  just partial,  replacement of  the 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dominant  coalition.  If  the  former  dominant  faction  still  holds  on  to  significant  or‐ganisational  resources,  substantial  party  change  is  rather  unlikely.  Finally,  we should  expect more party  change  if  the  dominant  faction  change  coincides with  a change  in party  leadership.  If  the  leadership positions of  the party are not held by members of the newly dominant faction, the leadership might resist dramatic party change. In other words, “the combination of leadership and factional change […] cre‐ates opportunities for change that are greater than what either event would accom‐plish alone” (Harmel, Tan and Janda 1995: 17; emphasis in the original).  A slightly different example of an actor‐centred approach is Aldrich’s (1995) an‐alysis  of  the  formation  of  political  parties  in  the  United  States  of  America.  Using game  theoretical models, Aldrich  shows how parties  are  institutions  able  to  over‐come problems of collective action and social choice. Although the main aim of the study is rather to explain why parties were established in the first place, and even if rational choice can indeed be accused of being latently structuralist (Hay 2002: 103‐104), the analysis is still founded on an individualistic basis, thereby hinting at the possibility of political actors affecting the organisational structures of political par‐ties in their own interests. While this latter approach has not gained much prominence in the literature, the theoretical framework developed by Harmel and Janda has repeatedly been applied to  explain  different  cases  of  party  organisational  change.  However,  the  empirical evidence  is  inconclusive. Müller  (1997),  studying  the development of  the Austrian Socialist Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ), maintains that leader‐
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ship change and change in the dominant faction are both valuable factors to explain party organisational reforms. In contrast, Bille (1997) finds that past changes in the organisation of the Danish Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterne, SD) cannot be  attributed  to  different  interests  held  by  the  various  leaders  that  have  been  in charge of the party. Similarly, Duncan (2007), who analyses the history of the Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen Democratisch Appèl, CDA) concludes that the Harmel and Janda model of party change requires several refinements. Despite suf‐fering a disastrous electoral defeat in 1994 and losing government office for the first time  since  1918  the  CDA did  not  change  extensively  because  of  the  nature  of  the Dutch  party  system,  its  specific  history,  and  secondary  goal  priorities  held  by  the party. The last study hints at the possibility that the voluntarist approach to party or‐ganisation might oversimplify the process of party formation and adaptation by only looking at the party actors’ interest. It thereby denies the fact that internal and ex‐ternal  structures  favour  certain  organisational  strategies  over  others  in  order  to achieve the given interests. As the structuralist approaches all point out, structures matter  and  it  does not become  clear why we  should  ignore  their  findings  and ex‐plain different forms of party organisation only by the interests of the party leader‐ship and the dominant faction. In order to achieve their goals party  internal actors need to take into consider‐ation  the  opportunities  and  pressures  provided  by  the  environment.  Policy‐maximisers, for instance, should include many elements of the mass party, as these 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will help them to stay in contact with the social groups they wish to represent, and to keep the party in public office under close control. However, which of these ele‐ments are necessary to gain influence on policy outcomes will very much depend on the context. While in the mid‐20th century many parties came close to the ideal type of the mass party, hence leading Duverger to predict a “contagion from the left”, con‐temporary policy‐seeking parties, as in the Italian party system, make increasing use of modern technologies of mass communication, and have abolished the workplace branch system, since nowadays far fewer voters fit  into clearly defined social cate‐gories.  Epstein,  expecting  a  “contagion  from  the  right”,  argued  that  the American‐style party was much better suited to mobilise large number of votes. Thus, if vote‐maximisers want to achieve their goals they should instead organise their party ac‐cording  to  the  catch‐all  type.  The  cartel‐party  thesis,  on  the  other  hand,  assumes that all parties are primarily office‐seeking, trying to get access to the cartel in order to participate in the distribution of state resources. It is easier to gain access into the cartel, the basic argument goes, if the party adopts the organisational characteristics of the parties already safely positioned within the cartel. In other words, no matter what  interests party‐internal actors pursue,  their strategic calculations will always have to include the external environment around the party. Moreover,  party  organisers  will  have  to  take  into  account  the  structures  pro‐vided by the party itself. Although the Harmel and Janda model of party change in‐corporates the power of the leadership position as one intervening variable, it fails to  include  broader  internal  dynamics.  For  instance,  maximisers  of  intra‐party  de‐
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mocracy will  have  to  be  aware  of  the  dangers  of Michels’  “iron  law  of  oligarchy”, which they will have to counter by certain organisational measures that will prevent the  leadership  from  becoming  indispensable.  Put  differently,  knowing  about  such organisational trends will force party internal actors to react accordingly. Other  factors  not  considered  by  Harmel  and  Janda  regard  power‐motivated changes. While the model argues that some party change can be explained without an external stimulus, but simply through leadership and dominant faction changes, it falls short of explaining these reconfigurations of party‐internal power. However, a comprehensive theory of party change should certainly include variables that can have an impact on the distribution of power within a political party. In line with the arguments made by Panebianco, parties  are best understood as very  conservative organisations  that  try  to  safeguard  the  power  relations  that  existed  among  the groups that initially established the party. In other words, the power map of a politi‐cal party does not just change, but it will take an external trigger – or even an inter‐nal  trigger  (such as  the death of  a  leader) –  to  significantly disturb  the balance of power. Without knowing what constitutes such a trigger, every theory of party or‐ganisational change will remain incomplete. To  sum up,  the  voluntarist  approach  to party organisation – mostly  associated with the model developed by Harmel and Janda – understands different party types as  the  product  of  the  interests  of  the  party  leadership  and  the  dominant  faction. However,  it  largely  ignores  the  structuring  effect  of  both  the  environment  around the party and the party‐internal dynamics. In addition, it fails to explain changes in 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leadership and  in  the dominant  faction, which should be considered as an  integral element  of  any  general  theory  of  party  change.  Nevertheless,  the  voluntarist  ap‐proach must be praised for introducing the party actors’ interests and goals into the analysis of party organisations  ‐  factors  that are  largely neglected by  the structur‐alist approaches. The different causal factors offered by the structuralist and volun‐tarist approaches to party organisation are summarised in Table 3. 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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK     In order  to explain  the origin and the subsequent development of political  institu‐tions, numerous scholars have  for a  long  time  insisted on an  integrative approach towards the structure‐agency debate (for example Thelen and Steinmo 1992). The study of political parties, however, has so far remained totally unaffected by this on‐tological  shift  in  comparative  politics.5  As  the  previous  section  has  shown,  to  ac‐count  for  different  forms  of  party  organisation  the  relevant  literature  still  offers 
either  structuralist or  voluntarist  theories. No attempt has been made  to  integrate these into a general explanation. This seriously weakens our understanding of party formation  and  adaptation,  since  the weaknesses  of  the  structuralist  approach  are the strengths of the voluntarist approach, and vice versa. Moreover, advocates of the structuralist approach do not agree on whether universal, domestic or party inter‐nal factors should be considered the most important ones. 
                                                5 As Hall (2003: 387: 387) argues, “[C]omparative politics has moved away from ontologies that as‐sume causal variables with strong, consistent, and independent effects across space and time to‐wards ones that acknowledge more extensive endogeneity and the ubiquity of complex interaction effects”. In other words, many scholars now recognise the unpredictable nature of human behaviour. One area that effectively combines structure and agency is, for instance, the study of democratic tran‐sitions (see Mahoney and Snyder 1999). 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Consequently, in order to gain a better insight into the process of party organisa‐tional development we should synthesise existing explanatory variables from differ‐ent levels of analysis into a single theory. This section will argue that historical insti­
tutionalism offers several useful ideas as to how to manage such an integration. The goals  of  this  chapter  are  therefore  to  outline  the  basic  theoretical  propositions  of historical institutionalism and use these to construct an integrative theory of party organisational formation and change.    
Historical institutionalism  Until at least the early 1950s political science consisted of little more than the study of  institutions.  Scholars  mainly  engaged  in  the  formal‐legal  comparison  of  whole systems of government, trying to find normative arguments for the best institutional order. This all changed through the “behavioural revolution”. Rather than producing descriptive  analyses  of  the  political  system,  the  focus  of  scholarly  attention  was shifted towards the inputs from society  into the political system. Research particu‐larly centred on forms of mass political participation, such as voting, and the actions of interest groups and political parties. As the main aim became to develop theories that could explain why individuals and organisations of interest aggregation behave in the way they do, political institutions were reduced to a “black box” in which soci‐
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etal inputs are invisibly converted into outputs of the political system. However, the empirical observation that “processes internal to political institutions, although pos‐sibly triggered by external events, affect the flow of history” (March and Olsen 1984: 739) has led to a comeback of institutions in political science.  While  behaviouralists  argued  that  institutions were  not more  than  the  simple aggregation  of  individual  preferences,  the  “new  institutionalism”  claims  that  the same  individuals will make different decisions within different  institutions. Yet,  in contrast  to  the  “old”  institutionalism,  which  employed  a  descriptive‐inductive method,  new  institutionalists  are  experimenting  with  deductive  approaches  that start from theoretical propositions about the way institutions work (Lowndes 2002: 95). On the basis of these propositions, it is possible to distinguish three basic theo‐retical varieties within the new institutionalism: (1) sociological (normative)  insti‐tutionalism, (2) rational choice institutionalism, and (3) historical institutionalism. On a general  level, all  three approaches agree that  institutions are “the rules of the game”  (Rothstein 1996: 145). They vary, however,  in  the  specific  criteria  they use to characterise an institution. Moreover, the three strands of institutional theory do not concur in how institutions affect the choices of political actors, how institu‐tions are reproduced, and how to explain institutional change. According to Hall and Taylor  (1996),  these  differences  arise  from  the  assumptions  the  distinctive  ap‐proaches make about human behaviour. Rational‐choice institutionalism follows the “calculus approach”, arguing that individuals are rationally calculating utility maxi‐misers.  Proponents of  sociological  institutionalism, on  the other hand,  found  their 
OLIVER HELLMANN   
   – 58 – 
 
work on the “cultural approach”, which sees individuals as satisficers, their behav‐iour  constrained  by  their  own  interpretation  of  the  world.  Historical  institution‐alism,  Hall  and  Taylor  argue,  finds  itself  in‐between  these  two  approaches,  using either the one or the other. The problem with  this distinction between the various approaches  is  that  it  ig‐nores the potential of the new institutionalism to transcend the long unfruitful de‐bate  between  structure  and  agency.  Theoretically,  by  stressing  the  role  of  human behaviour in the construction of institutions, the new institutionalism draws atten‐tion to the interaction between institutions and individuals, and acknowledges that both  influence  each  other  (Lowndes  2002:  102).  However,  as  Hay  and  Wincott (1998) maintain, both the “calculus” and the “cultural approach” are latently struc‐turalist, not allowing much space for agency. We should then instead distinguish be‐tween  rational‐choice  and  sociological  institutionalism  as  quasi‐structuralist  ap‐proaches on one side, and historical  institutionalism on the other side, which does 
not  vacillate between  “calculus”  and  “cultural”  considerations,  but  –  in  contrast  to Hall and Taylor’s argumentation – is founded on very distinctive ontological prem‐ises. Accordingly, the prospects for intellectual borrowing between the different ap‐proaches of  the new  institutionalism are much more  limited  than widely believed. Only the particular theoretical  foundations of historical  institutionalism, numerous scholars argue (for example, Hay and Wincott 1998;  Koelble 1995), promise to take us a good deal further to a resolution of the structure and agency debate. This is be‐cause, most significantly, historical institutionalists see the world in terms of circu­
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lar  causal  relationships  between  actors  and  structures,  rather  than  unidirectional links of causation, with either  actors creating structures or  structures determining actors’ behaviour.   
What are institutions? 
 The definition of an institution given by historical institutionalism is much less ab‐stract than those provided by the other approaches. Whereas rational‐choice insti‐tutionalism holds a highly functionalist view of institutions, describing them as col‐lections of decision‐making rules for determining how individual actions will be ag‐gregated  into  collective  decision  (Peters  1999:  45),  sociological  institutionalism understands an  institution as a set of “rules of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1984: 741), which comes into existence through the interpretation of the dominant institutional  values  by  the  individual members.  Historical  institutionalism,  on  the other hand, uses a rather “down‐to‐earth” definition of institutions. Historical insti‐tutionalists define institutions by example rather than by an underlying mechanism, or an overarching principle (Peters 1999: 66).  The reason behind the less abstract definition of an institution given by historical institutionalists  can  be  directly  linked  to  their  specific  ontological  foundations.  As has already been pointed out, rational‐choice and sociological institutionalism make 
OLIVER HELLMANN   
   – 60 – 
 
certain assumptions about general regularities driving human behaviour. They then apply  their  deductive model  to  the  real  world  in  an  attempt  to  confirm  their  as‐sumptions.  These  assumptions must  necessarily  be  incorporated  into  their  defini‐tion of an institution, in their quest to explain why institutions are created and how institutions affect political outcomes. Historical  institutionalists,  in contrast,  take a much more  inductive  approach  to  the analysis of  institutions. They usually  “begin with empirical puzzles that emerge from observed events or comparisons” (Thelen 1999:  373).  Accordingly,  an  historical  institutionalist’s  definition  of  an  institution derives directly from empirical observations, which will then be classified to make them available to political analysis. Unlike in the “calculus” and “cultural” approach to  institutionalism,  the  definition  of  an  institution  does  therefore  not  contain  any clear theoretical expectations of how agents will behave. By  generally  stressing  the  “intermediate”  character  of  institutions  (Thelen  and Steinmo 1992: 2) – meaning that  institutions reside somewhere between the state as an entity and individual behaviour – historicists would, without doubt, character‐ise  political  parties  as  institutions.  As with  any  institution,  parties  are  purposeful human  constructions  that  embody  the  “rules  of  the  game”.  When  establishing  a party, actors explicitly or tacitly agree upon a set of rules of behaviour that will help them to make decisions aimed at fulfilling at least the most basic function of all po‐litical parties, namely to compete in public elections. 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The structuring effect of institutions 
 This directly leads to the question of how institutions in general – and political par‐ties in particular – structure human behaviour. Starting from the basic assumption that  “conflict  among  rival  groups  for  scarce  resources  lies  at  the heart  of  politics” (Hall  and Taylor  1996:  937),  historical  institutionalism points  out  the  various  op‐tions to the resolution of political conflict. Institutions are conceived as “filters” that selectively favour some interests over others (Immergut 1998: 20). In contrast to a pure pluralist approach, historical institutionalists argue that the institutional struc‐ture of a polity will limit the number of ways in which political actors can combine their resources (Krasner 1984: 228).  In short, an  institution shapes the goals, pre‐ferences,  and  strategies  of  the  political  actors  competing  within  its  boundaries, thereby  steering  the  resolution  of  conflict,  and  ultimately  affecting  the  outcomes. This stands in strong opposition to the position taken by the proponents of rational‐choice  institutionalism, who argue  that  the preferences of  the  individual are exog‐enous to institutions (Rothstein 1996: 147).  However, historical institutionalism is not deterministic in its propositions about the effects of political institutions. Rather, it is recognised that the same institution may produce completely different outcomes within different social and cultural set‐tings.  In other words, historical  institutionalists view causality as being contextual (Immergut  1998:  19).  Thelen  and  Steinmo  (1992:  16‐17)  identify  four  distinct causes for the variability in the impact of institutions over space and time: (1) broad 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changes in the socio‐economic or political context transform a previously latent in‐stitution  into  an  increasingly  important  institution;  (2)  changes  in  the  socio‐economic context or the political balance of power facilitate the entry of new actors who pursue their (new) goals through existing institutions; (3) exogenous changes produce a  shift  in  the goals or  strategies pursued within existing  institutions;  and (4)  political  actors  adjust  their  strategies  to  accommodate  changes  in  the  institu‐tions themselves. That is to say, political actors do not only choose their strategies according to the institutional structures they find themselves in, but they also take into consideration the wider social, cultural, and economic context. Moreover, actors are able  to  learn about  the effects of  institutions, and under certain circumstances may alter their strategies in order to produce different outcomes. Historical institu‐tionalism thus stresses indeterminacy and multi‐causality. In this view, institutions are only one factor among others when trying to account for political outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996: 942). However, as institutions, the structural context does not de‐termine  actors’  strategies,  but  actors  can develop different  strategies  to  deal with problems posed to them by the context. Put in the words of Hay and Wincott (1998: 954):   [a]ctors are strategic, seeking to realize complex, contingent and of‐ten  changing goals. They do  so  in a  context which  favours  certain strategies over others and must rely upon perceptions of that con‐
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text which are at best incomplete and which may very often reveal themselves inaccurate after the event.  Similarly, when analysing the effect of political parties on actors within the party we should always take into consideration the context around the particular party. More than other institutions, however, political parties seem to be able to dominate their environment, as parties fill those other institutions, on which historical institution‐alists usually  focus (for example,  legislatures, bureaucracies), with  life. Conversely, political  parties  are  organised  by  the  same  actors,  who  decide  on  legislation  and other  political  outcomes.  In  other  words,  actors  within  parties  enjoy  a  compara‐tively large amount of freedom towards their environment as they control a vehicle with which they are able  to change the environment according to  their own  inter‐ests.  Consider  the  cartel‐party  thesis,  for  instance:  Parties  co‐operated  to  exclude contenders by introducing public funding and changing other party laws (Katz and Mair 1995). In a similar way parties can work together to change other rules of the electoral competition, such as the voting system. Moreover, there is still much con‐troversy over the extent to which parties reflect the interests of the mass electorate. While Downs (1957) argues that parties adapt their policy programmes to the de‐mands of voters, others (for example Dunleavy 1991) claim that parties are able to actively  shape voters’ preferences.  In  short, what  these examples  show  is not  that actors within political parties are totally independent from the environment around the party, but that they might be more independent than actors within those institu‐
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While historical  institutionalism  thus maintains  that  institutions have an effect  on the  behaviour  of  individuals  acting within  these  institutions,  it  also  acknowledges the  capability  of  political  actors  to  consciously  shape  institutions.  It  thereby  dis‐agrees with the sociological approach, which maintains that institutions are largely shaped by culture (March and Olsen 1984). Yet, a  frequently cited problem of his‐torical institutionalism is the fact that it seems much stronger in explaining persis‐tence  than  formation and change (Peters 1999: 67‐71;   Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 15).  Historicists  adhere  to  the  idea  of  “path  dependency”,  by  which  in  a  general sense  they  simply mean  that  “history matters”.    Essentially,  they  put  forward  the argment that 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the  policy  choices  made  when  an  institution  is  being  formed,  or when a policy is being initiated, will have a continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future. (Peters 1999: 61)  In other words, institutions are able to persist in the absence of the forces respon‐sible  for  their  original  establishment –  a phenomenon  that  economists  capture by the  concept  of  “increasing  returns”.  In  a  process  of  increasing  returns,  the  proba‐bility  of  maintaining  a  once  adopted  institutional  pattern  increases  with  its  con‐tinued adoption, because over time the benefits of the chosen pattern will increase in comparison with the benefits of previously available options (Pierson 2000).6  Perceiving  institutional development as a process of  self‐reinforcing reproduc‐tion  causes  a  dilemma,  however,  since  any  “convincing  account  of  institutional change must contain within itself its own negation, and yet somehow remain consis‐tent” (Immergut 2005: 290). Historical institutionalism tries to escape this dilemma by distinguishing between  the mechanism of  reproduction  and a  separate  logic  of change. Broadly speaking, historicists understand the development of institutions as a chain of  long periods of persistence divided by moments of  institutional  innova‐tion.  Borrowing  from  evolutionary  biology,  Krasner  (1984;  1988)  introduced  the concept of “punctuated equilibrium” into the analysis of  institutions.  In contrast to 
                                                6 One often cited example is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard, which gained an advantage over competitors, although it is generally not regarded as the most efficient alternative. However, being “the fastest out of the gate” was critical. Now that people have become accustomed to writing with the QWERTY keyboard, and computer producers have adjusted the industrial standard accordingly, the costs of switching to some previously available alternative are very high. 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the  conventional  Darwinian  view  of  evolution  as  a  slow,  continuous  process  of change, proponents of punctuated equilibrium argue that change takes place rapidly in  geographically  isolated  groups.  They  therefore  do  not  assume  that  constant causes  explain  the  evolution  of  living  organisms,  but  they  stress  uncertainty  and chance.7 Similarly, historical institutionalists theorise that the history of institutions is  punctuated  with  moments  when  structural  factors  are  least  determining  and when actors have  the greatest degree of  freedom to  shape  institutional  change.  In other words, during such “critical  junctures” (Collier and Collier 1991) the mecha‐nism of institutional reproduction is disrupted, giving space to agency and choice. In order  to explain  critical  junctures historical  institutionalists usually point  to exog‐enous  crises  –  typically  shocks  from  changes  in macro‐structures.  Such  crises  can cause the breakdown of existing institutions, which will then create room for politi‐cal conflict over the shape of a new institutional arrangement. However,  by mere  empirical  observation  it  is  possible  to  criticise  the  punctu‐ated‐equilibrium model on the ground that punctuations neither seem to be a suffi‐cient or a necessary condition for institutional change. First of all, institutions regu‐larly persist despite  external  shocks of  far‐reaching historical  importance,  such as wars or revolutions. Moreover, not all  institutional change happens within punctu‐ations, but institutions also evolve during periods of supposed stasis. 
                                                7 For example, Stephen Jay Gould, one of the driving minds behind the theory of punctuated equilib‐rium, argues that wings originally only served for thermoregulation, i.e. to lower excess body tem‐perature. As wings grew in size for more effective thermoregulation, they co‐incidentally also devel‐oped an aerodynamic function, allowing animals with wings to fly (Gould 1987). 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In  order  to  deal with  the  first weakness,  Thelen  (1999:  397)  suggests  that we should acknowledge that “different institutions rest on different foundations, and so the processes that are likely to disrupt them will also be different”. Put differently, what  constitutes  an  external  shock  will  depend  on  the  mechanism  assumed  to underlie the process of institutional reproduction. A useful contribution into this di‐rection  has  been  made  by  Mahoney  (2000a),  who  identifies  four  possible  causal mechanisms behind the phenomenon of path dependency. The first one is based on a utilitarian explanation: Actors rationally choose to reproduce institutions, because any  potential  benefits  of  transformation  are  outweighed  by  the  costs.  A  second theory makes use of functionalist ideas in order to explain the reproduction of insti‐tutions. It is argued that path dependency happens as every institution is embedded into a large system within which it fulfils certain functions. Third, institutional per‐sistence  has  been  explained  through  the  distribution  of  power  among  actors.  The basic idea of this theory is that any institution initially empowers a certain group at the  expense  of  other  groups.  The  advantaged  group  will  then  use  its  additional power to defend the originally implemented institutional order against pressure for change from less powerful groups. Finally, a fourth explanation for path dependence is built  around  the notion of  legitimacy. According  to advocates of  this  theoretical position, institutional reproduction occurs because actors view an institution as le‐gitimate and thus voluntarily opt for its reproduction. Depending on the specific mechanism of institutional reproduction, only particu‐lar changes in the environment around the institution will be perceived as a shock 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by the actors within the institution. Hence, utilitarian theorists often emphasise how increased  competitive  pressures  can  lead  to  institutional  transformation,  while functionalist accounts argue that institutional change usually requires an exogenous shock that puts pressure on the overall system, making a given institution’s function obsolete  and  demanding  its  transformation  to  preserve  the  system  in  the  envi‐ronmental  setting.  Scholars who  adopt  a  power‐based mechanism  of  institutional reproduction, on the other hand, would argue that changes in the environment con‐stitute  a  shock  when  they  weaken  the  elites  and  strengthen  subordinate  groups within the institution. And finally, legitimation explanations of path dependency de‐fine shocks as events  that  trigger changes  in  the values or subjective beliefs of ac‐tors. The problem with most of these approaches to institutional reproduction is that they must necessarily resort to elements exogenous to the theory in order to explain change. This is a point frequently raised by critics of historical institutionalism, who argue that historicist theory should be able to account for change through reference to  the  nature  of  institutions  themselves  (see  for  example  Harty  2005).  Only  the power‐based explanation of  institutional  reproduction seems  to  fulfil  this  require‐ment,  as  it  assumes  that  institutions  reproduce  through  a  continuous  conflictual process, which itself will eventually lead to institutional change (cf. Mahoney 2000a: 523). In other words, both reproduction and change can be explained through con‐flict between elites and sub‐ordinate groups. In light of this, the power‐based theory 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of reproduction promises to be the most coherent approach to the study of institu‐tional change. The power‐based approach to the study of institutions fits in perfectly with the more general arguments of historical institutionalism regarding the relationship be‐tween structures and agency. As discussed earlier, agents act strategically and pos‐sess the ability to develop different strategies within the same context. Conversely, contexts  are  strategically  selective,  favouring  certain  strategies  over  others.  This means  that over  time such strategic  selectivity will  throw up systematically  struc‐tured outcomes. However, these outcomes are by no means inevitable, as strategic agents can formulate alternative strategies to deal with the opportunities provided by the context (Hay 2002: 129‐130). In other words, within the same institution we can theoretically expect separate groups to follow different strategies. These strat‐egies will then feed into corresponding preferences regarding the nature of the in‐stitution, since any institution – as structures in general – will favour certain strat‐egies over others. Therefore,  similar  to  the  arguments  of  power‐based  accounts  of  institutional change, political parties should not be seen as unitary actors with a single goal, but consisting of coalitions of political actors who pursue their individual interests and goals.  Just as politics  in general can be seen as a process of consensus and conflict among interdependent individuals, intra‐party politics is also marked by consensual and conflictual relationships among interdependent party sub‐groups (Maor 1997: 147). As already hypothesised by the voluntarist approach to party organisation, the 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conflict between these  intra‐party groups, so‐called factions, can have a significant influence on organisational change (Harmel and Tan 2003). Accordingly, reproduc‐tion of the party organisation happens as the dominant faction will try to preserve the  organisational  configuration,  from  which  it  gains  an  unequal  share  of  power (Panebianco 1988). While making a distinction between different mechanisms of institutional repro‐duction can help explain why not all  large‐scale external events cause institutional change, it still leaves us with the question of why some institutional change does not require an external shock. As a solution to this problem it has been recommended that we  give  up  the  zero‐sum  view  of  institutional  change  versus  institutional  re‐production, and instead allow for modes of change that go beyond the cases of insti‐tutional breakdown or wholesale replacement as implied in the punctuated equilib‐rium model.  Two  possible  concepts  in  this  regard  are  institutional  “layering”  and institutional  “conversion”  (Thelen 2003). While  layering means  that  new arrange‐ments  are  set  on  top  of  pre‐existing  institutional  structures,  conversion  describes the situation when existing institutions are redirected to new purposes. In short, ra‐ther  than  picturing  institutional  development  in  terms  of  a  sharp  dichotomy  be‐tween punctuations and stasis, we should aim for an analysis “that seeks to identify 
what  aspects  of  a  specific  institutional  configuration  are  (or  are  not)  renegotiable and under what conditions” (ibid.: 233; emphasis in the original). Similarly, in the case of political parties, external shocks that lead to institutional breakdown and wholesale  replacement  are  relatively  rare,  and  certainly more  ex‐
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ceptional than historical institutionalism supposes. The reason is that constitutional institutions must almost necessarily be replaced in case of a breakdown, while par‐ties can simply die and be replaced by other existing parties. In contrast, those insti‐tutions  that are  typically  regarded as  the analytical object of historical  institution‐alism need a  functionally equivalent  replacement  for  the  larger political  system to fulfil its function.   Hence,  when  explaining  party  organisational  change  we  are  generally  dealing with change that falls between the two extremes of institutional breakdown and in‐stitutional stasis. Again corresponding to the theoretical views of  the power‐based strand  within  historical  institutionalism,  it  is  argued  that  such  incremental  party change happens when certain individuals or factions within the party experience an increase in their relative power vis‐à‐vis other individuals and factions, thus leading to a redistribution of power within the party.   
Summary 
 Although  there  is  still much  controversy over how  to explain  institutional  change, historical institutionalism provides an appealing theoretical framework with which to transcend the structure and agency debate. Its main propositions can be formu‐lated as follows: 
OLIVER HELLMANN   
   – 72 – 
 
(1) Structures influence human behaviour by functioning like a filter that selec‐tively favours some strategies over others. 
(2) However,  although  this  means  that  outcomes  within  the  same  structural context will exhibit a characteristic regularity when observed over a longer time frame, the outcome of any particular strategic calculation is unpredic‐table,  since  actors  can  choose  alternative  courses  of  action  to  respond  to opportunities presented by the context. 
(3) As a result, at any point in time, we should not be surprised to find actors offering different strategic responses to the same context. 
(4) Institutional reproduction and change  is  therefore best seen as a constant conflict between different groups within that particular institution, holding divergent views as to the norms and regulations that constitute the institu‐tion.  In sum, when accounting for political outcomes, historical institutionalism acknow‐ledges the explanatory power of institutions, external factors, and agency. These are exactly the three groups of factors that can be found in the party organisation litera‐ture, represented by the “life‐cycle”, the “period effect”, the “generation effect”, and the  voluntarist  approaches  respectively.  Hence,  historical  institutionalism  again demonstrates – albeit on a more abstract  level  than  in the previous chapter –  that the strengths of one approach towards party organisation are the weaknesses of the another  approach  and  vice  versa.  Actors  cannot  simply  form  and  change  political 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Political parties, as with any other institution, are constellations of power between different actors. These constellations can be explicitly codified in the formal norms and regulations of the party or informally supported by general practice. In this re‐gard it is important to note that informal institutions are to be understood as more than mere behavioural regularities. They are “socially shared rules, usually unwrit‐ten,  that  are  created,  communicated,  and  enforced  outside  of  officially  sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727). Therefore, although party structures in the “third wave” of democratisation are in many cases non‐bureaucratic and infor‐mal, such informality should not be conflated with weakness or lack of organisation (Levitsky  2001).  Numerous  parties maintain  solid  informal  organisations  that  are both extensive and enduring.  In other words,  ignoring  the  informal politics within many political parties in young democracies would reduce the analytical depth, re‐sulting  in  an  inadequate  understanding  of  how  these  parties  actually  operate (Erdmann 2004:  75).  Existing models  of  party  organisation,  unfortunately,  largely fail to incorporate informal dynamics into their analytical frameworks. Only  if  actors  decide  to  translate  the  power  relationships  between  them  into formal rules will political parties develop the three faces of party organisation that 
POLITICAL PARTY ORGANISATION IN EAST ASIA    
 – 75 – 
   
have been accepted by many as the most powerful concept to describe the develop‐ment of political parties in Western Europe. However, the number of possible power constellations between the three elements is limited. In fact, as the historical devel‐opment  of  European  parties  has  taught  us  –  both  empirically  and  theoretically  – there can only be two different models to formally distribute power within a party: Either  the party  in public office  is  the dominant  face or power  lies with  the party central office.  In‐between these  two constellations  there can be  transitional stages of power distribution. Moreover, the party on the ground – the third organisational face – can be stronger or weaker, thereby weakening the position of the respective dominant party element. However, the party on the ground can never be the domi‐nant party element itself, because it  faces a collective action problem. The party in central office will always be stronger, as it is a necessary vehicle to organise collec‐tive action among the individual members of the party. In other words, political parties are never unitary actors but rather collections of individuals and sub‐party factions with often diverging interests and strategies. The power relations between these actors can be either formalised in the party’s official decision‐making  rules  or  established  informally  through  mutual  understanding. This is in line with one of the central tenets of historical institutionalism: that actors can develop different strategies within the same context. The relevant strategies to consider when  trying  to  account  for  party  organisations  are  strategies  relating  to the  electoral  market.  This  follows  from  Sartori’s  influential  definition  of  political 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Broadly speaking,  there are two different strategies politicians can use to mobilise voters and link their respective party to the electorate: (1) programmatic principles or (2) clientelistic exchange circuits (Kitschelt 2000).8 Both of these linkage mecha‐nisms are,  broadly  speaking,  based on exchange  relations between politicians  and 
                                                8 Kitschelt also lists charisma as a third electoral strategy. However, we will treat charisma as a secondary strategy and therefore discuss it later on. 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voters, who trade material  incentives  for political support. However,  they differ  in terms of the procedure these exchange relations adopt, as clientelism describes di­
rect  exchange  relations,  compared  to  indirect  exchange  relations.  This  property  is captured by the classical definition of clientelism offered by Lemarchand and Legg (1972: 151‐152):   Political clientelism […] may be viewed as a more or less personal‐ized, affective, and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors,  commanding  unequal  resources  and  involving  mutually beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships.  While it has rightfully been pointed out that the patron in a clientelistic relationship can  also  be  the  party  organisation,  rather  than  any  individual  within  it  (Hopkin 2006: 409),  the  important question  to ask  in order  to establish whether  there  is a direct  exchange  relation  between  the  party/politician  and  the  voters  is: Who will 
benefit  from  the distribution of material  incentives? Whereas  in  clientelism voters will only be  included  in  the distribution of material  incentives  if  they comply with rules  of  the  exchange  game by  providing  political  support,  programmatic  benefits have a public‐good quality and voters cannot be excluded from benefiting from them (Stokes 2007). That is to say, clientelistic linkages target benefits either to individu‐als or  small  groups, who are expected  to  support politicians with  control over  re‐
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sources. As such, the resources distributed through clientelistic exchange networks can  be  either  of  an  individualistic  nature  –  including material  goods  (money  and other gifts), employment (both private and public) and services (such as help with the authorities, protection et cetera) – or of a collective nature (for instance, public infrastructure projects or the provision of community facilities).9 However, in reality, it is often very difficult to clearly distinguish between these latter benefits and programmatic benefits.  In many cases  the class of beneficiaries targeted  by  a  given  programmatic  strategy  can  be  very  narrowly  defined  (for  in‐stance,  steel workers, war veterans,  the unemployed) and  resources are  therefore made available to very small groups only. Conversely, if clientelistic benefits are al‐located to larger groups (for instance, defined by geography or constituency), politi‐cians  cannot  exclude  non‐supporters  living  in  those  areas  from  enjoying  the  re‐sources provided. Hence,  in order  to make a better distinction possible we should ask a second question: Are there any facilities for the politician to effectively moni‐tor  or  enforce  the  direct  exchange  linkages  (Kitschelt  and  Wilkinson  2007)? Whereas  in  clientelistic  relationships  such  monitoring  mechanisms  are  available, they  are  absent  from  programmatic  linkages  between  politicians  and  voters.  In other words,  in clientelism, only voters who actually vote  for  the politician are  in‐
                                                9 The allocation of public employment in return for electoral support will be defined as patronage. Many other authors use patronage and clientelism interchangeably, but this analysis will keep them strictly separate. Moreover, in order to clarify a further term often used in discussions of clientelism, the distribution of pork barrel will be defined here as the lawful clientelistic allocation of government spending to the politician’s electoral district – as opposed to vote buying which is almost always il‐legal. Patronage, on the other hand, has to be located somewhere in the grey area between illegality and legality. 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cluded  in  the distribution of  resources and  the politician has access  to monitoring systems through which to control whether they did so or not. The  enforcement  of  the  clientelistic  exchange  agreement  can  be  achieved through  various  different measures  (see  Schaffer  and  Schedler  2007).  First  of  all, political  parties  and  politicians  may  choose  to  manage  the  exchange  of  material benefits and votes through established social networks and personal relationships. Accordingly, candidates often recruit people with a high social status in their respec‐tive local communities as intermediaries between themselves and the voters, as this is  likely  to  impose on voters a strong moral obligation to vote as  instructed. How‐ever,  in addition, parties will also need to monitor the vote by circumventing elec‐toral secrecy, as the imposition of sanctions will have to be based on the knowledge about  non‐compliance.  In  order  to  monitor  how  individuals  vote,  politicians  can make use of various strategies. For instance, voters can be given carbon paper to re‐cord how they voted, or, in more modern societies, voters take a photo of their com‐pleted ballot with their mobile phone to send as a picture message to the vote bro‐ker. Another way is to give the voter a faked or stolen filled‐in ballot paper before entering the polling station. The voter casts the filled‐in ballot and gives the official ballot paper he or she received in the polling station to the vote broker waiting out‐side.  Alternatively,  politicians  can  offer  larger  groups  of  voters  incentives  for  ab‐staining  from voting altogether. Finally, politicians can also monitor  the aggregate turnout of villages or neighbourhoods. This strategy is especially relevant in places 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where candidates and their agents distribute material incentives widely within lar‐ger geographical units. Again, these monitoring systems ensure – or are to be understood as an attempt to ensure – that the goods the politician promised in return for voting support will only be distributed to actual supporters. Programmatic electoral strategies,  in con‐trast,  lack  similar monitoring  systems, which means  that  there  is  a much  greater likelihood that even non‐supporters will benefit from the allocation of resources af‐ter  the election. However, we  can distinguish programmatic  strategies  in  terms of how  clearly  they  define  the  target  group  for  the  redistribution  of  goods. While  a catch‐all  strategy  seeks  to  aggregate  the widest  possible  variety  of  social  interest, narrow programmatic strategies aim at a clearly specified electoral clientele consist‐ing  of  individuals  who  define  themselves  as  belonging  to  a  distinct  social  group. Hence, in the latter case – similar to clientelistic strategies – voters will be mobilised through  “club  goods”  –  benefits  for  subsets  of  citizens  that  impose  costs  on  other subsets (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 11). In addition to clientelistim and the two programmatic strategies just outlined we can identify two further electoral strategies: charisma and coercion. Charisma, in the classical Weberian  sense,  refers  to  “supernatural,  superhuman,  or  at  least  specifi‐cally exceptional powers and authorities”  (Weber 1964: 358), meaning  that politi‐cians can mobilise votes simply through their personal skills and powers of persua‐sion. Electoral strategies are coercive when politicians make use of violence and in‐timidation  in  order  to  achieve  electoral  success.  Both  these  strategies,  however, 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should  only  be  considered  secondary  strategies, which  are  used  in  a  combination with  either  a  clientelistic  or  a programmatic  electoral  strategy  (Hicken 2007:  54). Whereas charisma clearly has natural limits, suggesting that only a very small num‐ber of politicians can rely on charisma alone, the use of violence is very cost inten‐sive and carries great personal risk. Both strategies can theoretically combined with either clientelism or programmatic appeals.   
Strategically selective contexts 
 Having  identified  the basic  electoral  strategies political  actors  can use  to mobilise voters, we  should now  turn our  attention  towards  the  structural  environment. As historical institutionalism teaches us, the context around actors is itself strategically selective, meaning that it will favour certain strategies over others. In other words, when  choosing  between  potential  courses  of  action,  actors  will  have  to  take  into consideration  the  environment  in which  their  strategy  is  to  be  realised.  As  social agents  are knowledgeable  and able  to  enhance  their understanding of  the  context around  them – and  the  constraints  and opportunities  this  context  imposes –  their intentional conduct will produce systemically structured outcomes. In other words, we will not see a confusing array of strategies, but the context will select for a cer‐
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tain outcome, thereby – in combination with the learning effect on agents – causing certain regularities to emerge over time. However – and this is a very important point – although the outcome is strategi‐cally selected for, it is by no means inevitable. First of all, in order to realise the op‐portunities  inherent  in  a  particular  environmental  context,  access  to  strategic  re‐sources is crucial. That is to say, although contextual factors facilitate the strategies of actors with access to these particular resources over the expense of those without access, the latter can develop alternative strategies – requiring different sets of re‐sources – to deal with the problems posed to them by the context. Secondly, in order to act strategically actors must interpret the context. As interpretations of the envi‐ronment can vary between actors, actors’ strategic responses will accordingly differ. In short, we can make certain predictions about the most likely outcome, but actors are always able to develop strategies that will deviate from this strategically selec‐ted outcome – either because they control different sets of resources or hold differ‐ent sets of ideas through which to interpret the context. More precisely, we should not be surprised to find clientelistic, catch‐all and narrowly focused electoral strat‐egies within the same structural environment.  Keeping these basic theoretical propositions in mind, the first thing to note about newer democracies as a context for the formation and adaptation of political parties is  that  they  are  strategically  selective  towards  clientelism  and  catch‐all  program‐matic  appeals.  The  reasons  lie  in  the  sequence  of  democratisation  in  the  “third wave”, which has been very different from earlier waves of democratisation. First of 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all,  unlike  in Europe, processes of national unification and  industrial development did  not  precede  political mobilisation,  nor  have  these  processes  necessarily  been realised since (Randall 2001). Consequently, electoral strategies aiming to mobilise clearly defined social groups are likely to be unsuccessful, as social group identities will not translate into voting behaviour. Secondly, while the “first wave” of democra‐tisation  is  best  described  as  a  gradual  process,  the  democratic  transitions  in  the “third wave” have been relatively sudden, not leaving political parties enough time to  formulate clear programmatic platforms and develop close ties  to specific voter clienteles.  While  the  context  in  newer  democracies  thus  militates  against  narrow  pro‐grammatic strategies, we need to look at structural factors at the polity level to de‐cide whether the specific environment favours either clientelistic or catch‐all strat‐egies.  Contextual  environments  that  are  strategically  selective  towards  clientelism are  those  characterised  by  a  high  level  of  poverty.10  The most  convincing  explan‐ation as  to why  the poor are an effective  target  for  clientelistic practices  refers  to income inequality as the causal mechanism (Robinson and Verdier 2002): A context of  low  socio‐economic  development  favours  clientelistic  over  programmatic  strat‐egies,  it  is argued, because voters are  likely  to accept  low‐value rewards  in return for their electoral support, while the upper class, paying for both these rewards and 
                                                10 Other factors that are frequently mentioned as having a positive effect on the effectiveness of clien‐telistic electoral strategies are the institutional context – in particular the electoral system (for exam‐ple Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003; Kunicova and Rose‐Ackerman 2005) – and mass political cul‐ture (for example Putnam 1993). However, the empirical evidence is far from convincing and the rel‐evant literature is understandably divided over these two factors. Rather, it is argued here that al‐though both the institutional context and mass political culture can contribute to a personalisation of politics, this should not automatically be equated with clientelism. 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the maintenance of the monitoring system, will only have to invest a small share of their own resources. Economic development, on the other hand, will make clientel‐istic transfers more expensive, as they will have to be paid by a growing upper mid‐dle class, increasingly targeted at a lower middle class. That is to say, payments be‐come more and more expensive to politicians. As a result, the best strategy for po‐litical parties is to withhold the reward from the voter. Knowing that the party, even if it wins, is likely not to reward voters, voters are always better off defecting.  However, this does not mean that in a context of higher economic development programmatic catch‐all  strategies  targeted specifically at  the growing middle class become the strategically selected outcome. In fact,  if clientelism is established as a repeated  game,  it  can  be  strategically  selected  for  even  in  higher  developed  soci‐eties. Viewed from a game theoretical perspective, clientelism will not work under conditions  of  higher  economic  development  as  a  one‐shot  game. But  if  the  dyadic relationship between the politician and the voter  is embedded  in a social network this will help solve  the prisoner’s dilemma (Stokes 2007). Hence,  theoretically, es‐tablishing  a  clientelistic network  in  a  relatively developed  society  is  very difficult, because – as explained in the previous paragraph – the initial game is very likely to result  in one of the two sides defecting.  Instead,  the clientelistic exchange must be reproduced over time, assuring both sides that the respective other side will comply with the agreement. More specifically,  in newer democracies,  the environmental  context will  favour clientelism as a strategy of voter mobilisation, if the former autocratic regime used 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clientelistic means to gain support  from the population.11 However,  it will also de‐pend on  the  type of democratic  transition as  to whether  the clientelistic networks will be able to survive the end of non‐democratic rule (cf. Kitschelt 1995). In other words, when describing the context around parties in new democracies we need to ask  two  questions:  (1) Who  held  power  under  the  autocratic  regime  and  (2)  did these actors use clientelism to legitimise (or “buy” legitimisation for) their power? If the answer to the second question is “yes”, we then need to ask whether these ac‐tors were able  to maintain  their positions of power  through the democratic  trans‐formation of the political system, or whether the transition was triggered and con‐trolled  by  the  pro‐democratic  opposition  from  below,  leading  to  a  total  “replace‐ment”  (Huntington 1991) of  the regime.  If elements of  the autocratic  regime were able to maintain their positions of power, we should expect them to use their access to state resources to both sustain the monitoring network and provide material in‐centives for voters.   The  relevant  contextual  environment  to  make  predictions  about  the  electoral strategies  to  emerge  in  new  democracies  is  summarised  in  Figure  1.  However,  it must again be noted that these predictions will always be imperfect. As this analyti‐cal framework tries to integrate both structure and agency, we can only predict out‐comes that are strategically selected for. That is to say, these outcomes are not inevi‐
                                                11 Whether the autocratic regime had been able to establish effective clientelistic networks will have depended on a number of other factors commonly identified in the literature as causes for clientelism – most importantly, the degree of state control over the economy (Wilkinson 2007) and the degree of bureaucratic professionalisation (Shefter 1994). For matters of simplification these factors will be excluded from our analytical framework or otherwise the historical chain of causality would become uncontrollable. 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table, but actors can always develop alternative electoral strategies that go against the strategically  selected outcome.  In particular, we should not  rule out  the possi‐bility of actors developing narrow programmatic appeals targeted at clearly defined social groups – a strategic option that we would theoretically not expect in new de‐mocracies of the “third wave”.             
Linking electoral strategies and organisational preferences 




   
within the same political party. As a result of this, parties should not be regarded as unitary  actors  but  rather  as  collections  of  individuals  and  sub‐party  factions with often diverging interests and strategies. Acknowledging this notion of political par‐ties as coalitions of factions – and largely reflecting our earlier distinction between clientelistic  and  programmatic  electoral  strategies  –  Sartori  (1976:  76‐77)  distin‐guishes “factions of principle” and “factions of  interest”. While factions of principle primarily serve to articulate different policy  ideas,  the main  function of  factions of interest, on the other hand, is to allocate posts and resources among their members. Put  differently,  factions  of  principle  develop  programmatic  appeals,  whereas  fac‐tions of  interest are clientelistic networks connecting politicians  to voters  through the allocation of resources. Based on  their particular  electoral  strategies,  these  factions hold different pre‐ferences as to the organisation of the party: Whereas factions of principle will push for a transformation of inter‐factional power relations into a set of formal rules, fac‐tions  of  interest  will  resist  a  formalisation  of  decision‐making  procedures.  Politi‐cians following a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilisation should theoretically not be  interested  in  the  formal  party  organisation  as  the  central  arena  for  decision‐making,  because  clientelism  is  built  around  particularistic  relationships.  Under these  circumstances,  collective decision‐making mechanisms become unnecessary, but conflict will rather be resolved through the allocation of resources: 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Because [clientelism] relies on material incentives and self‐interest, it undermines the very essence of the organization using it: the po‐litical party […] With self‐interest as the link between voter and the party, and between politician and the party, sacrifices for the collec‐tive  good of  the party  are unlikely  to  occur  […]  [Clientelism] pre‐vents collective decision‐making by the voters and by the party. (Warner 1997: 535)  Consequently,  the  formal party organisation will  be without  a  real purpose,  but  it will only act as a formal cloak around the clientelistic networks. There is no need to invest in the formal organisation, as all functions usually attributed to political par‐ties, such as the recruitment of candidates or the mobilisation of supporters, can be performed by the clientelistic machine. For the formal party organisation this means that the different elements – the party on the ground, the party central office and the party  in  public  office  –  are  indistinguishable,  simply  because,  as Duverger  (1964) explained in regard to the classical cadre party, admission to the party will depend on the individual’s capacity to contribute politically relevant resources that can then be used to maintain and extend the clientelistic networks. As a result there will be a large personal overlap between the three faces, making it impossible to draw clear boundaries between them. Politicians following a programmatic strategy, on the other hand, will necessarily have to  invest  in  the political party as an arena  for collective decision‐making and 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conflict  resolution  among  diverse  interests.  This  imperative  follows  from  the  fact that   the party must speak with a more or  less single collective voice in order  to  create  a measure of  confidence  among voters  that  it will pursue the policy objectives after elections it has announced before an election.  (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 9)  However,  how  parties  will  organise  collective  decision‐making  will  depend  on whether  their  programmatic  strategy  targets  clearly  definable  social  groups  or whether it is rather a catch‐all strategy. If politicians aim to mobilise a distinct elec‐toral clientele, they will assign a high value to constituency representation and de‐velop a policy platform that clearly reflects the interests of this constituency. Conse‐quently,  ideological  consistency and  conformity  are  important keys  to  achieve  the party’s goal, which is why politicians following a narrow programmatic strategy of voter mobilisation should be interested in strengthening the party central office in order  to  increase  discipline  among  the  representatives  in  public  office.  If,  on  the other hand, politicians aim to appeal  to the wider electorate,  they should be  inter‐ested  in  a  powerful  parliamentary party,  because  the parties’  elected officials will need considerable freedom of action to prove themselves as managers of the public good.  Hence,  as  in  the  case  of  electoral  strategies  targeting  well‐defined  social 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groups, there is still a need for formal mechanisms of collective decision‐making in order to articulate policy objectives, but these policy objectives will be formulated in very general terms, making it necessary to take more concrete political decision in parliament on an everyday basis. However,  whether  to  strengthen  the  party  central  office  or  the  parliamentary party is not only the product of actors’  interests, but actors will again have to take into consideration the structural context. As the more general literature on organi‐sations  points  out,  the  environment  surrounding  an  organisation  should  be  de‐scribed according to its degree of uncertainty.12 The basic theory claims that organi‐sations naturally resist unpredictability, and will thus adapt accordingly in order to render  the  outcomes  of  their  actions  more  certain  (see  Burns  and  Stalker  1961; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). Correspondingly,  it  is hypothesised here that the out‐come strategically selected for by a context of high uncertainty is a centralisation of power within the party organisation and thus a more powerful party central office. In other words, under conditions of high environmental uncertainty, actors follow‐ing a catch‐all strategy will be under great pressure to strengthen the party central office in order to increase party discipline – although this outcome is by no means inevitable. In  new democracies,  environmental  uncertainty  for  political  parties  is  particu‐larly high, given that voter loyalties are often only weakly developed, which reflects 
                                                12 This is at least the assumption of contingency theory, which is considered the dominant approach to organisation design. For an application of the concept of uncertainty to the study of party organi‐sation see Panebianco (1988: 204). 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in  high  levels  of  party  system  fragmentation  and  electoral  volatility  (Mainwaring 1998). Moreover, loyalties also tend to be underdeveloped within parties, leading to frequent inter‐party conflicts (van Biezen 2003b: 216). These conflicts are particu‐larly  damaging  when  they  affect  the  stability  of  government  coalitions,  thereby jeopardising  the party’s  capacity  to  influence public policy outcomes.  In  short,  the context  for  politicians  following  a  catch‐all  electoral  strategy  should  be  described along  the  following  indicators  for  environmental  uncertainty:  party  system  frag‐mentation, electoral volatility and government durability.                
FIGURE 2:      PARTY ORGANISATION – STRATEGICALLY SELECTED OUTCOMES 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Whereas  a  programmatic  electoral  strategy  thus  requires  a  party  organisation  to provide formalised decision‐making procedures, the two secondary electoral strat‐egies outlined above – similar to clientelism – do not need large investments into the political  party  as  an  abstract  institution.  In  the  case  of  charisma,  decision‐making authority  will  flow  naturally  from  the  leader’s  personality  (cf.  Panebianco  1988), while parties  following  a  coercive  electoral  strategy will  only have  to  invest  in  an informal militant  group. Hence,  just  as  clientelism,  charisma  and  coercion will  re‐duce the function of the party organisation to that of a formal legal cloak, meaning that the three elements of party organisation will be indistinguishable. When com‐bined with programmatic strategies, we should still expect parties to develop formal procedures  for  decision‐making,  but,  depending  on  how much  the  party  relies  on either charisma or coercion as an electoral strategy, these secondary strategies can create informal channels of authority that will circumvent the formal regulations. However,  the central  causal mechanisms  to explain different  types of party or‐ganisation are still clientelistic incentives and programmatic appeals. Using these as the link between the structural context and organisational preferences, we can now identify the strategically selected outcomes in terms of party organisation (see Fig‐ure 2). As was discussed earlier,  the context of young democracies clearly  favours either  clientelistic  or  catch‐all  electoral  strategies  and we  should  therefore  expect either parties without formal organisational  faces or parties with the party central office as the dominant element as the strategically selected outcome. However, ac‐tors  following  a  catch‐all  strategy will  have  to  take  into  consideration  the  level  of 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environmental uncertainty: If environmental uncertainty is high they will be under great pressure to strengthen the party central office rather than the parliamentary party. Based on  the  idea  that  actors  can develop different  strategies within  the  same party, we should then see the reproduction and change of parties as a constant con‐flict between internal actors, each pushing for the organisational structures that will best  allow  the  implementation  of  their  respective  electoral  strategy.  Accordingly, factions of  interest will resist a  formalisation of decision‐making norms, while  fac‐tions  of  principle  will  be  interested  in  strengthening  the  role  of  the  party  as  the principal arena for decision‐making. Depending on whether the latter follow a catch‐all or a narrowly focused electoral strategy, they will work towards a more powerful parliamentary party or a stronger party central office respectively. In other words, the development of political parties is not a linear process, as maintained by struc‐turalist approaches to party organisation, but it is an open‐ended process driven by conflicting electoral strategies within the same context.  However, unlike voluntarist approaches suggest, the context strategically selects for a certain outcome, thereby strengthening certain actors over others. As the power‐based strand within historical  institutionalism maintains, the dis‐tribution of power between actors within the same party is thus the mechanism to explain both the reproduction of the party organisation and organisational changes. Party organisations  reproduce over  time as  conflicting  interests  create a deadlock situation, with neither  side being able  to advance  their  interests any  further. Con‐
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versely,  changes  to  party  organisation  will  become  possible  if  the  distribution  of power within the party is altered. This can happen under either of two conditions: (1)  the relevant environment around  the party changes  to such an extent  that  the strategically selected outcome becomes a different one; or (2) a  faction chooses to change its strategy in attempt to deal more effectively with the problems posed by the given context. In other words,  in the first case the context changes while strat‐egies stay the same, whereas in the second case actors offer new strategies for un‐changed environmental conditions.   
Summary 
 From the theoretical framework just outlined it should have become clear that pre‐dicting the development of political parties in new democracies per se is impossible. That is to say, it is very unlikely that parties in new democracies will follow exactly the same path of organisational development as their counterparts  in Western Eu‐rope, nor should we expect them to take an “evolutionary leap” towards more con‐temporary  models  of  party  organisation  found  in  the  established  democracies  in Western industrialised countries. Furthermore, it is highly improbable that all par‐ties in new democracies will converge towards a common type of party organisation 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that will clearly distinguish them from parties formed in earlier waves of democrati‐sation. Making  predictions  about  the  development  of  political  party  organisations  in newly  democratic  societies  becomes  impossible,  as  our  analytical  framework  ac‐knowledges  the  importance  of  human  agency.  Accordingly,  all we  can  predict  are strategically  selected  outcomes,  as  contextual  environments  favour  certain  out‐comes over others. These outcomes, however, are by no means inevitable as actors are able to develop alternative strategies within the same context. We should there‐fore  allow  for  the  possibility  that  different  strategies  may  compete  against  each other both within the same polity and the same political party. The development of political parties is thus best described as a constant conflict between different party internal actors following different strategies and interests. Given that the defining function of political parties is to compete in public elec‐tions,  actors’  electoral  strategies  become  the  key  to  understand  different  types  of party organisation. Broadly  speaking, we  can distinguish between clientelistic  and programmatic strategies for voter mobilisation, with the latter further differentiated as to whether the platform is narrowly defined or aimed at aggregating a wide range of social views. While  the environmental context  in new democracies of  the  “third wave” strategically selects for clientelistic and catch‐all strategies, it depends on the particular  context  in which actors make  their  strategic  calculations as  to which of these two will be the most likely outcome. Generally, a context characterised by low levels of income inequality and/or a democratic transition largely controlled by an 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autocratic regime that made wide use of clientelistic incentives to legitimise its non‐democratic  rule  will  strategically  select  for  clientelism  as  the  dominant  electoral strategy. Electoral  strategies  are  then  closely  linked  to  preferences  for  certain  types  of party organisation: While actors following a clientelistic strategy for voter mobilisa‐tion will resist a formalisation of decision‐making, actors campaigning on program‐matic appeals will be  interested  in  strengthening  the  formal party organisation as the  central  arena  for  decision‐making. More  precisely,  those  campaigning  on  nar‐rowly focused programmatic appeals will push for a centralisation of power in the party central office, whereas actors with a catch‐all  strategy will  try  to strengthen the  party  in  public  office  vis‐à‐vis  the  other  elements  of  party  organisation. How‐ever, in new democracies environmental uncertainty for political parties tends be to relatively high, making it difficult to realise this latter option. As actors within the same party can follow different electoral strategies and thus hold different preferences as to the organisation of the party, the organisational de‐velopment  of  political  parties  is  best  described  as  an  on‐going  conflict  between party internal groupings with an interest in either reproducing or transforming the party  organisation.  This  conflict  will  lead  to  party  change  if  changes  in  the  envi‐ronment strengthen groups rejecting the current norms and regulations, or if actors decide to change their strategies. However, in order to realise the opportunities cre‐ated  by  environmental  changes  actors must  both  control  the  necessary  resources and interpret these changes as opportunities in the first place. Moreover, changing 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In  a  logical  sequence,  the  theoretical  assumptions  that  constitute  our  analytical framework  shape  our  research  methodology.  Thus,  this  chapter  will  discuss  the methodological implications of conceptualising the development of political parties as  a  constant  conflict  between  strategic  actors  in  a  strategically  selective  context. This involves operationalising the variables that constitute our theory of party for‐mation and change, deciding on appropriate methods of data collection and analysis, and selecting the cases.    
Measurement  The preceding chapter  identified  several variables  that need  to be  taken  into  con‐sideration when explaining party formation and change. These variables must now 
POLITICAL PARTY ORGANISATION IN EAST ASIA    
 – 99 – 
   
be operationalised in order to make them empirically measurable. As a general rule for the process of operationalisation, the chosen indicators must adequately capture the full content of the concept the researcher seeks to analyse (Adcock and Collier 2001).   
The environmental context 
 To  remind  ourselves,  in  order  to  make  a  prediction  about  electoral  strategies  – which are the key to understanding different types of party organisation – the envi‐ronment  around  political  parties  in  new  democracies  should  be  described  along three variables:  (1)  the autocratic regime,  (2)  the process of democratic  transition and (3) the level of socio‐economic development. These variables do not have a de‐terministic influence on human behaviour, but they will help us to predict outcomes that are strategically selected for by they environment. Since “third wave” democra‐cies as a context mitigate against narrow programmatic electoral strategies, the only two outcomes we  should  expect  are  either  clientelistic  practices  or  catch‐all  cam‐paigns.  Clientelism will  always  be  the  strategically  selected  outcome under  condi‐tions  of  low  socio‐economic  development,  which  provide  the  perfect  breeding ground for vote‐buying and/or patronage. Most importantly, in less developed soci‐eties, clientelism does not need to be established as a repetitive game, but it can be 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set up from zero. In order to measure the level of socio‐economic development the following  indicators will be used:  (1) GDP per capita,  (2)  the Gini coefficient13,  (3) the degree of urbanisation and (4) the literacy rate. Whereas the first two indicators are related the question of how much of their resources politicians will need to in‐vest in the establishment of a clientelistic network, the latter two indicators have an influence  on  how  well  the  system  to  monitor  voters’  compliance  will  work:  It  is much easier  to maintain  effective monitoring  systems  in  rural  areas, while poorly educated voters might not know about  the unlawfulness of vote‐buying and other clientelistic methods. However, if clientelism is established as a repetitive game, clientelistic electoral strategies can also be the strategically selected outcome in more modern societies. In new democracies this will, first of all, depend on whether the outgoing autocratic regime used clientelistim to legitimise its power. Unfortunately, the literature does not offer any typology of non‐democratic regimes that would capture the differences we are interested in.14 It is therefore necessary to build our own typology, based on two separate dimensions. First of all, we need to ask how the regime legitimised its rule: Was  the curtailment of political pluralism  justified only by universalistic mo‐tives – such as the need for development and modernisation, religious beliefs, politi‐cal  ideologies,  an  external military  threat  or  nationalism  –  or  did  the  regime  also 
                                                13 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality of the distribution of income. It is defined as a ratio with values between 0 and 1: 0 corresponds to perfect income equality, while 1 corresponds to per‐fect income inequality.  14 Probably the most influential typology of autocratic regimes is the conceptualisation by Linz (2000), which is organised around three core dimensions: (1) the degree of pluralism, (2) the degree of mobilisation, and (3) the degree of ideology. 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maintain clientelistic exchange relations with the population through which to “buy” political support? Secondly,  in order  to establish whether  the elements controlling these clientelistic relationships were able to re‐establish themselves as political ac‐tors  in  the new democracy  it  is necessary  to ask: Who ruled? Possible answers  to this question are a single leader, a political party, the military or the bureaucracy. However, in order for the clientelistic networks to survive the transformation of the political system, the democratic transition must at least be partly controlled by the regime elites: If the regime is completely removed from power, this means that the  clientelistic  networks will  decay,  as  they  are  disconnected  from  the  supply  of public  resources.  Following  Huntington  (1991),  we  can  distinguish  three ways  in which  an  autocratic  regime  can  be  developed  into  a  democracy:  (1)  “transforma‐tion”,  (2)  “replacement”  and  (3)  “transplacement”.  In  a  transformation  the  regime takes the lead in institutionalising democracy, while in a replacement the regime is overthrown, allowing opposition groups to control the process of transition. Trans‐placement, on the other hand, describes the situation when neither the regime nor the pro‐democratic  opposition have  the necessary power  to  control  the  transition process independently of each other. Democratisation will hence largely result from joint action. In other words, elements of the authoritarian regime will be able keep positions of power  in a  transformation and a replacement, whereas a replacement provides the worst conditions for the regime to maintain its clientelistic networks. We  should  therefore  expect  the  context  to  favour  catch‐all  electoral  strategies over  clientelism  under  conditions  of  high  socio‐economic  development,  provided 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that the exiting autocratic regime did not use clientelistic appeals to “buy” legitima‐tion for its non‐democratic use of power – or if it did, that the democratic transition was triggered from below and completely removed the autocratic elites from power. As explained in the previous chapter, actors following a catch‐all strategy to mobi‐lise voters should be interested in strengthening the party in public office. However, if  environmental  uncertainty  is  high,  these  actors will  be  under  great  pressure  to centralise power in the party central office in order to increase party discipline. En‐vironmental  uncertainty  for  political  parties  can  be measured  along  the  following dimensions:  party  system  fragmentation,  electoral  volatility  and  government  lon‐gevity.  Party  system  fragmentation  can  be  expressed  as  the  “effective  number  of parties” through the index developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), which takes account of both the number of parties in the system and their share of votes/seats. A widely used method  to  capture  electoral  volatility  is  the Pedersen  index, which  is equal to the next percentage of voters who changed their votes between two subse‐quent elections (Pedersen 1979). Finally, government stability is measured in years, using the following criteria to determine the end of a cabinet: (1) new elections, (2) change  in  party  composition  or  (3)  change  in  prime ministership/presidency  (Li‐jphart  1999:  132).  Environmental  uncertainty  is  higher,  the  higher  party  system fragmentation and electoral volatility, and the lower government durability. 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Party organisation 
 Several  typologies  of  party  organisation  have  been  offered  (see  Krouwel  2006). These are, however, not without major weaknesses. First of all, most party models were  developed  in  the  context  of  politics  in Western  Europe  (cf.  Wolinetz  2002: 137). This makes them difficult to apply to the numerous parties that have only re‐cently  emerged  through  the  third  wave  of  democratisation  in  other  parts  of  the world.  Due  to  this  “travelling  problem”  (Sartori  1970),  the  real‐world  differences between  political  parties  in  young  democracies  and  their  counterparts  in  estab‐lished democracies in the West are often obscured. Moreover, existing typologies of party organisation suffer from a “transformation bias” (van Biezen 2003a: 178), as most of the existing party types actually reflect models of party change rather than models of party organisation per se. However, a general theory of party organisation must necessarily be based on party models that can accommodate theoretical claims on both party adaptation and formation. Broadly speaking, there are two solutions to these problems. One is to develop a new typology that can capture the broad empirical variation among political parties in different parts of the world (see Gunther and Diamond 2003), the other is to dis‐integrate existing party models  into  their  single elements  (see van Biezen 2003b). The latter option has undeniable advantages, since it much more effectively adds to existing knowledge concerning the organisation of political parties. Introducing yet another typology of political parties would make it difficult to compare our results 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with  those  that  have  already  been  generated  by  the  existing  literature.  However, simply disintegrating existing types is not enough, but the single indicators that we obtain must be clustered according to a meaningful matrix that defines the interplay between these defining characteristics (Sartori 1984: 46‐50; 1993). In order to integrate the new model into the ongoing debates surrounding party organisation, the power relations between the “party on the ground”, the “party in central office” and the “party in public office” promise to offer such a meaningful or‐ganising matrix. These relations are extremely valuable, since they have a significant effect  on  the  linkages between  civil  society,  political  parties,  and  the  state. Hence, the particular functioning of a democracy will always depend on the internal power relations  of  the parties  competing within  its  boundaries  (cf. Katz  and Mair  1995). According to the democratic ideal, political parties should function as “gatekeepers” (Easton 1965)  of  the  political  system by  aggregating  social  interests  into  possible policy options. Parties fulfil this role as a bridge between civil society and the state when, as in the era of the mass party, there is a symbiotic relationship between the party on the ground and the party in central office. If the party internal power pen‐dulum swings too far towards the party on the ground, the party will not be able to realise  demands  from  civil  society  against  the  interests  of  the  state  bureaucracy. Conversely,  if  it  swings  too  far  towards  the  party  in  public  office,  the  party  will transform into an agent of the state, removed from civil society. If no clear distinc‐tion can be made between the three faces (similar to the classical cadre party), civil society, the party system, and the state will also be indistinct. 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When disaggregating existing models of party organisation we obtain a number of formal indicators that serve to evaluate the power distribution between the party on the ground, the party in central office, and the party in public office. In order to assess the relative strength of the party on the ground scholars usually rely on the size  of  the  party  membership.  The  simplest  measure  by  which  to  assess  party membership  strength  is  simply  to  compare  the  absolute  number  of members  be‐tween different parties over time. However, although such a raw membership count is valuable  information  for  the  individual party,  it does not allow us  to control  for such  intervening  variables  as  the  size  of  the  electorate. Hence,  it must  be  supple‐mented with more sophisticated methods to evaluate the strength of  the member‐ship organisation. One method is to express the absolute numbers as a percentage of the party’s own electorate. Yet, the weakness of this technique is that it wrongly as‐sumes each party  to have a  fixed electorate  (Katz et al. 1992: 331). Therefore,  the better indicator for party membership strength is the ratio of a party’s membership to the overall national electorate. The problem with standardised membership figures in general, however, is that the figures vary according to the party’s performance in attracting members, which again  is dependent on a number of  factors beyond the control of  the party  leader‐ship. Thus,  if we want  to  include some space  for agency  in our  theory of party or‐ganisation, we also need to take into account the height of barriers separating party members  from non‐members,  because only  these  can  –  at  least  in  theory  –  inten‐tionally be shaped by  the actors within  the party. Generally,  the  level of  inclusive‐
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ness of a party can be determined by the extent of duties and privileges attached to party membership, and by  the ease or difficulty of enrolment  (Scarrow 1996: 30). On  a more  specific  level we  can  ask  the  following  questions  to  operationalise  the ease of access to party membership:   (1) Is enrolment open or restricted (Duverger 1964: 72)? Does the party require that individuals meet certain conditions, such as age, ethnicity or nationality? (2) How formal is the membership procedure? For instance, joining socialist par‐ties in the early 20th century required the would‐be member to follow a leng‐thy application procedure that, among other formalities, involved signing the party’s statutes, and securing sponsorship from existing members. Moreover, one often had to go through a probationary period in order to be granted full member rights. (3) Do members need to pay regular dues? And if so, how much do they have to pay? In order to allow for cross‐country comparison the level of membership dues should be put in relation to the average per‐capita income.  How high  the party  sets  the barriers of party membership  tells us  a  lot  about  the type of members the party  is  looking to attract. Broadly speaking, we can say that the  lower  the  barriers  the  less  engagement  in  party‐internal  politics  is  excepted from members. In this regard, Scarrow (1994: 51) distinguishes five different forms of  activities  for  party  members  (ranked  in  increasing  order  according  to  the  in‐
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tensity of engagement): (1) statistic, (2) donor, (3) ideas, (4) volunteer, and (5) can‐didate.  It  is reasonable to claim that the party on the ground will weakest,  if party members are only perceived as statistic. It will be more powerful, if party members are  recruited as  important providers of money,  ideas,  and  free  labour. Finally,  the party on the ground will be strongest if, in addition, it is also perceived as a pool of potential candidates for public elections. Measuring  the strength of party on  the ground – based on a combination of  its numerical  strength  and  its  inclusiveness  –  provides  very  little  value,  if we  do  not also consider the relative power of the two other organisational faces. A second and more comprehensive indicator of the distribution of power within a political party is the procedure used  to select candidates  for public elections. Whereas many of  the functions originally monopolised by political parties are now also exercised by other institutions, competing for governmental offices – and the necessary recruitment of political  leadership – remains the exclusive realm of parties. Hence, given the rela‐tive  importance of electoral competition as a motivation to establish and sustain a party,  the  selection of  candidates  inevitably becomes one of  the  central  objects  of party  internal  power  struggles  (Gallagher  1988a).  In  other  words,  the  process  of candidate selection is not only an indicator of the distribution of power within a po‐litical party, but it also influences the distribution of power. Existing models  of  party  organisation  usually  put most  emphasis  on  the  inclu‐siveness of the procedures of candidate selection, asking who is entitled to vote  in the decision‐making process (see Katz 2001). Hence, if we want to compare parties 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in young democracies  to  their counterparts  in Western Europe, we should  include the same indicator in our analytical framework. According to the operationalisation of candidate selection developed by Rahat and Hazan (2001), the selectorate, i.e. the body that nominates the candidates for election, can be classified on a continuum. At the most inclusive extreme, every citizen has the right to participate. At the most ex‐clusive extreme, on the other hand, the selection of candidates will only be decided by  a  single  party  leader.  The main  categories  in‐between  these  two  extremes  are summarised in Figure 3.   











   
access  to candidacy: Who  is  allowed  to present his  or her  candidacy  in  the  candi‐date‐selection process? Again,  this  dimension  can be  classified  in  a  continuum: At the inclusive end, every voter can stand as party candidate; at the exclusive end, po‐tential candidates will have to fulfil a series of restrictive conditions (see Figure 3).15 If the procedure of candidate selection under analysis can be placed at the highly inclusive end, the researcher can certainly  identify the party  in public office as the dominant organisational face. This is because membership records administered by the party in central office will not play an important role in mobilising support, and because the party on the ground will be atomised. However, it becomes difficult to measure the distribution of power when party agencies are involved in nominating the candidates or electing the party leader (who then monopolises nomination). Of‐ten, such agencies are composed of representatives  from the different  faces – par‐ticularly from the party in central office and the party in public office, making it dif‐ficult to isolate a dominant face. Consequently, we should supplement candidate se‐lection, which only paints a very general power‐map of a party, with more accurate indicators to determine the internal balance of power. Based on the work by van Biezen (2000; 2003b) on political parties in the young democracies of Southern and East‐Central Europe, we can identify a number of as‐pects  in  the official party rules  that will help  to describe  the relationship between 
                                                15 The framework by Rahat and Hazan includes two further indicators. One is the degree of the terri‐torial (or functional) decentralisation of candidate selection. However, this concept has hardly any influence on the internal balance of power between the three faces of party organisation, and will thus not be included here. The same applies to the fourth indicator developed by Rahat and Hazan – the question of whether each candidate is determined exclusively by votes or whether an agreed‐upon list is ratified by the selectorate. This dimension has probably a greater impact on the problem of who gets nominated, hence candidate recruitment (see Norris 1996). 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To sum up,  the power relations between  the  three  faces of party organisation can effectively be measured by describing parties along three dimensions: (1) member‐ship,  (2)  candidate  selection and  (3)  ties between extra‐parliamentary and parlia‐mentary organs. These three central elements of party organisation and their basic properties are again summarised in Table 4.  Feeding  these  indicators  back  into  our  organising matrix will  then  allow us  to measure the distribution of power between the three faces of party organisation. As a reminder, there are three possible power constellations: (1) The three faces are be indistinguishable, (2) the party in central office is the dominant face or (3) the party in public office  is  the dominant  face. The three central elements of party organisa‐tion are  indistinguishable  if party membership  is highly exclusive –  that  is, admis‐sion to membership is dependent on whether the person in question can contribute resources  that make  him  a  strong  candidate  in  public  elections  –  the  selection  of candidates highly centralised, and the party bureaucracy almost non‐existent, while the  leadership of the parliamentary party often perfectly overlaps with the  leader‐ship  of  the  party  as  a whole. On  the  other  hand,  the  party  in  public  office will  be dominant organisational  face  if both party membership and the selection of candi‐dates are highly inclusive, with the latter often organised as open primaries, and the parliamentary party controlling most of the party’s resources and decision‐making. Finally,  the  party  central  office  will  be  the  dominant  face,  if  admission  to  party membership  is  located  somewhere  between  highly  inclusive  and  highly  exclusive, candidate selection decided by membership vote within the party and control over 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resources  and  decision‐making  exercised  by  the  party  bureaucracy  and  the  party leadership.   
Data collection  As  the  previous  section  demonstrated,  different  types  of  data will  be  required  to empirically test our theory of party formation and adaptation. We need to fill vari‐ous  levels of  analysis with empirical  information,  ranging  from  the environmental context, the formal organisation of political parties and the power relations between party internal groups to actors’ electoral strategies. Depending on the nature of the data, social scientists make use of a wide variety of data collection techniques. In our case,  documentary  analysis  and  elite  interviews  are  certainly  the  most  adequate methods.  Concerning  the  sequencing  of  these  two  stages  it  should  be  noted  that when interviewing elites, one should not only have detailed knowledge of the inter‐viewee, but also of the facts surrounding the event or the activity studied. Therefore, interviews should take place towards the end of the data collection process (Lilleker 2003: 212) and we shall begin with a documentary analysis. Usually, three different types of documents are distinguished: (1) primary sour‐ces, (2) secondary sources and (3) tertiary sources (Burnham et al. 2004: 165). Pri‐mary  sources  are  “those  that were written  (or  otherwise  came  into being)  by  the 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people directly involved and at a time contemporary or near contemporary with the period  being  investigated”  (Finnegan  1996:  141).  Primary  sources  that  should  be used in the analysis of party organisations are party statutes and other party docu‐ments, such as finance reports, membership statistics or proceedings of party meet‐ings. Secondary sources, on the other hand, consist of other evidence produced soon after the event, and usually made available to a larger public. When studying party organisations, printed mass media – one example of secondary sources – serves as a good  source  to  learn  more  about  the  inner‐workings  of  parties,  and  the  socio‐political  context  around  them.  The  same  applies  to  tertiary  sources,  which  differ from secondary sources in having been created much later after the event, such as books and academic journal articles. These also help the researcher to get a better understanding of the parties under analysis, and to structure the respective context.  The  problem with  documentary  sources  in  general  is  that  they  are  of  varying quality. While  it  is more difficult  to determine the reliability of secondary and ter‐tiary sources, Scott (1990: 6) suggests four easily manageable criteria to assess the quality of primary documents:  (1) Authenticity: Is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin? (2) Credibility: Is the evidence free from error and distortion? (3) Representativeness:  Is  the evidence typical of  its kind, and,  if not,  is  the ex‐tent of its untypicality known? (4) Meaning: Is the evidence clear and comprehensible? 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Official party documents are likely to be authentic and meaningful. Issues of repre‐sentativeness and credibility will probably exercise the researcher somewhat more. Representativeness could be a problem if the researcher is denied access to certain documents,  or  when  some  documents  have  been  destroyed.  While  this  could  be simply stated in the analysis, it is more difficult to establish credibility. One example are party membership figures. Political parties have a tendency to exaggerate their membership levels, and there is very little the analyst can do about this but to accept the figures made available by the parties (Mair and van Biezen 2001: 7‐8). Having analysed the most relevant documents, we can then proceed to interview elites. Interviews fulfil several purposes. Not only can they be used to fill gaps in the data, but most importantly they help us to understand how parties work in reality – behind the formal procedures and norms – as well as giving us an idea of the per‐ceptions and strategies held by the relevant party actors when designing the organi‐sation. Commonly, three different types of  interviews are identified: (1) structured interviews, (2) semi‐structured interviews, and (3) unstructured interviews (Punch 1998: 175). While  in structured  interviews the  interviewer reads out very specific questions exactly  in the same order as they are printed on the interview schedule, very  often  offering  the  interviewee  a  fixed  range  of  answers,  unstructured  inter‐views  tend  to be very  similar  in  character  to a  conversation, with  the  interviewer trying to cover a certain range of broader topics. In a semi‐structured interview, on the other hand, the researcher has a list of questions, but the interviewee has a great deal of leeway in how to reply. 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As we want to compare between parties and elites in order to explain why par‐ties organise in different ways, unstructured interviews are not a good choice, since a  comparison  always  requires  a  certain  level  of  standardisation  across  cases (Bryman 2001:  315). However, we  should  not  structure  the  interviews  too much, because  elites  “appreciate  being  treated  as  individuals”  (Zuckerman  1972:  174). Moreover,  as we  are  unlikely  to  have  nearly  perfect  knowledge  after  the  stage  of documentary  analysis,  questions  should  rather be open‐ended,  allowing  the  inter‐viewees  to  bring  in  their  full  expertise  as well  as  their  perceptions  of  the  events under analysis (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674). However, ultimately, the degree of standardisation applied to the interview will depend on who we are interviewing. Generally speaking, conventional sampling techniques can usually not be used in elite interviewing, since respondents are not of equal weight (Burnham et al. 2004: 207). Rather,  interviewees should be chosen on  the basis of  their  relevance  to  the research question and to the theoretical framework. Thus, in our case, we will inter‐view political party elites in order to collect the information about the formal party organisation, and academic experts as well as other elites (such as NGO leaders) to get an  insight  into  the  informal power dynamics within  the parties  studied. More‐over, the latter interviews will help us understand the meaning and relevance of our theoretical concepts in the different countries, as these can considerably differ from our Western European understanding. Consequently, we will use structured  inter‐
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views with political party elites16 in order to ensure full comparability between the political parties and semi‐structured interviews with party external elites. Similar to documents, elite interviews can suffer from problems of credibility. In some cases the interviewees can have different perceptions of what the facts are or they may also attempt to rewrite history in their own favour. In order to deal with this problem Davies (2001) – writing about elite interviewing in security and intelli‐gence  studies  –  suggests  applying  the method  of  “triangulation”.  This means  that data  the  researcher has  collected  from  interviews  is  cross‐referenced,  firstly, with data  obtained  from  primary  documents  and,  secondly,  with  published  secondary and tertiary source material. Where interviews conflict with written records, the lat‐ter should be taken as the final authority. If interviews come into conflict with other interviews, the uncertainty must be reported in the text.   
Data analysis  Once the data has been collected, it can be used to build general theories. Following Lijphart (1971; 1975), we can distinguish three social scientific methods that can be used for hypothesis‐testing: (1) the statistical method, (2) the comparative method and  (3)  the  case‐study  method.  The  first  two  methods  are  based  on  John  Stuart Mill’s  “methods  of  experimental  inquiry”,  which  are  “modes  of  singling  out  from 
                                                
16 See Appendix for questionnaire. 
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among the circumstances which precede or follow a phenomenon those with which it is really connected by an invariable law” (Mill 1875). In other words, by changing the circumstances in which a relationship among variables is observed, rival obser‐vations can be ruled out and hypotheses tested.  In political science, the most com‐mon  units  of  analysis  are  countries.  Countries  are  compared  to  control  for  those socio‐political  variables  that  are  not  part  of  the  hypothesised  causal  relationship, allowing the researcher to examine the effect of the independent variable on the de‐pendent  variable with more  confidence. As  such, both  the  statistical  and  the  com‐parative method can be seen as an inferior substitute for the experimental method, which  involves  the controlled manipulation of  the object of analysis under  labora‐tory conditions, but which due to practical and ethical impediments is not available in the social sciences. The  crucial  difference  between  the  statistical  method  and  the  comparative method  is  the  number  of  cases  compared  (Lijphart  1971:  684).  The  statistical method, which  is Mill’s “method of concomitant variations”, compares many cases. This is also referred to as “variable‐oriented” research (Ragin 1987), since cases are not compared directly to each other, but only broad patterns of covariation are as‐sessed, making it possible to infer a variable’s average, net effect in all contexts. The comparative method, on the other hand, compares a small number of cases. It is di‐vided primarily into two types of system design: the “most similar systems design” (MSSD)  and  the  “most  different  systems  design”  (MDSD)  (Przeworski  and  Teune 1970). While MSSD, which is based on Mill’s “method of difference”, compares cases 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that are as homogeneous as possible except the variables under analysis, MDSD, or Mill’s “method of agreement”, serves to analyse cases that, ideally, do not share any features but the variables that are part of the theory to be tested. These two designs of comparison are thus referred to as “case‐oriented” (Ragin 1987), because the re‐searcher  focuses  on  the  similarities  and  differences  among  cases,  rather  than  the analytical relationship between variables. Large‐N  comparisons  generally  suffer  from  two  serious weaknesses  (cf.  Land‐man 2000: 25; Mackie and Marsh 1995: 185). First of all, collecting data for the large number of cases necessary for a significant statistical analysis can be difficult, time‐consuming  and  expensive.  As  the  above  paragraphs  on  data  collection  explained, data  on  party  organisations  and  their  relevant  environments  is  usually  not  easily available but must be gathered through laborious processes of documentary analy‐sis and elite interviewing. As such, analysing a large number of cases seems almost impossible.  Second, by applying  concepts  to a broader  range of  cases,  global  com‐parisons  often  suffer  from  “conceptual  stretching”  (Sartori  1970),  as  the meaning associated with the original concept fails to fit the reality of the new cases. Rather, in cross‐cultural  research, we  should  constantly keep our  concepts open  for  revision by engaging in “a continuous dialectical tacking between the most local of local de‐tail and the most global of global structure” (Geertz 1983: 69). Doing so is near im‐possible if concepts used in the theory of party organisation developed above (such as party membership or clientelism) are numerically coded for statistical analysis. 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The  problems  associated  with  the  statistical  method  suggest  that  we  should  compare a smaller number of cases instead. Regarding the question of what to com‐pare,  the answer  lies  in  the  theoretical assumptions of our  theoretical  framework: Since – by acknowledging the importance of agency – we do not rule out the possi‐bility of different  types of party organisation emerging within  the same context at the same time, political parties should be chosen as the unit of analysis, not count‐ries. However, this is not only a logical consequence of our dialectical understanding of  the  relationship  between  structure  and  agency,  but  the  comparison  of  sub‐national  units  is  in  fact  a  useful  tool  to  control  for  variation  (Snyder 2001). Thus, MSSD becomes the automatically selected research design to study political parties within the same political system, because all parties compete within the same envi‐ronment.  It  follows from this that – with all contextual variables being equal – dif‐ferent types of party organisation can, with great confidence, be explained by actors’ diverging  electoral  strategies  and  the  distribution  of  power  between  these  actors within the different political parties.  In order to isolate environmental factors that have an effect on actors’ choice of electoral strategies we will then have to compare between countries, thereby inject‐ing contextual variance into the research design. However, applying either MSSD or MDSD in a strict sense does not seem possible in this second step. This is because it would be  impossible  to establish unit homogeneity, which  is a basic assumption to make causal  inferences  (King et al. 1994: 91‐94). Put differently, while  in  the  first step we assumed that political parties are heterogeneous within the same context, 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we would now have to assume that  they are homogeneous. As a result, we should apply the comparative method in a less rigorous way, only using it as a rough guide‐line for the conduct of our inquiry.17 In fact, as Ragin points out, we need to distin‐guish  between  formal  characteristics  of  case‐oriented  methods,  as  formulated  by Mill and others, and their application. That is to say, case‐oriented methods should not be used in a rigid or mechanical manner, but, instead, they should only be used to carry on a dialogue with the empirical evidence, helping us to pinpoint “patterns of constant association” (Ragin 1987: 42). For that reason, to isolate environmental factors that constrain political actors in developing electoral strategies, we will apply our framework to different countries. We will thereby – through the comparison of these countries – establish patterns of constant  association.  Admittedly,  our  causal  inferences will  be weaker  than  those produced by a rigorous application of the comparative method. However, by repli‐cating  our  findings  over  several  countries  our  evidence  will,  first  of  all,  be  more compelling than if we used the single case study method. Moreover, causality can be increased  through methods of within­case analysis,  such as pattern matching, pro‐cess  tracing  and  causal  narrative  (Mahoney 2000b; Mahoney 2003).  In  particular, process tracing offers a strong alternative to making causal inferences when it is not possible to do so through the method of controlled comparison (George and Bennett 2004: 214). Broadly speaking,  the process‐tracing method attempts  to  identify  the 
                                                17 This would also help us avoid more general weaknesses of the comparative method, such as the degrees of freedom problem, the combined causes problem and the different causes problem. For a critique of the MSSD and the MDSD see Ragin (1987), Lieberson (1992) and Faure (1994). 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causal  chain  between  an  independent  variable  and  the  outcome of  the  dependent variable. Hence, rather than examining multiple  instances of X1 → Y (as  in  large‐N statistical designs), the researchers examines a single instance of X1 → X2 → X3 → X4 
→ Y (Gerring 2007: 173). In other words, it is the quality of the observation, not the quantity of observations, that is relevant in evaluating the truth claims of a process‐tracing study. If the researcher can connect empirical evidence to a convincing his‐torical sequence that links cause and effect, he is in a good position to assert that the relationship under analysis is causal.   
Case selection  There  is widespread  consensus  among  scholars of democratic  transitions  that po‐litical parties play a significant role in the consolidation of democracy (for example Morlino 1998; Pridham 1990; Sandbrook 1996). Unsurprisingly,  then, a significant number of comparative studies have been produced in recent years that study the development of parties  in  the different  regions  that were hit by  the  third wave of democratisation during the past three decades. There are numerous works analys‐ing political parties in Eastern Europe (for example Kopecký 1995; Kostelecký 2002; Lewis  2000),  Southern  Europe  (for  example  Bosco  and  Morlino  2006;  Diaman‐douros and Gunther 2001; Ignazi and Ysmal 1998), Latin America (for example Dix 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1992; Levistky 2003; Mainwaring and Scully 1995), and we even find comparisons of parties across  regions  (for example van Biezen 2003b). Astoundingly, however, East  Asia,  which  got  caught  by  the  third wave  in  the mid‐1980s,  has  so  far  been widely ignored by political party research.18 As a matter of fact, most of the very few analyses of East Asian parties have not been written by distinguished experts, but rather  by  scholars  specialising  on  single  countries.  The  resulting  reports  tend  to overlook the more theoretical and methodological debates within the general litera‐ture on political parties, instead focussing on description and failing to apply gener‐ally accepted typologies or existing theories. When authors move beyond a pure de‐scription, explanations tend to remain largely case‐specific with a very low level of abstraction. Moreover,  scholars  do  not  engage  in  cross‐national  comparisons,  but rather lock themselves in their country of specialisation. Admittedly,  different  from  the  regions  that  have  so  far  been  in  the  analytical focus of political party research, East Asia only describes geographical borders, not a common cultural and historical heritage.  In  fact,  it  is  consistently pointed out  that “Asia” is no more than a European invention. Nevertheless, this heterogeneity across East Asian societies has not prevented political scientists from treating East Asia as a single region in comparative studies of democratisation and democratic consolida‐tion (see for example Cheng 2003; Croissant 2004; Hsieh and Newman 2002; Laot‐hamatas 1997). In other words, there is no reason to dismiss a comparison of East 

















democracy? Cambodia  6  5  5.5  Not free  no China  7  6  6.5  Not free  no East Timor  3  4  3.5  Partly free  yes Indonesia  2  3  2.5  Free  yes Japan  1  2  1.5  Free  yes Laos  7  6  6.5  Not free  no Malaysia  4  4  4.0  Partly free  no Myanmar (Burma)  7  7  7.0  Not free  no North Korea  7  7  7.0  Not free  no Philippines  3  3  3.5  Partly free  yes Singapore  5  4  4.5  Partly free  no South Korea  1  2  1.5  Free  yes Taiwan  2  1  1.5  Free  yes Thailand  7  4  5.0  Partly free  no Vietnam  7  5  6.0  Not free  no 
Notes: Political rights and civil liberties ratings range from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of “free,” “partly free,” or “not free.” Those whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered “free”, 3.0 to 5.0 “partly free”, and 5.5 to 7.0 “not free”. To qualify as an “electoral democracy” a state must satisfy the following: (1) a multiparty political system, (2) universal adult suffrage, (3) regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy and in the absence of massive fraud, and (4) public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and open political campaigning. 
Source:  Freedom House (2007)  
 The Marcos regime on the Philippines was the first to be washed away by the “third wave” of democratisation in February 1986. Subsequently, democracy was also in‐stalled in Taiwan (1986‐1992), South Korea (1987/88), Thailand (1992), Cambodia (1993), Indonesia (1999) and most recently East Timor (2002). However, the demo‐cratic  system  installed  in Cambodia by  the United Nations only  lasted  for  a  single 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national election, while Thailand, too, reverted to more authoritarian forms of gov‐ernment after a military coup  in September 2006. Hence,  in  its 2007 report, Free‐dom House  only  lists  six  East Asian  countries  as  “electoral  democracies”:  Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, East Timor and Japan (see Table 5). The lat‐ter  two, however, will be excluded  from this analysis:  Japan because  it has been a democracy since the end of the Second World War and is therefore not comparable with “third wave” democracies, as political parties formed under very different cir‐cumstances; East Timor because  it has only been an  independent state since 2002 and held legislative elections only once, in June 2007, meaning that parties have not had enough time yet to develop an organisational apparatus. We will thus study po‐litical  parties  in  South  Korea,  Taiwan,  the  Philippines  and  Indonesia  –  in  a  time frame ranging from the first free and fair elections to December 2008.19 For our cases we will only choose political parties that have competed in the two latest elections and have obtained at  least  three per cent of  the votes  in  the  latest election. Choosing parties according to their electoral success and their age does not constitute  a  selection  bias  –  as  selecting  cases  on  the  dependent  variable  is  con‐sidered highly problematic (Geddes 1990) – but it is rather an attempt to keep the number of cases manageable and select cases where party organisational change is actually possible. To exclude irrelevant cases where the outcome has no real possi‐bility of occurring is another key guideline for selecting cases (Mahoney and Goertz 
                                                19 In the 2008 Freedom House report, the Philippines’ political rights rating declined from 3 to 4 as a result of serious, high‐level corruption allegations; the pardon of former president Joseph Estrada; and a spike in political killings in the run‐up to legislative elections. The country is therefore cur‐rently not listed as an “electoral democracy” anymore. However, there is no need to retrospectively exclude the Philippines from our analysis, as this is only a recent development. 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2004)  and we  should  thus  not  include  parties  in  the  analysis  that  are  simply  too young to have experienced organisational change. Applying these two criteria leaves us with 17 cases summarised in Table 6.  
TABLE 6:  CASE SELECTION 
Country  Political parties South Korea   Grand National Party (GNP, Hannaradang) 
 United Democratic Party (UDP, Tongham Minjudang) 
 Korean Democratic Labour Party (KDLP, Minju Nodongdang) Taiwan   Nationalist Party (KMT, Kuomintang) 












Notes: aFor the 2004 elections, the Nacionalista Party and KAMPI joined president Arroyo’s K‐4 coalition and therefore no separate election results were reported for these two parties. However, as both parties com‐peted the elections they still fulfil our criteria for case selection. bThe PKS participated in the first free elections in 1999 under the name Justice Party, but then had to change its name purely for legal reasons.   Over the next four chapters we will apply our theoretical framework to each of the four  countries  listed  above,  in  order  to  discuss  the  environmental  context,  actors’ strategic  choices  within  this  context  and  how  electoral  strategies  translate  into 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party  organisation.  Following  these  chapters,  we  will  then  compare  our  findings across the countries in final chapter to identify patterns of constant association. 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The environmental context 
 South Korea was drawn into authoritarian governmental control in the early 1950s when the Korean War provided the pretext to demolish the democratic system that the Americans had installed after liberating the peninsula from 35 years of Japanese colonialism in 1945. However, regime cohesion was not very strong, as elite factions frequently putsched against each other, and short democratic interludes alternated with  longer  periods  of  autocratic  rule.  The  central  pillars  of  the  regime were  the military, the bureaucracy and – as a junior partner – large business conglomerates (jaebol).  Operating within  the  legalistic  frame  of  a  pseudo‐democracy,  the  regime tolerated  opposition  parties,  but  competition  for  political  offices  was  subtly  cur‐tailed  so  the  elites’  claim  to  power would  not  be  threatened.  The  elites  sought  to gain legitimacy for their authoritarian rule by emphasising the military threat posed by North Korea and – closely related – the need for economic development. In particular,  its high economic efficiency proved to be a powerful source of  le‐gitimacy (see Table 7).   Not only did the economic strategy of export‐oriented ind‐ustrialisation  lead  to  a  general  improvement  of  living  standards,  but  profits were directly channelled to  individual citizens through clientelistic networks connecting the regime with the electorate. The regime mobilised the financial resources neces‐say to nurture the clientelistic exchange of particularistic material gifts against po‐litical support through “quasi‐taxes”, which large businesses – particularly the jaebol – were required to pay for preferential treatment in the allocation of state subsidies, 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South Korea  4,467 (1988) 22,029 (2005)  0.400 (1988) 0.316 (2007)  74.4 (1990) 80.8 (2005)  95.5 (1990) 99.0 (2006) 
Germany  29,461 (2006)  0.283 (2007)  75.2 (2005)  99.0 (2006) 
United Kingdom  33,238 (2005)  0.360 (2007)  89.7 (2005)  99.0 (2005) 
Source:  United Nations ESCAP (undated); United Nations Development Programme (undated); Hong (1996)  
Interestingly, not only the regime mobilised voters through clientelism but the op‐position,  too,  employed  clientelistic  linkage  mechanisms  to  gain  votes.  However, given their relative lack of resources, opposition candidates could not engage as ac‐tively  in  the  distribution  of  clientelistic  rewards  as  the  regime  party’s  legislators (Park 1988: 1057).20 As a result, opposition politicians would in addition campaign on the demand for political democratisation, which is why the opposition tended to enjoy strong support among more affluent, better educated urban voters, while the regime gained the majority of votes in rural areas – a phenomenon that came to be 
                                                20 The opposition generated the resources necessary for a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilisation through the private wealth of its candidates, private donations and by securing public infrastructure projects for their constituencies. 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known as yochon yado (villages for the government, cities for the opposition) (Kim H.N. 1989: 487). Confirming  the  central  assumption of modernisation  theory,  eco‐nomic  development  had  given  rise  to  a  new  urban  middle‐class,  which  was  no longer willing to accept a restriction of its participatory rights.21 The pro‐democratic  opposition performed better  in  cities,  as  the  regime’s pro‐gramme for economic modernisation was primarily based on cheap labour and re‐pressive  employment  laws,  causing  the  income  gap  between  the  urban  working class and the rest of the population to widen accordingly. In 1980, when the Korean economy  plunged  into  a  deep  recession,  forcing  the  government  to  implement  a rigid  adjustment  and  stabilisation  programme,  the working  class  again  felt  them‐selves to be the big loser due to these new economic policies, and – with the support of  students  and  intellectuals  –  took  its  protest  to  streets  (Croissant  1998:  176).22 Finally, it is important to mention that by the early 1980s, the regime’s scenario of a permanent military threat from North Korea had lost much of its credibility (Potter 1997: 235). Confronted  with  this  apparent  loss  of  legitimacy,  the  regime  decided  to  hold “nearly”  free and  fair elections  for a new National Assembly  in 1985,  in which  the newly  formed  opposition  party  New Korea  Democratic  Party  (NKDP,  Sinhan Min­
judang) under the leadership of Kim Dae‐jung and Kim Young‐sam won a surprising 29.3% of the votes. The NKDP subsequently based its strategy on two elements: ob‐
                                                21 For a detailed description of the ambiguous and complex role of the middle class in the South Korean democratisation process see Koo (1991). 22 The most violent protest was the so‐called “5.18 Uprising” in south‐western Gwangju when, after a mass rally on 15 May 1980, demonstrators took control of the city. The regime answered a few days later with the deployment of elite troops, leaving hundreds dead and thousands injured. 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structive  opposition  in  parliament  and  –  in  alliance with  other  pro‐reform move‐ments  – mass  public  demonstrations  (Cheng  and Kim  1994:  136).  Eventually,  the increasing  political  pressure  forced  the  regime  to  invite  the  opposition  to mutual talks  on  constitutional  reforms.  When  these  negotiations  failed  after  only  a  few months, the opposition camp mobilised large parts of the urban population. This left the  regime with  the  choice  of whether  to  return  to more  violent  repression  or  to continue  along  the  path  of  liberalisation.  However,  political  pressure  from  the United  States,  which  in  the  late  1980s  abandoned  its  policy  of  supporting  anti‐communist regimes even against the will of their citizens, plus Seoul’s hosting of the 1988 Olympic Games – which moved South Korea into the spotlight of international attention – benefited the soft‐liners within the regime. Hence, in June 1987, the re‐gime accepted most of the opposition’s demands, and resumed the negotiations over constitutional reform. Thus, the transformation of South Korea’s military‐bureaucratic autocracy into a political system with free and fair elections took place through a process of bargain‐ing between the regime and the democratic opposition. By the mid‐1980s both sides were locked in an uneasy stalemate that could only be broken through a negotiated compromise (Saxer 2002: 54‐61). As a result of this, both actors were able to con‐tinue  their  clientelistic  strategies of voter mobilisation,  as will be described  in  the next section. 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Actors and their strategies 
 The 1990s have been described by observers of Korean politics as the “three Kims” era,  as  elections were dominated by  three politicians with  the  same  family  name: Kim Young‐sam, Kim Dae‐jung  and Kim  Jong‐pil.  The  two  largest  parties  in Korea today  are  the  final  product  of  strategic  games  played  by  these  highly  charismatic politicians: While  the Grand National Party (GNP, Hannaradang)  is strongly  linked to earlier parties under the leadership of Kim Young‐sam (DLP and NKP), the United Democratic Party (UDP, Tongham Minjudang) is the last link in a long chain of par‐ties  that  harboured  politicians  loyal  to  Kim  Dae‐jung  (PPD,  DP,  NCNP,  MDP,  Uri Party, UNDP). Kim Jong‐pil’s party, the ULD, on the other hand, lost nearly all signifi‐cance in the 2004 National Assembly election, when it only won four parliamentary seats and even Kim Jong‐pil himself  failed to secure a mandate. As a result of  this, three of  the newly‐elected  lawmakers  left  the party  to  form the People First Party (PFP, Gungmin Jungsimdang), while the only remaining assemblyman decided to join the GNP in 2006.23 The only other relevant party that was not founded shortly be‐fore  the  2008 National  Assembly  election  is  the  Korean Democratic  Labour  Party (KDLP) – established in 2000.  
                                                23 In 2008, the PFP was then absorbed by the newly founded Liberty Forward Party led by Lee Hoi‐chang, who, after leaving the GNP, had run as an independent candidate in the 2007 presidential elec‐tions, finishing third. 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The era of the “three Kims” 
 The  strongest  party  to  emerge  out  of  the  1988  elections  was  the  former  regime party, the DJP (Democratic Justice Party, Minjeongdang), which was not surprising, given that the pro‐democracy movement had split in two. Already during the consti‐tution  talks, Kim Dae‐jung and Kim Young‐sam split  away  from  the NKDP  to  form the  Reunification  Democratic  Party  (RDP,  Tongil  Minjudang).  Only  a  few  months later, Kim Dae‐jung  established  the Party  for Peace  and Democracy  (PPD, Pyeong­
mindang) in order to compete in the 1987 presidential elections. Yet another oppo‐sition party was  founded by Kim Jong‐pil, who had served as prime minister  from 1971 to 1975 – the NDRP (New Democratic Republican Party, Sinminjudang). When,  in a  surprising move  in 1990, Kim Young‐sam merged his RDP with  the former  regime  party  DJP  to  form  the  Democratic  Liberal  Party  (DLP, Minjadang), this heralded the era of the “three Kims”. At the same time, the merger between the two  parties  meant  the  end  of  the  democracy‐authoritarianism  cleavage.  Instead, coming  from different  regions,  the  three Kims mercilessly  overplayed  the  existing rivalries  between  their  home  regions,  thereby  turning  regional  identities  into  the most  important  factor  to  explain  voting  behaviour  throughout  the  1990s  (Sonn 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2003).24 Initially, the vote in the south‐eastern region of Yongnam was divided be‐tween Kim Young‐sam and Roh Tae‐woo, the leader of the ruling DJP, who had his family roots in the same region. However, when both politicians merged their par‐ties in 1990 to become the DLP, they created a monopoly of regional representation by  the  “three Kims”  through which each of  the Kims was guaranteed  the  full elec‐toral support from their respective home region. This reflects in the effective number 
of  political  parties,  which  throughout  the  1990s  hovered  around  the  three‐party mark (see Table 8).  
TABLE 8:  SOUTH KOREA – PARTY SYSTEM INDICATORS 
  ENEPa  ENPPb  Volatility 1988  3.87  3.34  ‐ 1992  2.96  2.37  95.15 1996  3.51  2.83  77.25 2000  2.81  2.30  80.80 2004  3.17  2.32  51.35 2008  4.36  2.92  55.60 
Average  3.45  2.68  72.03 
Notes: aEffective number of electoral parties in elections to the National Assembly. After 2004, when a second vote was introduced to elect a party on the closed party list, the number is calculated on the share of votes parties received in the single‐member constituencies. bEffective number of parliamentary parties in the National Assembly. 
Source:  Author’s own calculations based on Table 9.  
                                                24 While Kim Young‐sam is from Yongnam, located in the southeast of the Korean peninsula, Kim Dae‐jung has his family roots in the south‐western region of Honam. Kim Jong‐pil, finally, mobilised most of his voters in the Chungchong region to the north of Honam. Although these three regions do only represent a part of the Korean electorate, an unknown number of voters living in other parts of the country  in  their  third or  fourth generation  tended  to vote according  the regional  roots of  their regional family background. 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The conflict between the south‐western and south‐eastern part of the Korean penin‐sula clearly has  its  roots  in  the unequal  socio‐economic development between  the regions (Kim W.B. 2003).25 However, after the democratic transition, the economic aspect of the regional conflict lost much of its significance. Instead, regionalism be‐came mainly driven by the regional origin of candidates, as recent research shows that  post‐authoritarian  governments  allocated  state  resources  evenly  to  their  re‐spective home region and the opposition’s region (Horiuchi and Lee 2008). While the charisma of the three Kims was thus one strategy parties relied on to mobilise  voters,  clientelism  was  the  other.  Although  Kim  Dae‐jung  would  not  be elected into government until 1997, he still attracted a substantial amount of corpo‐rate – mostly undeclared – donations (Thornton and Korvick 2003: 282). As in the governing party,  this money was then channelled to candidates to build and main‐tain clientelistic linkages to voters. Typical activities to strengthen the loyalty within these clientelistic networks ranged from offering condolences at funerals, to making gifts at weddings, to placing supporters in jobs, to   interceding with the police or courts  for  favorable treatment and  in the case of legislators who are lawyers, pleading before the court on behalf of constituents;  helping  to  obtain  business  licenses,  permits,  or  registra‐
                                                25 Southeastern Yongnam, home region of former military dictators Park Chung‐hee (1961‐1979) and Chun Doo‐hwan (1980‐1988), was the preferred target for large industrial and infrastructural pro‐jects during the period of state‐led economic modernisation in the 1960s and 1970s. Southwestern Honam, on the other hand, remained largely excluded from the Korean economic miracle, keeping its largely agriculturally based economy. Moreover, during the authoritarian regime the economic and political elite was mainly recruited from Yongnam, while Honam – compared to its population size – suffered from serious underrepresentation. 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tions  through  administrative  agencies;  helping  to  get  promotions  and transfers in public or private agencies; providing assistance in obtaining bank loans or in securing relief funds and a wide range of compensations for accidents, planning and zoning projects, shoddy work by construction companies,  industrial  pollution,  and  so  on;  making  financial  donations and  contributions,  such  as  those  to  assist  constituents  with  living  ex‐penses, children's school expenses, and local festivals; and helping to re‐solve constituents' tax disputes with the revenue office. (Park 1988: 1059)   As a result of their charisma and their control over effective clientelistic networks, the  three  Kims  –  Kim  Young‐sam,  Kim  Dae‐jung  and  Kim  Jong‐pil  – more  or  less shared the total national vote between them throughout the 1990s and were the all dominating  players  in  the  post‐autocratic  party  system.  Before withdrawing  from the political  stage,  the  three Kims altogether  established  ten political  parties: Kim Young‐sam three, Kim Dae‐jung four and Kim Jong‐pil three. They saw their parties merely as functional vehicles to gain access to power, creating, dissolving, merging and renaming them as it suited their personal interests (Kim B.‐K. 2000: 60; Heo and Stockton 2005: 685). This  strategic game  the  three Kims played with  their parties translated into extremely high electoral volatility figures in the 1990s (see Table 8). 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TABLE 9:  SOUTH KOREA – RESULTS FOR NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 
1988  1992  1996  2000  2004  2008 
Party 
Va  Sb  V  S  V  S  V  S  V  S  V  S DJP  34.0  41.8  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ RDP  23.8  19.7  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ PPD  19.3  23.4  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ NDRP  15.6  11.7  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ DP (1)  1.3  0.3  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ DLP  ‐  ‐  38.5  49.8  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ DP (2)  ‐  ‐  29.2  32.4  11.2  5.0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ UPP  ‐  ‐  17.4  10.4  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ NPRP  ‐  ‐  1.8  0.3  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ PP  ‐  ‐  1.5  0.0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ NKP  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  34.5  46.5  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ NCNP  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  25.3  26.4  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ ULD  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  16.2  16.7  9.8  6.2  2.8  1.6  ‐  ‐ NPUPP  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.9  0.0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ GNP  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  39.0  48.7  35.8  41.1  37.4  51.2 MDP  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  35.9  42.1  7.1  2.1  ‐  ‐ DPP  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  3.7  0.7  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ Uri  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  38.3  53.1  ‐  ‐ KDLP  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  13.0  0.8  5.6  1.7 UDP  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  25.1  27.1 Pro Park  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  13.1  4.7 LFP  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  6.8  6.0 CKP  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  3.8  1.0 Other  6.1  3.0  11.6  7.0  11.8  5.4  11.7  2.2  3.0  1.2  8.2  8.3 
Notes: aShare of votes (in per cent)  bShare of seats (in per cent) 
Source:  Croissant (2001); Psephos Election Archive (undated)  
Below the Kims, faction leaders competed for the party president‘s favour, without ever acquiring enough power to seriously challenge the Kims. Factions did not de‐velop high levels of institutionalisation, and all decisions were made by the faction leader.  Factional  coherence  among  the  clearly  identifiable  members  was  mainly based on patron‐clientelism rather than shared ideological interests (Yun 1994). In other words, parties were  large clientelistic networks with  the party  leader as  the 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highest patron, who – due to the fact the he could be sure of the exclusive electoral support from his respective home region – could take all significant organisational decisions without the interference of other actors within the party. The environmental context  in Korea during the 1990s favoured the clientelistic strategies  of  the  three  Kims  for  several  reasons.  First  of  all,  as  to  be  expected  in “third  wave”  democracies,  the  conditions  for  the  electoral  mobilisation  of  social classes based on  ideology were bad, meaning  that politicians campaigning on pro‐grammatic appeals did not pose a serious electoral challenge. Most importantly, the virulent anti‐communism of the outgoing autocratic regime had prevented socialist or social‐democratic parties  from forming (Kang W.T. 1998), while  the ban on  the formation of independent trade unions – which stayed in place until 2002 – meant that workers were not organised outside the state corporatist structures. This  made it very difficult to mobilise these groups. Instead, the three Kims were able to turn the  regional  conflict  between  the  south‐eastern  and  south‐western parts  of Korea into the most important electoral cleavage. Secondly, both the old regime elites and the  pro‐democratic  opposition  successfully  transferred  the  clientelistic  networks they had been using in the regime’s pseudo‐elections into the new democratic arena. Although the process of export‐led industrialisation had resulted in a dramatic im‐provement  of  living  standards  for  the  general  population,  patron‐client  relation‐ships  had  become  embedded within  social  life  and  thus  continued  to  play  an  im‐portant role in the voters’ electoral decision. And thirdly, independent from the en‐vironmental context, the three Kims radiated natural charisma, thereby acting as a 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magnet for votes and donations.   
The post‐Kims party system 
 Power only became more evenly  spread among other politicians within  the major political parties once the Kims left the political arena. When Kim Young‐sam’s term as  president  came  to  an  end  in  1997,  his  influence within his  own party  declined steeply, as he would no longer be able to distribute state resources and patronage to his  supporters  in  return  for  loyalty.  Instead,  influential  factions  grouped  around other presidential hopefuls, with Lee Hoi‐chang, who had served as prime minister under Kim Young‐sam, eventually emerging as the primus inter pares and the party’s presidential candidate in 1997.26 Similarly,  as  Kim  Dae‐jung’s  presidency  was  reaching  the  constitutional  five‐ year limit, he began losing authority within the MDP. Finally, after he resigned from the party chairmanship  in 2001 (to  focus his energies on his  last months as presi‐dent),  a  number  of  corruption  scandals  and  a  disastrous  defeat  in  the  2001  by‐election,  a  number  of  young  reform‐minded  politicians  emerged  as  a  new  force within  the MDP.  The most  significant  figures were  Chun  Jung‐bae,  Shin  Ki‐nam  – 
                                                26 The author owes much of the information about the development of inter‐factional conflict within Korean parties contained in this and the following paragraphs to personal communication with Jin‐Min Chung (16 April and 23 April 2008) and Wook Kim (17 April 2008). 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both human rights  lawyers – and Chung Dong‐young,  a  former TV‐anchorman. All three politicians had been nominated by Kim Dae‐jung as candidates  for  the 1996 National  Assembly  election  to  give  the  party  a  younger  image.  The  faction  led  by these  politicians  (commonly  known  in  Korea  as  Chun‐Shin‐Chung)  rallied  behind Roh Moo‐hyun who was nominated as the MDP’s candidate for the 2002 presiden‐tial election and then defeated Lee Hoi‐chang of the GNP by a small margin. After  this defeat, reform‐minded politicians also gained more power within the GNP – albeit to a much lesser extent than in the MDP – eventually forcing Lee Hoi‐chang to step down as party president. Choe Byung‐yul, again a rather conservative politician,  was  elected  as  his  successor  in  2003.  However,  the  progressive  camp more  or  less  restored  the  balance  of  power  only  a  few  days  later  when  reform‐oriented  Hong  Sa‐duk  became  the  party’s  floor  leader  in  the  National  Assembly. Amid continuing demands for party reform, Choe’s presidency only lasted for a few months.  In March 2004, he was replaced by Park Geun‐hye. Being  the daughter of ex‐dictator Park Chung‐hee, Park enjoyed strong support among conservative forces within  the  GNP,  while  her  corruption‐free  image  also  pleased  more  progressive thinkers. She was therefore a party president acceptable to both sides. Meanwhile, in the MDP, the movement around Chun‐Shin‐Chung was very disap‐pointed by the merely marginal support the party showed for newly elected presi‐dent Roh Moo‐hyun and thus, in September 2003, split away from the MDP to form the Yeollin Uridang (generally abbreviated to Uri Party, “our party”).  In addition to 42  of  the  MDP’s  103  lawmakers,  this  newly  established  party  also  attracted  five 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legislators of the GNP. Moreover, it absorbed the Reform Party under the leadership of Yu Si‐min that had emerged out of Roh Sa Mo – the mass social movement uniting supporters of Roh Moo‐hyun in the 2002 election. The Yu Si‐min group soon estab‐lished itself as the dominant faction in the Uri Party: As the most fervent supporters of Roh they profited enormously from Roh’s high popularity ratings during the early stages of his presidency – more than any other grouping within the Uri Party. In  the  GNP,  factions  again  began  to  form  around  presidential  hopefuls.  While Park Geun‐hye – with her election as the party chairman in 2004 – had established herself as one of them, Lee Myung‐bak, the mayor of Seoul, slowly ascended as her main competitor. The two politicians represent very different groupings within the GNP: Park has the support of the older guard of politicians with constituencies in the GNP’s  traditional  stronghold  in  the  southeast  of  the Korean peninsula;  Lee  enjoys the backing of more progressive assemblymen from Seoul and the provinces around Seoul.  Lee Myung‐bak  seems  to  have won  the  power  struggle  for  now,  as  he was nominated  as  the  GNP’s  presidential  candidate  for  the  2007.  However,  as  several Park supporters, who had left the GNP shortly after to found the Pro‐Park Alliance, were able to win parliamentary seats in the 2008 National Assembly elections, Park is  seen  by many  as  the  actual winner  of  the  latest  elections, which will  definitely strengthen her position within the GNP. The Uri Party also witnessed a major reshuffle of internal power before the 2007 presidential elections. After president Roh’s popularity dropped dramatically – lead‐ing to a series of humiliating defeats for the Uri Party in the 2005 by‐elections – the 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Yu  Si‐min  faction’s  power  within  the  party  decreased  simultaneously.  Finally,  as politicians wanted to distance themselves from Roh as far as possible in order not to jeopardise their chances in the 2007 and 2008 elections, 80 out of 152 lawmakers of the  Uri  Party  left  the  party  to  establish  the  UNDP  in  August  2007.  Factions  soon grouped around those politicians with good chances of winning the party’s nomina‐tion as the presidential candidate: the aforementioned Chung Dong‐young, Son Hak‐gyu  (the  former  governor  of  Gyeonggi‐do who  had  joined  the  UNDP with  a  small group  of  progressive  politicians  from  the  GNP)  and  Lee  Hae‐chan  (former  prime minister  under  Roh Moo‐hyun).  Chung won  the  party’s  nomination,  but was  then defeated in a landslide by Lee Myung‐bak. Before the 2008 National Assembly elec‐tion,  the UNDP was merged with  the DP –  the successor of  the MDP –  to  form the UDP, with Son Hak‐gyu elected as its chairman. In short, after departure of the three Kims, conflict arose within both of the par‐ties between old party elites and younger politicians. As  these younger politicians were not embedded into the existing clientelistic structures they had to develop dif‐ferent strategies in order to be elected into office. They did so by reintroducing eco‐nomic incentives into the regional cleavage and extending regionalism to other parts of the Korean peninsula. In fact, according to Hyeok Yong Kwon, one of the leading experts  on  electoral  behaviour  in  Korea,  economic  voting  and  the  distribution  of pork  have  become  the  most  important  factors  to  explain  voting  in  national  elec‐tions.27 One example for this recent trend is Lee Myung‐bak’s promise in the 2007 
                                                27 Personal communication with Hyeok Yong Kwon, 7 April 2008. 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presidential  election  to  use  public  funds  to  turn  Seoul’s  greenbelt  into  a massive housing programme,  thereby providing  investment  opportunities  for  voters  in  his home constituency.28 Put in more abstract terms, because these younger politicians lack private resources to establish patron‐client relationships, they are using public goods to mobilise voters. They do so not in a legal grey zone but through the lawful distribution of pork barrel programmes. This represents a notable departure  from earlier clientelistic strategies and thus confirms one of the central tenets of our ana‐lytical framework, that social actors are able to develop alternative strategies within the same context.  However, while these strategies do not differ categorically from the strategically selected outcome, as they are still clientelistic in nature, real disparities become ob‐vious  when  looking  into  the  Korean  Democratic  Labour  Party  (KDLP),  which  is populated with  actors  campaigning  on programmatic  electoral  appeals.  The KDLP emerged out of  the pro‐democratic student movement, which had always been di‐vided  into  two main  streams:  the National Liberation and  the Political Democracy factions. The National Liberation’s main political aim was the reuniﬁcation of Korea and  –  strongly  influenced by North Korea’s  Juche  ideology  –  the  realisation of  au‐tonomy  of  the  Korean  nation  from US  imperialism, while  the  Political  Democracy faction were followers of traditional Marxist‐Leninist  ideas and thus put more em‐phasis on the liberation of the worker, as opposed to the liberation of the nation. Ac‐cordingly,  both  streams  also  differed  in  their  strategies:  Whereas  the  National 
                                                28 The author is very much indebted to Eun‐Jeung Lee for pointing out this example (personal com‐munication, 15 April 2008). 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Liberation stressed participation in the regular political process and sought to build a “united front” of all Koreans that would also include the middle class, the Political Democracy group took a class‐based approach that only aimed at improving the po‐sition of the working class through organising strikes and demonstrations. However, with the founding of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) in 1995, the Political Democracy movement  slowly  adopted  a more  participatory  strategy,  and soon joined the National Liberation’s efforts to establish an independent progress‐ive  party  that  could  successfully  compete with  the  existing  parties  created  by  the three Kims. Finally, cooperation between the two groups ended in the founding of the KDLP in January 2000. While the KDLP deﬁnes its constituency as including farmers, small business entrepreneurs,  the urban poor, women,  the disabled, youth, students and concerned intellectuals, it is primarily a party that seeks to represent Korea’s work‐ing  class  (Gray  2008:  119).  The  party’s  electoral  breakthrough  came  in  the  2002 local elections, in which it received 8.3% of the votes. Then, in 2004, ten KDLP can‐didates  were  elected  into  the  National  Assembly,  making  the  KDLP  the  country’s third largest party. However, analyses of the 2004 elections show that the party was not very successful  in gaining  the support of  its  core constituency, but most votes seems  to  have  been  “protest  votes”,  which  suggests  that  mobilising  the  Korean working class is still a very difficult task (Lee and Lim 2006: 328). In fact, the KDLP was unable to repeat its success in the 2008 elections, when it only won five legisla‐tive seats. 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As the National Liberation had been the driving force behind the founding of the KDLP  it was  initially  the dominant  faction within  the party. However,  the continu‐ation of Kim Dae‐jung’s sunshine policy through Roh Moo‐hyun – finally leading to an eight‐point peace agreement between South and North Korea in October 2007 – made it difficult for the National Liberation to justify the KDLP’s continuing strong focus on the relations with the communist regime in the north. Hence, the Political Democracy faction was strengthened, and for the first time in the party’s history fac‐tional fissures became visible to the public, when the party’s nomination process for the 2007 presidential election turned into a race between Kwon Young‐ghil from the National Liberation  faction and Shim Sang‐jeong  from the Political Democracy  fac‐tion. When Kwon won the nomination, several members of the Political Democracy faction, including Shim, left the KDLP to found the New Progressive Party (NPP). To sum up, the post‐autocratic context in South Korea clearly favours clientelistic over  programmatic  electoral  strategies.  Both  old  regime  elites  and  the  pro‐democratic  opposition  were  able  to maintain  their  clientelistic  networks  through the democratic  transition,  and –  although  the  socio‐economic  conditions  that pro‐vided the breeding ground for these networks have largely disappeared – the distri‐bution  of  clientelistic  rewards  still  plays  an  important  role  when  accounting  for voting behaviour in Korea. In recent years, younger politicians have emerged within the major parties, challenging the old guards and their clientelistic networks. Lack‐ing  the  resources  to  maintain  similar  networks,  these  younger  politicians  have introduced economic incentives into the regional cleavage through the allocation of 
OLIVER HELLMANN   
   – 146 – 
 
public goods to their own constituencies. However, while this  is certainly an inter‐esting case to study strategic calculations, the most striking evidence for actors be‐ing able to develop alternative strategies within the same context is to be found in the KDLP, where factions are campaigning on narrowly focused programmatic plat‐forms – something we should theoretically not expect in young democracies of the “third wave”.     
Party organisation  Based on  the different electoral strategies political actors pursue  in South Korea – clientelistic  and programmatic  – we  should  expect  a  similar  diversity  of  party  or‐ganisations.  In  fact,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  following  sections,  the  parties  of  Kim Young‐sam and Kim Dae‐jung served merely as formal cloaks to cover their exten‐sive patron‐client networks, making it very difficult to distinguish between the three faces  of  party  organisation.  This  is  still  true  for  the  two major  parties  today,  but younger  politicians  have  successfully  pushed  for  a  formal  regulation  of  candidate selection, making the process less dependent on money and other resources. In con‐trast, in the KDLP, where politicians follow programmatic strategies for voter mobi‐lisation,  the  three  faces  of  party  organisation  are  clearly  distinguishable, with  the party central office enjoying the most powerful position. 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Membership 
 Political parties  in South Korea portray themselves as  large membership organisa‐tions based on dense networks of local branches that cover the whole country.  For instance,  in  his  analysis  of  party  institutionalisation  in  neo‐democratic  Korea, Köllner  (2003: 7)  cites  a  longer passage  from a GNP brochure,  in which  the party tries to convey the impression that its members are integrated into a complex orga‐nizational  hierarchy, which  gives  every member  the  possibility  of  participating  in the internal decision‐making of the party:    The Grand National Party (Hannara Party) consists of  the Central Party (Party Hq), 16 City & Provincial Chapters and 253 district parties each of which has a secretariat. […] The city & provincial convention consists of 150 to 300 representatives. It performs such functions as electing repre‐sentatives  for  the National convention, operating  the committees of  the Central Committee, choosing the chairmen of city & provincial chapters, deliberating on matters recommended by the district party, and submit‐ting  recommendations  of  every  kind  to  Central  Party.  […]  The  district convention consists of 100 to 150 representatives. It performs such func‐tions as choosing the chairmen of district chapters, electing representa‐tives  for  the  National  Convention,  and  submitting  recommendations  of every kind to Central Party. 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However,  in reality,  the  local branches of political parties  in Korea are usually  just the  personal  political machine  of  the  assemblyman  or  candidate  in  the  respective constituency.  The  formal  local  party  chapter  only  serves  as  a  cloak  for  the  politi‐cian’s personal network of  supporters  at  the grassroots  level. These networks are the true source of political identity for party members. People do not join the local party organisation because  they  share  the party’s  ideological positions or because they  feel  they belong  to a distinctive social grouping.  Instead,  “the district party  is based […] on personal and particularistic bonds between a political boss and follow‐ers” (Park 1988: 1051). Hence, party members are usually recruited among friends and  relatives  of  the  local  political  boss,  or  they  join  because  they  are  otherwise socially connected to the boss, such as through school ties or regional provenance. Moreover, party membership networks are held together by the boss’ provision of particularistic benefits and favours in return for electoral support. The status of the local party branch as an autonomous membership organisation from the party central at the national level is further reinforced by the fact that the membership  register  is  kept  by  the  district  chapter  chair privately,  not  by  the  re‐gional branch officially.29 The political boss thus has exclusive access to all member‐ship data, which means that any effective communication between the party head‐quarters  and  the  individual member will  be  dependent  on  the  boss’  cooperation. The powerful position of the assemblyman or candidate was further strengthened in 2004, when an amendment to the Party Law Act abolished the requirement for par‐
                                                29 Personal communication with Yong‐Ho Kim, 12 April 2008. 
POLITICAL PARTY ORGANISATION IN EAST ASIA    
 – 149 – 
   
ties  to  be  based  on  a  dense  network  of  local  party  chapters.30  Although  the main purpose of this amendment was to lower the expenses for political parties in order to reduce the need to accept illegal donations, local bosses have found ways to main‐tain  the  institutionalisation of  their  personal  networks without party  funding.  For instance, work that was previously done by full‐time party staff,  is now often dele‐gated to friends and family or to employees in the boss’ own private company.31 In other words,  the personal networks of supporters of assemblymen and candidates are now established as the parties’ grassroots organisation, as political parties only have official representation at the provincial level.  Outside the formal party organisation every legislator maintains other informal vote‐gathering machines that do not function under the official banner of the party. These  so‐called  sajojik  can  take  different  forms.  Some  common  examples  include friendship societies, clan groups, alumni groups, hiking clubs, and other recreation groups. Usually,  the  assemblyman does not directly  influence  the operation of  the informal groups affiliated with him or her, and will only act as their sponsor and ad‐visor. In the case of long‐serving parliamentarians, the sajojik are characterized by a certain degree of  stability, but  they have never achieved  the  same  level of  institu‐tionalisation as the personal vote‐gathering machines found in neighbouring Japan 
                                                30 Up until 2004 Articles 25 and 26 of the Party Law Act required political parties to have district of‐fices in at least one‐tenth of the electoral districts and five of the seven main metropolitan areas. Dis‐trict branches had to consist of at least 30 members. 31 One example given by Heike Hermanns (personal communication with the author, 16 April 2008) is the case of a GNP candidate in the 2008 National Assembly election, who turned her English lan‐guage school into the virtual local party branch, with members of staff having to help out with the organisation of the campaign and other administrative work. In such cases money is usually paid under the table, or employees are compensated with a gift or a free meal. 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(koenkai)  (Köllner  2003:  8).32  Regarding  membership,  it  must  be  noted  that  al‐though there can be high personal overlap between the formal party branch and the 
sajojik, members of the latter do not automatically become formal party members. A  slightly  different  type  of  support  organisation  to  the  sajojik  emerged  in  the run‐up to the 2002 presidential election, when followers of Roh Moo‐hyun used the internet  to  form a  fan club, known as Roh Sa Mo  (literally, gathering of  the people who love Roh). This virtual support group attracted a lot of attention, mostly from younger voters, who – disillusioned with the old style of politics – came together on the web to debate policy issues and mobilise votes for Roh – a human rights lawyer and for many a real alternative to the old guard of politicians. As this online network of supporters proved to be an important pool of voters behind Roh’s electoral suc‐cess (Walker and Kang 2004: 843), similar websites mushroomed before the 2004 National Assembly. This time, however, fan websites were created on the initiative of the candidates – not by the supporters themselves – who tried to attract visitors with online games, personal blogs, videos and other contents. Since then, however, the virtual networks of supporters have dramatically declined in importance, since the  new  Election  Law  revised  in  2004  stipulates  that  internet  portals  should  not post  any  content, which  supports  or  opposes  a  political  party  or  a  candidate  180 days before the election (Article 93).  In  fact,  in  the 2007 presidential elections the internet hardly played any role at all (Woo and Lee 2008). 
                                                32 For a detailed analysis of the Japanese koenkai see Bouissou (1999). 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Although there is thus a formal concept of party membership that distinguishes party members  from ordinary citizens,  it  seems a bit misleading  to  speak of party membership,  as  voters  join  parties  through  their  personal  loyalty  to  the  local  as‐semblyman or candidate. Moreover, the criteria that define party members are very limited. Parties usually refer to the Political Party Act, which states that any person older than 19 years (20 years up until 2005) may join a party – with the exception of public officials, which included most teachers, and, up until 2000, labour‐union func‐tionaries.  In  addition,  membership  fees  are  relatively  low  and  generally  not  en‐forced. For example, the rules of Kim Young‐sam’s NKP (1995‐1997) prescribed that party members  should  pay  at  least  1,000 KRW  (about  0.50 GBP)  (Kim Y.H.  1998: 145).  The  successor  party  of  the  NKP,  the  GNP,  charges  2,000  KRW  per  month, which members are,  again, not obliged  to pay33, while  the UDP does not  specify  a fixed sum, but members can make a voluntary contribution34. In other words, join‐ing either of these parties only requires filling in a membership form. What is more, cases  have  been  reported  when  people  were  even  signed  up  as  party  members without their own knowledge.35 This commonly happens when the head of a volun‐tary social organisation has strong personal connections to a local boss and simply transfers the members of his or her organisation into the party membership regis‐ter.  
                                                33 Personal communication with the GNP, 17 April 2008. 34 Personal communication with the UDP, 24 April 2008. 35 Personal communication with Eun‐Jeung Lee, 15 April 2008. 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The only major political party in South Korea that attaches higher requirements to party membership  is  the KDLP.36  In order to be granted  full party membership, individuals  must  pay  a  monthly  fee  that  ranges  from  5,000  KRW  (2.50  GBP)  for those without  a  regular  income  (i.e.  students,  housewives,  senior  or  disabled  citi‐zens) to 10,000 KRW (5 GBP) for everybody else. Moreover, in addition to signing a declaration,  saying  that  they  will  adhere  to  the  party  statutes,  aspiring members need to attend an introductory lecture to familiarise them with the party’s policies and decision‐making structures. In contrast to the other major parties in Korea, the KDLP  keeps  a membership  register  at  the  party  central  office,  with  two  full‐time members of staff  responsible solely  for  the maintenance of  the register. The KDLP also distinguishes itself from its competitors in that its members are organised into 150 genuine party branches across the country, each with local organisation at the neighbourhood or workplace level. Unlike in other Korean parties, the local chapters are organised by the party as an organisation, not by a local boss as his or her per‐sonal machine. In 2004,  the newly  founded Uri Party  experimented with  the  introduction of  a membership model similar to the one of KDLP, trying to enforce regular dues among its members. Initially, the monthly membership fee was set to 8,000 KRW (4 GBP), but over  the next months  it was continuously  reduced  to 6,000 and  then  to 2,000 KRW, before finally dropping the obligation of a regular financial contribution com‐pletely. The statutes of Uri Party had originally also stipulated that party members 
                                                36 The information in this paragraph was obtained through personal communication with the KDLP, 15 April 2008. 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should attend at  least one party meeting a month, but as with the membership fee this requirement was soon abandoned.37 Clearly, these measures to make the party membership  less  inclusive  reflect  the  strategic  calculations of  the dominant Yu Si‐min group within the Uri Party, which contained large numbers of fervent Roh Moo‐hyun supporters. The KDLP also differs from the two older parties regarding membership activity. In both the UDP and the GNP – and in their respective parent parties – members are usually  dormant  and will  only  become  active  shortly  before  elections,  when  they help with the electoral campaign. One common sight in the streets of major Korean cities during the 2008 electoral campaign, for instance, was groups of supporters of the local candidate – all dressed in the party’s colours – performing choreographed dances to the party’s official pop song.38 Not surprisingly then, party members of the GNP and UDP receive no significant  training  from the party. The NKP, Kim Young‐sam’s party, used to maintain a Central Training Centre at the central  level to pro‐vide political education for party officials and activists, but, as Yong‐ho Kim (1998: 148)  points  out,  the  effectiveness  of  these  training  programmes was  highly  ques‐tionable.  In  the KDLP,  in  contrast, members  are  active  throughout  the  year.  The  party’s local chapters usually hold two meetings per week: one political meeting,  in which current events and party related matters are discussed, and – in the style of socialist 
                                                37 Personal communication with Yong‐ho Kim, 12 April 2008. 38 Usually, the campaign songs are light upbeat pop tunes – sometimes based on the melody of fa‐mous chart hits – which in their lyrics will constantly repeat the party’s name and party’s number on the voting ballot as well as the key words of the party’s pledges. 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parties in early 20th century Europe – one social meeting, where members come to‐gether for activities such as hiking tours. Moreover, although there is no institution‐alised training programme for party members as such, local chapters can request ad hoc training sessions from the party central, which, according to the party’s own re‐port, happens very frequently.39    After this cross‐party analysis of party membership it has become clear that the traditional parties on the one side and the KDLP on the other side are aiming to re‐cruit very different types of members. What is more, in the case of the GNP and the UDP – and the parties of Kim Young‐sam and Kim Dae‐jung respectively – it is prob‐ably even better not to speak of party membership, as individuals primarily join the personal  network  of  the  local  assemblyman  or  candidate.  In  fact,  neither  of  these two parties makes any centrally coordinated effort  to recruit new members. How‐ever,  at  the  same  time,  both  parties  do  not  hold  off  presenting  large membership figures. While in the mid‐1990s Kim Young‐sam’s NKP claimed to have about three million members  (Kim Y.H. 1998: 146),  in 2008  its  successor,  the GNP,  still main‐tains  to  have  a  membership  of  1,070,000.40  Similarly,  the  UDP  purports  to  have roughly one million members.41 This roughly translates to a membership/electorate ratio of 2.6% for each of the major parties. However, it is widely known that Korean parties  vastly  inflate  their membership  figures when  prompted  by  political  scien‐
                                                39 This paragraph is based on information provided by the KDLP through personal communication with the author on 15 April 2008. 40 Personal communication with the GNP, 17 April 2008. 41 Personal communication with the UDP, 24 April 2008. 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tists  in  order  to  create  the  impression  that  they  have  strong  support  in  society (Köllner 2002: 11).  In  the  Korean  context,  in  contrast,  political  parties  do  not  even  seem  to  value members as statistic, since their clientelistic strategies do not require parties to give the illusion that they are strongly rooted in society. For the candidates, on the other hand, members are a loyal pool of voters. While they also provide free labour during election  campaigns,  this  contribution  is  far  from  vital  for  electoral  success. More‐over,  votes  can  also  be mobilised  outside  the  formal  party  structure  through  the numerous  sajojik  affiliated  with  each  candidate.  In  other  words,  members  within both traditional parties have virtually no power, as there is very little to distinguish them  from  regular  voters.  Correspondingly,  members  do  not  enjoy  significantly more participatory rights in the parties’ internal decision‐making processes than the average citizen, as will be shown in the next chapter. On the other hand, in the KDLP, the party on the ground enjoys some consider‐able power. First of all, the fact that members pay regularly fees makes them a valu‐able financial asset to the party. According to the KDLP’s own declaration, in 2007, about 50 per  cent of  the party’s  total  income came  from membership payments.42 This  again  stands  in  stark  contrast  to  the budget  structure of  the  two more  tradi‐tional  parties,  which  in  2003  obtained  only  16  per  cent  (GNP)  and  12  per  cent (MDP) of their total income from membership dues (National Election Commission undated). However, it must be noted in many cases, these dues are paid by the po‐
                                                42 Personal communication with the KDLP, 15 April 2008. 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litical boss of the member’s local branch, not by the member. Secondly, the fact that the KDLP holds  regular meetings at  the  local  level  and organises political  training sessions for its members, shows that the party perceives its membership as a pool of candidates  for  public  election.  This  –  in  addition  to  their  financial  contribution  – gives KDLP members yet another source of power within the party. As  a  result,  the membership  figures published by  the KDLP,  as  opposed  to  the blown‐up  figures of  the other major parties,  actually hold  significance. As of 2008 the party claimed to have about 80,000 members, of which roughly 50,000 pay their dues regularly.43 However, only the latter group are regarded as full members who are given voting rights in the party’s decision‐making processes, which thus clearly distinguishes  them from the ordinary voter outside the party (see next section  for more  details).  The  figure  seems  reliable,  and  is  supported  by  the  literature  (Gray 2008:  119).  In  terms  of  membership  strength  the  50,000  members  translate  to 0.13% of the total electorate – or 5.1% of the party’s electorate in 2008. Particularly the M/E ratio is relatively low when compared to the average M/E in the established democracies of Western Europe (see Mair and van Biezen 2001: 9), but in the South Korean context of alarmingly high levels of political apathy this must be interpreted in  a  different  light,  particularly  if  we  remind  ourselves  that  the  KDLP  is  the  only party that charges membership fees.44 
                                                43 Personal communication with the KDLP, 15 April 2008. 44 One indicator for political apathy in South Korea is the declining level of voter turnout. In the 2008 National Assembly elections turnout hit a record‐low 46 per cent, down 14.6 percentage points from the 2004 elections and 11.2% from the elections in 2000. For an analysis of recent public opinion surveys on Koreans’ views on democracy and politics see Shin, Park and Jang (2005). 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To sum up, traditionally, the party on the ground in Korean parties is hardly re‐cognisable.  Members  are  merely  passive  subjects  in  the  personal  network  of  the local assemblyman or candidate, and they hardly differ from the average voter out‐side the party, since membership obligations and rights are negligible. The only ex‐ception to this general pattern is the KDLP – founded in 2000 – which to some ex‐tent  tries  to  emulate  the  grassroots  organisation  of  the  classical  socialist  party  in early 20th century Europe. Because in the KDLP party membership is attached to a number of demanding criteria, members – in their role as financial supporters and potential candidates – carry some significant weight.   
Candidate selection 
 While the membership structure of political parties – except for the newly founded KDLP – has remained the same since the end of the authoritarian regime, there has been some significant change in the ways the relevant parties select their candidates for public elections at the national level. Fundamentally, the development of candi‐date selection procedures can be divided into a “three Kims” phase and a post‐“three Kims”  phase.  Although  Article  31  of  the  old  Party  Law  Act  demanded  that  “the nomination of public post candidates by parties must be made in a democratic man‐ner”, the selection of candidates has only recently become more inclusive. For more 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than a decade after  the  first  and  free elections  in 1987 decision‐making  in  all  rel‐evant parties of South Korea had been highly centralised. All control over the nomi‐nation of electoral candidates rested with the party leader (Kim Y.H. 1998: 151), and it  is probably not an exaggeration to say  that  “they ran the parties as  if  they were feudal lords” (Im 2004: 189). A thorough description of candidate selection during the “three Kims” era can be found  in K.S. Kim’s (1997) case study of  the 1996 National Assembly election. The usual practice  in Korean parties then was to select a district party chair, who – al‐most  automatically  –  became  the  party’s  candidate  of  that  district  in  the  coming election. In order to nominate the local party chairs, both Kim Young‐sam’s NKP and Kim Dae‐jung’s NCNP established a kind of screening committee. These committees, composed of high‐ranking party officials, reviewed both incumbents and newly ap‐plying candidates, and submitted their recommendations to the party president. The president  then made  the  final  decision  on  whom  to  nominate.  In  the  case  of  the NCNP, party leader Kim Dae‐jung announced that he would not alter the screening committee’s selection of district chairs, but  it was a matter of common knowledge that his intentions were carried out by close aides in the committee.  In  other  words,  the  selection  of  candidates  was  perfectly  monopolised  by  the party leader. In fact, nomination for a National Assembly mandate could be bought from the party  leader  in return  for a donation (Chon 2000: 72). Besides corporate donations, this practice was the most stable financial resource for parties during the “three Kims” era – particularly for opposition parties, as these lacked the power to 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influence government policies. The price varied according  to  the prospects of  suc‐cess. The higher one wanted to be ranked on the party list – used in addition to sin‐gle‐member  plurality  in  Korea’s  parallel  electoral  system  –  the more  one was  ex‐pected to donate to the party.  Using  the  process  of  candidate  selection  as  an  indicator  for  the  distribution  of power within political parties during the “three Kims” era, we can follow Thornton and Korvick (2003: 292) and offer the following summary:   This highly centralized  leadership style has contributed to  low  levels of internal  party  democracy.  Party  members  are  dependent  on  the  party leader for political advancement, and opposition or criticism of the party leadership is tantamount to political suicide. Loyalty to the party leader is often rewarded with “safe” electoral districts.  The  processes  of  candidate  selection  in  Korean  parties  have  only  become  more democratic since  the  late 1990s. The  first party  to organise  its nomination system according  to  more  abstract  regulations  was  the  NKP.  When  Kim  Young‐sam  an‐nounced his retirement from politics after the end of his presidential term in 1997, the party had to appoint a new candidate for the upcoming elections. The newly im‐plemented rules governed that the presidential candidate was to be elected by the delegates  in  the NKP’s national  convention. Moreover,  the  ratio  of  ex‐officio posts versus elected delegates in the convention was shifted from 40:60 to 15:85. In order 
OLIVER HELLMANN   
   – 160 – 
 
to  register  a  bid  for  candidacy,  the  recommendation of  at  least  50 delegates  from three regions was required (Lee H.C. 2002). Overall, these regulations marked a his‐torical milestone, as it was the first time since the beginning of the democratic tran‐sition in South Korea that a presidential candidate was selected through competition among multiple aspirants. On the other hand, the selection of candidates for parlia‐mentary elections remained highly centralised in a special committee of party lead‐ers.  Candidates were  evaluated  by  criteria  such  as  public  visibility,  loyalty  to  the party,  connections with  the  top  leader,  and  likelihood of  victory  (Park C.W.  2000; see also Köllner and Frank 1999: 96). The selection of candidates became much more inclusive when Kim Dae‐jung left the political arena four years later. To nominate a candidate for the 2002 presiden‐tial elections, his then party, the MDP, implemented a system that combined a closed and an open primary. Voting for the open primary took place in several cities, and votes were then averaged with the results of a vote among party members. Shortly after, the GNP, the successor party of the NKP, adopted the same system to select its presidential candidate. However,  in  order  to  fully  understand  the meaning  of  these  seemingly  demo‐cratic reforms,  it  is necessary to take into consideration the membership structure of Korean parties. As was explained in the previous section, party members are pri‐marily passive subjects at the  lower ends of a  local boss’ patron‐client network.  In return  for  particularistic  services,  members  promise  the  boss  electoral  support. While we have so far only discussed how these clientelistic practices affect elections 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outside the party, it is common practice that the boss will also demand his or her cli‐ents’ votes inside the party. Hence, in the case of a closed primary, for instance, the boss will  instruct his or her members to vote for the candidate endorsed by his or her faction, or – if he or she stands for election – for him‐ or herself (Lee H.C. 2002). Similarly,  votes  in an open primary  can effectively be mobilised  through  the boss’ 
sajojik. In other words, opening up the selection of the presidential candidate to the wider party membership and general electorate, did not strengthen the party on the ground, but it simply distributed the power that had originally been monopolised in the hands of the party leader among a larger group of political bosses.  In  the  KDLP,  in  contrast, members  enjoy  genuine  voting  rights,  which  are  not undermined by informal dependencies on local bosses. Moreover, its procedures of candidate selection again underline the value that the party attaches to members, as to nominate the presidential candidate for the 2002 election the KDLP held a closed primary, without extending voting rights to the common citizen. Hence, members of the KDLP not  only  differ  from non‐members  in  their  obligations,  but  also  in  their rights.  The  party  on  the  ground  in  the  KDLP  is  therefore much  stronger  than  the grassroots members  in  the  traditional  parties, who  only  carry  out  voting  instruc‐tions given by their respective patron.  The same applies for the 2004 National Assembly elections, for which the three traditional parties – the GNP, the Uri Party, and the dwindling MDP – organised the selection of candidates  in very similar ways to 2002, and, again, based nomination on  the  combined  result of  a  closed and an open primary, whereby both outcomes 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were weighted equally. However, to be able to participate in the primary, candidates needed  the  endorsement  of  their  party’s  “independent”  screening  commission. These commissions were appointed by the party leadership, and consisted of party officials and popular personalities of Korean society (such as clerics, professors or writers). Moreover, the party leadership reserved itself the right to make so‐called “strategic” selections. That is to say, the leadership could nominate candidates with‐out the need of a primary, if they felt that this was necessary to secure electoral vic‐tory. And,  in  fact,  the  leaders of the three parties made extensive use of that right: The GNP only held 15 primaries for a total of 228 nominations (6.6%), the Uri Party 86 in a total of 229 districts (37.6%), and the MDP 73 out of 217 (33.6%) (Kim and Kim 2005). In other words, the selection of candidates was – to a very high degree – still controlled by the party leadership. The  only  exception was  again  the  KDLP,  which  held  a  closed  primary  in  each constituency  to nominate  the candidates  for  the SMP race  in Korea’s parallel elec‐toral system. The composition of the party list was decided by the party’s executive committee,  but  it  then  needed  to  be  approved  by  the  vote  of  the  whole  party membership. Moreover, in drawing up the party list, the leadership is bound by spe‐cific rules in the party’s constitution, such as the requirement that the first candidate on the list must be a disabled person.45 For  the  2007 presidential  election  the  two  traditional  parties went  away  from the 50‐50 formula and adopted much more complicated rules. Particularly the sys‐
                                                45 Personal communication with the KDLP, 15 April 2008. 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tem institutionalised by the GNP seemed a patchwork of different methods and se‐lectorates. While the overall selectorate size was 231,652 (representing 0.5% of the total electorate), votes were not counted equally. 20 per cent of the votes came from “representative party members”. This group consisted of 4,811 members who were holding  a public  office  either on  the national,  provincial  or  local  level,  and 41,386 regular party members who were appointed by these office holders. Another 30 per cent of the vote came from “other party members” (69,496), whose vote was again split between members who had paid a regular membership fee of 2,000 KRW for at least  18  months,  and  all  other  members.  Moreover,  the  party  conducted  phone interviews with randomly selected voters outside the party, which accounted for 30 per cent of the total vote. As this “citizen committee” was supposed to embody the average Korean electorate, this was done until enough representative votes from all age groups and both genders had been collected. Finally,  in order to fill the last 20 per cent of the selectorate, the party commissioned three independent social‐survey organisations to ask 5,490 randomly chosen citizens for their candidate preferences. 
46  The UNDP – successor of the Uri Party – also changed its procedure to select its presidential  candidate,  albeit  less  drastically  than  the  GNP.  A  two‐round  process was adopted, in which the first round served to find the five top‐runners that would then be allowed to participate in the second round. The selectorate in the first round consisted of  randomly  selected voters  through an opinion poll  (50 per  cent of  the 
                                                46 Personal communication with the GNP, 17 April 2008. 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total vote) and 10,000 randomly selected party members (another 50 per cent). In the second round an open primary was held, that counted 90 per cent towards the final result. In order to participate in the primary, voters could vote in one of eight multi‐provincial primaries or they could also cast their vote by sending a text mes‐sage  from  their mobile phone.47 The  remaining 10 per  cent of  the  final  vote  came from a public opinion poll conducted across the country.48 The KDLP, again, did not  invite common citizens to participate in  its process to nominate  the  presidential  candidate  for  2007,  but,  similarly  to  the  UNDP,  a  two‐round system was adopted. The new rules stipulated that a second round of voting would be held if in the first round no candidate won an absolute majority of votes, while only allowing the two top runners to participate in the second round. In both rounds the size of the selectorate was 50,117, equalling the number members regu‐larly paying the membership fee. Members could exercise their vote either in one of 227 voting stations across the country, or online on the party’s website.49 While  the KDLP kept  its closed primary system to nominate candidates  for  the 2008 National Assembly election, the traditional parties again revised their proced‐ures  by  abolishing  the  possibility  of  holding  primaries  at  the  district  level.  The nomination of  candidates  thus became  the  exclusive domain of  the  “independent” screening committees. In both the GNP and the UDP – the successor of the UNDP – this committee was nominated by the respective party’s executive committee. In the 
                                                47 Before being able to participate in the mobile‐phone vote voters had to register on the party’s web‐site. Personal details needed for registration were kept to a minimum: name, resident registration number, address and phone number. 48 Personal communication with the UDP, 24 April 2008. 49 Personal communication with the KDLP, 15 April 2008. 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case of the GNP, the committee had eleven members – six from outside the party and five party members. Among the six outsiders were university professors, leaders of NGOs  and  a  former  public  prosecutor, while  of  the  five  insiders  two were  assem‐blymen and three party politicians without public office.50 Similarly, the UDP nomi‐nated six members from outside the party – two university professors, a  lawyer, a medical doctor, a museum director and a poet – and four assemblymen from within the party.51 It  thus  seems  that  with  the  introduction  of  the  screening  committees  the  two traditional parties have reverted to the un‐democratic style of the “three Kims” era. However, the reforms must be seen in the light of inter‐factional conflict within the parties. As the old guards within the party still controlled the vast majority of party members, any efforts to democratise the procedure had to open the decision‐making process  to non‐members outside  the party. However, even outside  the party  long‐established politicians have a competitive advantage, since they potentially control large shares of  the electorate  through their sajojik.  In other words, younger politi‐cians  needed  to  find  other  ways  to  ensure  a  fair  competition,  which  is  why  they pushed  for  the  introduction of  independent  screening  committees.  These  commit‐tees refused  to nominate candidates who had been  found guilty of  corruption and 
                                                50 Personal communication with the GNP, 17 April 2008. 51 Personal communication with the UDP, 24 April 2008. 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other illegal activities.52 This particularly affected the old guards, who – in order to fuel their clientelistic networks with resources – are much more likely to engage in corrupt  activities  than  younger  politicians.  The  committees  seemed  to  have  been quite independent in their decisions and it now seems more difficult,  if not impos‐sible, to buy a nomination from one of two major parties.53 To sum up, this section supports the conclusion formulated after the earlier dis‐cussion of the membership structure of Korean parties: The party on the ground in the two traditional parties is virtually powerless. While during the “three Kims” era candidate selection was decided only by the party leader, the formally more demo‐cratic procedures institutionalised thereafter did not succeed in cutting through the informal  patron‐client  networks  that  connect  the  party  leaders  to  the  grassroots membership. As a result, younger politicians have pushed very hard to move candi‐date selection outside the political party – either by conducting public opinion polls or giving  the decision‐making power  to  independent  screening committees.  In  the KDLP,  on  the other hand,  candidate  selection  is  organised  according  to  effectively democratic  rules.  However,  different  to  its membership  structure,  the  KDLP  does not follow the classical mass‐party model, which is usually associated with a hierar‐
                                                52 For instance, prominent figures that were eliminated by the UDP’s screening committee included former presidential chief of staff Park Ji‐won, Kim Hong‐up – Kim Dae‐jung's second son – and Lee Yong‐hee, a four‐term lawmaker. Park was convicted of taking 100 million KRW (50,000 GBP) in bribes from two local conglomerates, while Kim Hong‐up was found guilty of receiving about 2.5 bil‐lion KRW (1.2 million GBP) from several companies in July 2002. Lee Yong‐hee received a suspended jail term for taking bribes. 53 The only alleged case of a bought National Assembly seat in the 2008 election concerned the Pro Pro‐Park Geun‐hye Alliance – a splinter party from the GNP – which placed publicly unknown Yang Jung‐rye as the number one candidate on its party list – after her mother had donated 1.55 billion KRW (about 782,000 GBP) to the party. However, the party claims that it only borrowed the money to cover electoral campaign costs. 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chical system of delegation, but rather more contemporary models of party organi‐sation and the principle of “one member, one vote”. This weakens the party on the ground, as members are atomised and will thus have difficulties coordinating a seri‐ous challenge to the other two faces. However,  in order to determine which of  the organisational faces within each of the Korean parties should be regarded as domi‐nant, let us turn to the next section.   
Distribution of resources and decision‐making positions  
 When discussing  the  distribution  of  internal  resources  in Korean political  parties, we can once again observe significant differences between the parties of  the three Kims, on the one hand, and their successor parties on the other.   During the “three Kims”  era,  all  politically  relevant  resources were  channelled  through  the hands of the  respective  party  leader.  Given  that  the  three  Kims  shared  almost  the  total national  vote  among  them,  aspiring  politicians were  practically  forced  to  join  the party of one of the Kims. Establishing a fourth party or standing as an independent candidate  would  have  been  futile,  since  the  regional  electoral  strongholds  of  the three Kims were impossible to break. Moreover, the three Kims did not only attract the majority of votes, but at the same time acted as a “magnet” for substantial finan‐cial donations. Similarly to voters, who would not waste their vote on a fourth party, 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businesses would not  invest  in a party  that could not be expected  to win. Particu‐larly the ruling party was thus a popular choice for corporate donations, which were often paid as “quasi‐taxes” – principally by the large conglomerates, the jaebol (Kang 2002; see also Park B.S. 1995). As donations were given directly to the party leader, this led to the emergence of a  hierarchical  exchange  of money  and  loyalty  through  a  system  of  patronage  em‐bedded within the political parties. Money was handed down to the faction leaders for their political support, who would then inject the money into their own clientel‐istic networks until it reached the grassroots members. This high degree of control the three Kims exerted over both the collection and distribution of party funds made assemblymen and candidates highly dependent on their respective party leader. Ex‐pressed  in  the words of  a  civic  group  leader  cited  in Thornton and Kovick  (2003: 293),  “money  is  the channel  through which party bosses keep candidates subordi‐nate”. However, not only  assemblymen and  candidates depended on  the party  leader for their political survival, but the whole party as an organisation. This explains the short  life span of Korean political parties  throughout  the 1990s, since parties only existed at the mercy of their leader, and were dissolved, merged or renamed accord‐ing to the leader’s own interest. In case the leader chose to leave the party, the party would simply die, as it had no value in itself. Although the parties of the three Kims were highly bureaucratised,  the party bureaucracy would usually  follow  the party 
POLITICAL PARTY ORGANISATION IN EAST ASIA    
 – 169 – 
   
leader into his new party or cease to exist with the new one.54 This shows that the party  central was  best  understood  as  the  “property”  of  the  party  boss,  solely  em‐ployed to perform organisational and administrative tasks.   As a result of this dependency on the party leader, the three Kims also monopo‐lised  all  decision‐making  responsibilities.  In  the  parliamentary  party,  the  unques‐tioned authority of the leader was further strengthened by the practice of nominat‐ing  a  large  number  of  fresh  candidates  who,  when  and  if  elected,  were  placed around a core of very experienced parliamentarians. These experienced lawmakers conducted  the work  in  committees  and  the party’s  caucus  according  to  the guide‐lines  of  the  party  leader.  While  more  experienced  parliamentarians  were  often bound to the party leader by decades long political loyalty, the newly elected depu‐ties were  normally  inexperienced,  did  not  have  their  own  political  networks,  and depended very much on the support of the party patron when it came to their politi‐cal career (Croissant 2002). Finally – as an indicator of the party leader’s decision‐making authority and a factor that further reinforced his authority – the floor leader was not usually chosen by the Assembly members of the party but appointed by the party president. The dependency on individual party leaders decreased when the three Kims left politics. Moreover, stricter political financing laws were crafted, which meant that it became more difficult for individual politicians to collect large corporate donations. 
                                                54 For instance, the secretariat of Kim Young‐sam’s NKP was a large organisation with three‐tier of‐fices on a geographical basis (the central office, the province/city offices and the electoral district offices), employing about 1,200 full‐time staff. Kim Dae‐jung’s NCNP, which was in opposition then, still had 300 party employees on its payroll (Kim Y.H. 1998: 150). 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Already  in 1999, president Kim Dae‐jung  launched a national  anti‐corruption pro‐gramme, which tightened the regulations on donations and contributions, imposing ceilings on the amounts  individuals and corporate bodies could give to  the central party  organisation  or  a  local  branch. Moreover,  the  new Political  Fund Act  estab‐lished  an  annual  government  subsidy  for political  parties  calculated  at  the  rate  of 800 KRW (0.40 GBP) for each vote cast in the most recent National Assembly elec‐tion. However, given both the high running expenses of Korean parties and the em‐barrassing corruption scandal surrounding Kim Dae‐jung’s own son in 2000, the ef‐fectiveness  and wholeheartedness  of  these  reforms must  be  seriously  questioned (Ferdinand 2003: 65). A more  serious  attempt  to  reform  political  financing  laws  was made  in  2004. First of all, a lower limit for financial contributions was set, as the maximum amount money each assemblyman is allowed to collect each year decreased by half –  from three billion KRW (150,000 GBP)  to one and a half billion KRW – while  the maxi‐mum amount each voter can donate a year was lowered to 20 million KRW (10,000 GBP), which is only one sixth of the previous limit. Secondly, the new laws regulate unidentifiable money: The maximum amount for anonymous donations, per person and  per  donation,  is  now  100,000  KRW  (50  GBP)  –  lowered  by  one  tenth  –  and donations  larger  than  500,000 KRW  (250 GBP) must  now be  transferred  through check or credit card. The new political funding laws were passed through the initia‐tive of younger politicians across different parties. They did this with the support of civil society organisations, which had been blackballing corrupt politicians since the 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late  1990s,  thereby  putting  public  pressure  on  those  legislators who  opposed  re‐forming the political finance laws (see Horowitz and Kim 2002). However, although formal political funding laws have become more effective, the party bureaucracy remains powerless as an organisational element. To start with, an amendment to the Political Party Act in 2002 stipulates that parties are only allowed to have 150 salaried employees at the central party level, meaning that the parties had  to  considerably  slim  down  their  bureaucratic  apparatus. Moreover,  the  party central office enjoys no representation in any of the parties’ decision‐making bodies. The members of both the GNP’s and UDP’s executive committee are all elected, and there are no designated ex‐officio posts within  these bodies.55 Similarly, no  repre‐sentative of the party bureaucracy has voting rights in the parties’ National Assem‐bly caucuses, but these are comprised of assemblymen only, who will also elect their floor leader without interference from outside. Finally, in both parties – and in con‐trast to the typical Western European model – the general secretary has in the past always been a parliamentarian, appointed by the party chairman (in the case of the GNP) or the executive committee (UDP).56 The party bureaucracy does not have any power to demand participation in the parties’ decision making, because the party in public office is largely self‐sufficient. First of all, as was discussed earlier, assemblymen have their own networks of sup‐porters  and  do  not  have  to  rely  on  the  party  central  office  to  communicate  with 
                                                55 The executive committee of the GNP consists of nine members, all of whom need to be approved by the party congress. The 10 members of the UDP’s executive committee, on the other hand, are elected by all party members.  56 The information in this paragraph was obtained through personal communication with the GNP (17 April 2008) and the UDP (24 April 2008) respectively. 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grassroots members.  Secondly,  assemblymen  are  financially  independent,  as  their respective  party’s  contribution  to  their  electoral  campaign  budget  is minimal,  but the money comes almost exclusively from donations the candidate collects him‐ or herself. Finally, parliamentarians are provided with administrative assistants by the National Assembly, and do not depend on staff allocated by the party central office.   In  the KDLP,  in  stark  contrast,  the party  central  office  is much more powerful. First of all, the party’s constitution declares that the party central office must be rep‐resented  in  all  decision‐making  bodies.  Accordingly,  the  supreme  committee,  the party’s highest executive body, is composed of the party chairman, the leader of the parliamentary party, the general secretary, the chairperson of the policy committee and seven other elected members. The general secretary, who – in contrast to other Korean parties –  is usually a party bureaucrat, also participates  in  the meetings of the party’s caucus in the National Assembly. Moreover, KDLP parliamentarians are not only obliged to forward all donations they collect to the party central office, but, in addition, they must hand over much of their assemblyman salary so they do not earn more than the average Korean worker.57 To sum up, during the three Kims era all politically relevant resources were mo‐nopolised by the party leader. Since Kim Young‐sam and Kim Dae‐jung left politics, resources  in  their respective parties (and their successor parties) have been more evenly distributed among a  larger number of politicians, with a particular concen‐tration in the National Assembly. However, it is doubtful whether we can thus con‐
                                                57 Personal communication with the KDLP, 15 April 2008. 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clude  that  the party  in public office  is  the dominant organisational  face  in  this  re‐gard. First of all, significant resources are also held by political bosses who do not occupy a public office. Secondly, it is not the party in public office as such that con‐trols the resources, but rather each individual politician controls his or her own re‐sources. In contrast, in the KDLP political resources are mainly located in the party central office, which, consequently,  is also empowered to participate  in  the party’s decision‐making process.   
Summary 
 The environmental  context  in post‐autocratic South Korea clearly  favours clientel‐istic over programmatic electoral strategies: First of all, similar to other newer de‐mocracies of the “third wave”, the working class is difficult to mobilise for electoral means because of the virulent anti‐communism and the repressive anti‐union laws that  accompanied  the  process  of  industrialisation  under  the  authoritarian  regime. Secondly,  both  the  regime  and  the  pro‐democratic  opposition  used  clientelistic forms of electoral mobilisation in the regime’s pseudo‐elections, and through a ne‐gotiated  democratic  transition  were  able  to  transfer  their  patron‐client  networks into  the  new  democratic  arena.  These  networks  are  deeply  embedded  in  Korean mass political culture and have thus taken on a life of their own – independent of the 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conditions of  low socio‐economic development that allowed their establishment  in the first place.  Therefore,  as  clientelism  is  the  outcome  strategically  selected  for  by  the  envi‐ronmental context, the major political parties in South Korea are nothing but a for‐mal façade for informal patron‐client networks that connect politicians and voters. Very much  like  in  the classical  cadre party  in early‐democratic Europe,  the  formal party organisations remains underdeveloped and the three faces of party organisa‐tion are indistinguishable: Party members do not differ much from common citizens in  terms  of  their  rights within  and  their  obligations  towards  the  party,  the  party central leadership selects itself as candidates for public elections and the party cent‐ral office is merely a passive bureaucratic body without any independent decision‐making power.  However,  after  losing  their  charismatic  leaders,  Kim  Young‐sam  and Kim Dae‐jung,  the major Korean parties have  increasingly become affected by  internal  con‐flicts between factions of younger politicians and old guards. As these younger poli‐ticians are not embedded into the existing clientelistic networks and lack the neces‐sary  private  resources  to  establish  similar  patron‐client  relationships,  they  intro‐duced  public  economic  incentives  into  the  regional  electoral  conflict.  Simulta‐neously, they have been trying to overpower the older generation within the major parties  by  introducing  party  membership  fees  –  which  failed  –  give  the  right  to nominate  candidates  for public  election  to  independent  forces outside  the party – 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either through screening committees or public opinion polls – and pass stricter po‐litical finance legislation.  While  these measures have not  led  to  the emergence of a new type of political party  in  South Korea,  party  internal  processes  have  become more  formalised  and transparent. This is particularly true for the selection of candidates for public elec‐tion, which is now less dependent on resources controlled by individual politicians and factions, particularly votes and money. Moreover,  the party  internal allocation of resources is much more closely regulated by law, making it impossible for single politicians to gain control of the party, as happened during the “three Kims” era. In other words, as in the classical cadre party, the different elements of party organisa‐tion  are  still  indistinguishable,  as  extra‐parliamentary  organisation  is  minimal. However, very similar to Koole’s (1994) “modern cadre party” there seems to exist a stronger  link  of  accountability  between  the party  public  office  and both  the party members and the wider public. Although these party internal conflicts are a good example of how actors can de‐velop different strategies within the same context, which then translate into diver‐ging preferences regarding the party organisation, the outcome is not very different from  the  outcome  strategically  selected  for  the  environment.  Therefore,  a  much more valuable case to study is the KDLP, which is the only major party that breaks with the traditional pattern of Korean political party organisation. To begin with, the mass membership within the KDLP holds significant power as it contributes signifi‐cantly to the party’s financial survival. In return for this contribution, the member‐
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ship  is  granted  significant  participatory  rights  in  the  party’s  process  of  candidate selection. However, candidate selection is organised as a closed primary, which at‐omises and thus somehow weakens the party on the ground. This gives considerable power to the party central office, which administers the party membership register, thus forcing the party in public office to rely on the bureaucracy for any communica‐tion with  the  rank‐and‐file. Moreover,  the  party  in  central  office  also  controls  the financial  resources  of  the  party  and  has  considerable  participatory  rights  in  the party’s  internal decision‐making procedures. We can  thus conclude  that –  in  stark contrast to the two other major Korean parties – it is the party in central office that dominates the KDLP. This particular outcome is, again, closely linked to the key ac‐tor’s  electoral  strategy, which,  in  the  case  of  the KDLP  is  based on  a narrowly  fo‐cused programmatic platform. Thus, similar to the socialist mass parties in late 19th century, the KDLP needs a strong party bureaucracy in order to discipline the mem‐bers of the party in public office. In short,  the KDLP is a perfect example of how actors can make diverging stra‐tegic  choices  within  the  same  environment.  This  could  be  because  actors  in  the KDLP either  lack  the necessary  resources  to  establish  clientelistic networks or  in‐terpret  the  context  through  a  different  set  of  ideas  than  other  actors.  However, whatever  the reason,  the  important point  to note  is  that  the outcome strategically selected for by the context – elitist parties characterised by the lack of formal faces of party organisation –  is by no means  inevitable. Moreover,  as  the bitter  internal conflicts within the two major Korean parties show, even the strategically selected 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outcome is not a direct product of the environment, but it is constantly contested by actors with different sets of resources or ideas. Therefore, although the constellation of party organisations  in post‐autocratic Korea  is  very  similar  to party  systems  in 19th century Europe, with mass parties challenging the hegemonic position of cadre parties,  this  should  not  be  understood  as  a  case  of  “history  repeating  itself”,  but party organisations in Korea are the product of strategic calculations made in a par‐ticular context that favours certain strategies over others. 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Political  parties  in  Taiwan  share  many  similarities  with  contemporary  parties  in Western Europe, as the party in public office is clearly the dominant organisational element. However, as our analysis will show, they arrived at this stage not through an “evolutionary leap”, but each of the parties followed a very distinctive path of or‐ganisational development, constrained by the inter‐factional conflict within each of the parties and the particular environmental context.   
The environmental context  The  change  of  the  Taiwanese  political  system  from  a  one‐party  state  to  a  fully‐fledged  democracy  happened  through  a  transformation  guided  from  above  (Tien 1997: 124). The ruling Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party) never lost con‐
POLITICAL PARTY ORGANISATION IN EAST ASIA    
 – 179 – 
   
trol of the protracted transition process, while the pro‐democratic opposition could only sit and watch as different groupings within the regime negotiated the new rules of  the  electoral  game.  Therefore,  the  clientelistic  networks  the  regime  had  built around local power brokers in order to mobilise voters in local‐level elections sur‐vived  the  transformation  of  the  political  system  and we  should  expect  these  net‐works to be used to activate electoral support also under the new democratic rules – despite the high level of socio‐economic development that characterises Taiwan to‐day. The KMT imposed martial law on Taiwan in 1949 after the national government of China around Chiang Kai‐shek was forced to flee the mainland from the advancing communist  forces.  That way, Taiwan became  the  last  fallback position  for  the Re‐public of China,  leading to a sudden influx of two million party functionaries, state officials,  soldiers  and entrepreneurs. The KMT, which after  the defeat  reorganised itself  according  to Leninist principles  in order  to emulate  the Communist Party of China (CPC),  soon began to  “colonise”  the  island by placing party cadres  in all key positions  of  the  state  apparatus  –  including  the military  –  and  integrating  society into party mass organisations  (Dickson 1993). All  other parties were banned,  and elections only held at local level, while the distribution of seats in the national par‐liament was  “frozen”. The Taiwanese, who  still  constituted  the overwhelming ma‐jority of  society, were  thus practically excluded  from the political decision‐making 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Taiwan  7,981 (1990) 17,116 (2008)  0.312 (1990) 0.326 (2000)  74.1 (1989) 80.0 (2008)  94.0 (1990) 97.2 (2004) 
Germany  29,461 (2006)  0.283 (2007)  75.2 (2005)  99.0 (2006) 
United Kingdom  33,238 (2005)  0.360 (2007)  89.7 (2005)  99.0 (2005) 
Source:  Department of Investment Services (undated); Government Information Office (undated); Tsai (1996)   
                                                58 The term “Taiwanese” in this regard refers to ethnic Chinese, who immigrated to Taiwan from the 17th century onwards mainly from the coastal regions of Fujian and Guangdong. Today, slightly less than 85 per cent of the island’s population are considered as Taiwanese, whereas mainland Chinese account for approximately 14 per cent of the population (Copper 1996: 12). 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However, when, in the late 1970s, it became clear that the international community was no longer willing to support the KMT’s claim of sovereignty over China, the KMT suffered  a  severe  blow  to  its  credibility  (Wachman 1994:  135).  At  the  same  time, Taiwan’s rapid industrialisation had led to the emergence of a new middle class (see Table  10),  which  clearly  reflected  the  sub‐ethnic  division  in  society:  “As  national politics was primarily  reserved  for mainlanders,  […] Taiwanese pursued economic advancement for social upward mobility” (Cheng 1989: 482; emphasis added). The political demand of the growing middle class was clear: Taiwan should be governed by the Taiwanese majority, not by a small minority as a part of China. Under the leadership of Chiang Ching‐kuo, the son of Chiang Kai‐shek, who suc‐ceeded his father in power in 1978, the KMT reacted to this loss of legitimacy with a strategy  of  “Taiwanisation”,  opening  top  ranks  in  the  party  and  in  government  to sub‐ethnic Taiwanese (Hood 1997: 65). Consequently, the proportion of Taiwanese members  of  the  KMT’s  central  standing  committee  rose  from  14.3%  in  1973  to 57.1%  in  1993  (Huang  1996:  119‐120).  By  the  late  1980s  this  sub‐ethnic  divide within  the KMT gave rise  to  the  formation of  two  larger  factions:  the Mainstream, including mostly Taiwanese, and  the Non‐mainstream, mainly a grouping of main‐land‐born politicians and children of mainlanders born on Taiwan. Both these  fac‐tions consist of a number of smaller  factions, which are all more serious  than ten‐dencies or cliques, since members need to enlist officially, and the leadership team meets regularly to discuss faction matters (Cheng and Chou 2000: 61‐62). 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Simultaneously,  the  regime  decided  to  hold  “supplementary”  elections  on  the national level in order to replace those parliamentarians who had either become too old to govern or had passed away. Marginalised  in the party  internal power game, members of  the Mainstream  faction started developing  links with  local  factions  to mobilise support  in  these and  local elections (Hood 1997: 109). Local  factions (di­
fang  paixi)  are  large  interpersonal  networks  that  are  held  together  by guanxi  –  a term  connoting  social  ties  and  connections  (kin,  patron‐client,  friendship,  neigh‐bourhood, school et cetera) (Bosco 1992: 158). The electoral mobilisation of  these groups was achieved through vote‐brokers (called tiau­a­ka in Taiwanese), utilising political campaigns, personal relationships, the mobilisation of employees and vote‐buying. The ban on political parties remained in force, but opposition candidates began to coordinate their campaign activities in the so‐called dangwai‐movement (literally, “outside  the party”). However,  there was disagreement over whether  this was  the best strategy to bring down the KMT regime, resulting in a split between radical and moderate groupings (Tsang 1999: 12). Whereas both the Mainstream faction, led by Kang Ning‐hsiang, and the Formosa faction advocated political change through elec‐tions, the New Tide faction was committed to push for democratisation from outside the system. As the opposition still had hardly any influence over legislation, the re‐sulting  frustrations  favoured  the  radicals within  the dangwai  (Cheng and Haggard 1990: 68). At  the same  time,  the  regime perceived  the  limited electoral  success of 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the dangwai as a serious threat, which provoked a split within the regime between hard‐ and soft‐liners, with the hard‐liners instantly gaining the upper hand. The more radical tactics of the dangwai – which were centred on social mobilisa‐tion – were soon crushed by the regime hardliners when a mass demonstration held in Kaohsiung on 10 December 1979 was put to a violent end by riot police, and most leaders of the radical faction within the opposition were jailed. This tipped the bal‐ance back  in  favour of  the moderate  forces  in the opposition camp, which,  in turn, advantaged the KMT soft‐liners, who soon resumed the process of political liberali‐sation  (Cheng 1989: 486‐487).   With  the moderates  in  control,  the dangwai  again concentrated  on  institutionalising  a  competitive  electoral  organisation,  eventually leading  to  the  founding  of  the Democratic  Progressive  Party  (DPP, Minjindang)  in September 1986. The KMT silently tolerated this move, before proclaiming the end of martial  law and, only a few weeks later, the prohibition of political associations. The first free and fair elections for a national parliament were held in 1991.   
Actors and their strategies  The strategic calculations made by the KMT’s soft‐liners turned out to be correct, as the party succeeded in staying in power until 2000. The electoral success of the KMT during that decade was to a large extent based on the Mainstream faction’s clientel‐
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istic connections with local factions. On the other hand,  lacking similar clientelistic links,  both  the Non‐mainstream  faction within  the KMT as well  as  the DPP devel‐oped programmatic appeals. Therefore, when the DPP took power at the turn of the millennium,  clientelism  ceased  to  be  a  viable  strategic  option.  This  is  because  the KMT found itself excluded from access to state resources, while the DPP was unable to use its newly‐achieved executive power to establish clientelistic linkages with the electorate,  since  its  electoral  success  was  largely  built  on  criticising  the  growing level of corruption due the KMT’s clientelistic money politics.   
A one‐party dominant system (1991‐2000) 
 Some authors have described  the process of democratisation  in Taiwan as a  “pro‐tracted transition” (Rigger 2000), given that the KMT continued to dominate party politics  for  almost  a  decade  after  holding  the  first  free  and  fair  elections.  In  fact, throughout the 1990s, the effective number of parliamentary parties never exceeded 2.5,  as  the KMT  successfully managed  to maintain  its  absolute  parliamentary ma‐jority.  Similarly,  volatility  remained  at  a  relatively  low  level  for  new democracies, indicating that voters did not switch their votes from the regime party to other al‐ternatives (see Table 11). As a result, the DPP, as the main opposition party, failed to 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significantly  increase  its  seat  share  in  1990s  elections  and  never  posed  a  serious threat to the former regime party (see Table 12). Turning our attention  towards  the  intra‐party  level, we  can observe  that,  from the beginning, a power‐sharing agreement was  institutionalised within  the DPP  to accommodate  the different groupings: While  the moderates dominated  the party’s decision‐making apparatus (the party chair and the central standing committee), the New Tide obtained a disproportionate share of posts in the party bureaucracy (Rig‐ger  2001a:  25).  In  order  to  diminish  the  influence  of  the New Tide,  the moderate forces within  the DPP merged with  the  Formosa  Faction, which  had  risen  to  high prominence  after  its  leaders were  pardoned  and  released  from  prison  in  the  late 1980s.  
TABLE 11:  TAIWAN – PARTY SYSTEM INDICATORS 
  ENEPa  ENPPb  Volatilityc 1992  1.95  1.86  ‐ 1995  2.51  2.42  16.70 1998  2.65  2.25  11.30 2001  4.12  3.47  28.60 2004  3.71  3.25  7.10 2008  2.30  1.75  23.30 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Factional politics in the DPP were thus characterised by intense confrontation. Con‐flict  between  the  two  factions  revolved mainly  around  the  search  for  an  efficient electoral  strategy. Once  the KMT  followed  through with  its  promise  to  lift martial law and hold free and fair elections, the issue of democratic reform lost its value as a vehicle for voter mobilisation (Rigger 1999: 148). It soon became apparent that the DPP had been nothing more than an “umbrella” party for adversaries of the KMT re‐gime. Whereas  the Formosa  faction gathered most of  the opposition’s political  ce‐lebrities, thus combining charisma with a catch‐all programmatic strategy, the New Tide followed a very narrow ideology, stressing the sub‐ethnic cleavage and calling blatantly for Taiwanese independence from mainland China. The Formosa group, in contrast,  took  a  much  more  moderate  standpoint,  and  argued  that  self‐determination  could  only  be  achieved  through  open  debates  and  referenda  (Chao 2002:  108).  Both  factions  also  differed  as  to  their  level  of  institutionalisation. Whereas the Formosa faction could be classified as a personalised faction, the New Tide  is  virtually  a  “party within  a  party”  (Arrigo  1994:  161) with  its  own  profes‐sional staff, and a highly sophisticated organisational apparatus. In the initial years after the DPP’s founding, the Formosa faction prevailed over the New Tide. However,  things changed when overseas advocates of Taiwan  inde‐pendence were  allowed  back  into  the  country. Many  of  the  returning  exiles  soon joined the DPP, thereby tipping the inter‐factional balance in favour of the New Tide (Wachman 1994: 118). This allowed the New Tide to launch a credible attack on the party’s  policy  platform  at  the  1991  national  party  congress  to  include  the  goal  of 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Taiwan independence. After several rounds of negotiations the two factions finally came to a compromise. The Formosa faction was allowed to renew its party leader‐ship,  while  the  New  Tide’s  urge  for  national  sovereignty  for  Taiwan  became  the DPP’s official ideological line (Cheng and Hsu 1996: 147).  
TABLE 12:  TAIWAN – RESULTS FOR LEGISLATIVE YUAN ELECTIONS 
1992  1995  1998  2001  2004  2008a 
Party 
Vb  Sc  V  S  V  S  V  S  V  S  V  S KMT  53.0  59.0  46.1  51.8  46.4  54.7  28.6  30.2  32.8  35.1  53.5  71.7 DPP  31.0  31.7  33.2  32.9  29.6  31.1  33.4  38.7  35.7  39.6  38.2  23.9 NP  ‐  ‐  13.0  12.8  7.1  4.9  2.6  0.4  0.1  0.4  ‐  ‐ TAIP  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  1.4  0.4  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ PFP  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  18.6  20.4  13.9  15.1  0.3  0.9 TSU  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  7.8  5.8  7.8  5.3  0.9  0.0 Other  16.0  9.3  7.7  2.5  15.5  8.9  9.0  4.5  9.6  2.8  3.1  3.2 
Notes: aThe share of votes for the 2008 elections is calculated on the absolute number of votes received by parties in the single‐member constituencies. bShare of votes (in per cent)  cShare of seats (in per cent) 
Source:  Rinza (2001); Lin J.W. (2002); Chen C.F. (2006); Taipei Times (2008)  
Thus, the issue of national  identity was introduced into the electoral arena, almost immediately developing into the most important factor with which to explain voting behaviour  (Hsieh  2002:  38).  If  the  KMT wanted  to  compete  successfully with  the DPP under  the new democratic  rules,  it needed  to  take a stand on  the question of national  identity.  This  caused  intense  factional  conflict  within  the  former  regime party. Whereas  the conservative Non‐mainstream held  the orthodox view  that  the government  in Taipei was  the sole  legitimate government of China, which had  the 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EISa  MISb  SQSc  MUSd  EUSe December ‘92  6.2  6.3  30.6  30.1  26.9 January ‘95  6.6  8.6  51.1  20.7  12.9 March ‘96  9.1  12.4  53.5  15.4  9.7 January ‘99  12.9  14.8  43.5  17.4  11.4 June ‘00  6.2  15.3  46.0  22.4  10.1 
Notes: aExtreme independence supporter. bModerate independence supporter. cStatus quo supporter. dModerate unification supporter. eExtreme unification supporter. 
Source:  Hsieh (2001: 935)  
As can be seen from Table 13, public opinion benefited the KMT Mainstream, as the largest share of voters was grouped around the centre of the spectrum, either pre‐ferring to retain the status quo or supporting unification with China only under cer‐tain circumstances. Moreover,  the Mainstream faction’s strong  links with  local  fac‐tions  proved  to  be  very  effective  channels  for  electoral mobilisation,  allowing  the Mainstream to become the dominant faction within the KMT (Hood 1997: 109). Al‐ready  in  1988,  Taiwanese  Lee  Teng‐hui  had  been  elected  the  party’s  chairman, thereby  automatically  also  becoming  president  of  the Republic  of  China. With  the government resources at his disposal, Lee slowly consolidated his power by bring‐
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ing people who supported him into important decision‐making positions within the party and the state (Tan 2002: 157). Under the leadership of Lee Teng‐hui the KMT then shifted towards a more moderate position on the Taiwan identity versus Chi‐nese identity spectrum (Fell 2005: 111). We can therefore summarise that both major parties  in Taiwan were each split into  two  larger  factions,  which  differed  considerably  in  their  electoral  strategies. This again supports our view that social agents are able to develop alternative stra‐tegic reactions to the same context. In the KMT, the Mainstream faction, based on its close  link with local  factions,  followed a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilisation. The faction also gave itself a broad programmatic image to distance itself from the Non‐mainstream,  which  campaigned  on  very  narrowly  defined  programmatic  ap‐peals, pushing for re‐unification with the Chinese mainland. In the DPP, too, factions were divided over strategies for voter mobilisation: While the Formosa faction cam‐paigned on a broad programmatic platform, supported by the charisma of its  lead‐ers, the New Tide targeted very narrowly defined social groups with its call for Tai‐wanese  independence. The  reasons why  these various actors developed divergent electoral strategies are beyond the scope of  this analysis – most  likely because ac‐tors hold different sets of resources or ideas – but the important point to note is that the major Taiwanese parties were deeply riven by factionalism. However, in the DPP, the inter‐factional conflict over the best electoral strategy lessened through the 1990s. When the DPP moved to the far left of the unification‐independence spectrum in 1991, this was heavily penalised by the electorate, as the 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party only won 29.34% of the votes in the first free and fair elections to the National Assembly  (compared  to  71.17 won  by  the  KMT).  After  this  disastrous  defeat,  the DPP began to redraft its independence policy, bringing it into line with public opin‐ion  (Rigger  2001a:  126).  However,  the  failure  of  the  pure  Taiwan  independence platform did not weaken the position of the New Tide within the DPP. In fact, for the subsequent years the DPP was controlled by a balanced New Tide‐Formosa coalition that  was  pitted  against  smaller  factions  that  emerged  in  the  early  1990s  (Fulda 2002:  331).  Rather,  the New Tide moderated  its  own  ideology  (Chao  2002:  113). Particularly after the 1996 presidential election, which was overshadowed by mili‐tary manoeuvres held by the People’s Republic of China in the Taiwan Strait, it has become clear that Taiwanese independence can only be achieved by risking a major war. In the same year, a group of die‐hard radical  independence advocates left the DPP, and founded their own party – the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP, Jianguo­
dang). When the DPP moved further to the centre of the ideological spectrum, the KMT had to follow, if it did not want to lose the electoral fight for the median voter. This, again,  helped  the Mainstream  to  tighten  its  grip  on  power.  Moreover,  by moving away  from  the  revolutionary  mission  of  the  KMT,  and  taking  a  more  Taiwan‐oriented stance, the Mainstream disappointed many who wished to uphold the po‐litical  legacy of Chiang Kai‐shek. Ultimately,  in 1993,  the New Alliance, a  faction of mainly second generation mainlanders within the Non‐mainstream, decided to split away from the KMT in order to establish the New Party (NP, Xindang) (Hood 1996: 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477). This  gave  the Mainstream yet more  leverage over  the KMT decision‐making apparatus, allowing Lee Teng‐hui to move the party even further to the centre of the national identity spectrum. Finally, after winning the 1996 presidential election Lee and his  faction ultimately beat  the Non‐mainstream  in  the  inter‐factional  struggle, making the distinction between the two factions obsolete. As an expression of  this dominance  Lee  proclaimed  his  “two‐states  theory”  in  July  1999,  which  held  that Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China enjoyed “special state to state relations” (Schubert 2004: 540). However,  Lee’s  leadership  did  not  go  unchallenged,  as  the  highly  charismatic James Soong emerged as a  serious opponent. Once close party associates, Lee had appointed Soong as the governor of Taiwan Province in 1993.59 Things became sour between  the  two when Lee perceived Soong’s  increasing popularity with  the elec‐torate as a threat to his own status and thus did not nominate Soong as prime minis‐ter in 1996, although Soong felt that as the governor of Taiwan he should have natu‐rally been selected. Moreover, in 1998, the Lee government decided to abolish Tai‐wan Province as an administrative unit, thereby – as Soong and his supporters be‐lieved – destroying Soong’s power base. Finally, when Soong lost the KMT’s nomina‐tion for the presidential candidate in 2000 against Lien Chan, who Lee endorsed as his successor, Soong left the party to stand as an independent and establish the Peo‐ple First Party (PFP, Qinmindang) shortly before the 2001 Legislative Yuan elections. 
                                                59 When the KMT arrived in Taiwan in 1949 the administration that ruled Taiwan as a province of the Republic of China was left untouched. However, since Taiwan also became the last territory to be ef‐fectively ruled by the government of the Republic of China, this gave rise to an odd double adminis‐trative structure. 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A two‐party system emerges 
 Lee’s  powerful  position within  the  KMT  suddenly  collapsed when  Lien  Chan  only finished  third  in  the  presidential  election  behind  the  DPP’s  Chen  Shui‐bian  and James Soong. Rumours started spreading within the KMT that Lee had only favoured the unpopular Lien Chan to secretly support Chen Shui‐bian, who otherwise would not have been strong enough to beat Soong. As a result, Lee had to resign from the party chairmanship to take responsibility for the devastating result, and Lien Chan was elected as his successor by the national party congress  in  June 2000.  Immedi‐ately after assuming chairmanship, Lien Chan formed a reform committee to exam‐ine  ways  that  the  party  could  reform  itself  and make  itself  competitive  in  future elections (Tan 2002: 158). One strategic mistake identified was the KMT’s problem‐atic position at  the  ideological centre of  the national  identity spectrum. Under Lee Teng‐hui, the KMT attacked both the DPP for pushing for independence, and the NP for advocating rapid unification. It was felt that this contradictory tone lost the KMT votes on both sides (Fell 2005: 120). Accordingly, the new party leadership decided to move the party back to the centre‐right. Moreover, the Mainstream’s reliance on its links with local factions for electoral mobilisation had paved the way for organ‐ised crime into the Legislative Yuan and led to increasing levels of political corrup‐tion at the national level (Yu et al. 2008). The DPP successfully attacked the KMT on the “black gold” issue, forcing the party to take a tougher line on corruption and cut‐ting the connections to local factions.   
POLITICAL PARTY ORGANISATION IN EAST ASIA    
 – 193 – 
   
Consequently,  since  2000  more  programmatic‐oriented  forces  have  come  to dominate  the  KMT, which,  in  turn,  have  reintroduced many  traditional  principles into  the  party’s  policy  platform.  The KMT  clearly  returned  to  the  formula  of  “one China,  two political entities”, which advocates unification of Taiwan and the main‐land in a Chinese confederation (Schubert 2004: 541). As a result of the ideological shift to the right, supporters of the policies advocated by Lee Teng‐hui left the KMT in order  to establish  the Taiwan Solidarity Union  (TSU, Taiwan Tuanjie Lianmeng), shortly before the 2001 Legislative Yuan elections. However, this did not mean the end of ideological conflict within the KMT, as the KMT saw the emergence of a new faction, the Bentupai faction.60 The faction arose because KMT politicians in central and southern Taiwan, where competition with the DPP is fiercest, saw the necessity to take a more moderate position on the national identity issue in order not to jeop‐ardise their electoral chances.61 Wang Jinpyng, speaker of the Legislative Yuan since 1999, is widely seen as the leader of the Bentupai. Hence, while  the KMT has  remembered  its  ideological  roots,  the DPP has  con‐tinued  its  ideological moderation. Since winning  the presidency  in 2000,  the party has  repeatedly  expressed  its wish  to  conserve  the  status  quo  in  the  relations  be‐tween Taiwan and PRC, while leaving any decision about future changes to the Tai‐
                                                60 Bentu literally means “homeland”. In political Taiwan, the term bentupai refers to any public figure or group who identify with Taiwan and give priority to the well‐being of the Taiwanese ahead of con‐cerns for the Chinese nation. 61 Traditionally, the KMT is stronger in the north of Taiwan around the capital of Taipei because this area was the main target for public infrastructural investments under martial law. Moreover, Taipei is were most supporters of the KMT settled after they fled the mainland in 1949. Conversely, voters in the south are more likely to feel Taiwanese rather than Chinese and support an independent Tai‐wan (Lee P.S. and Hsu 2002). 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wanese population (Chao 2003). As to the factional configuration within the DPP, it can be noted that the New Tide is now the only founding faction left, as the Formosa faction increasingly merged into other factions and ceased to exist. The main reason for its disintegration was the decision of its long‐term patron, Xu Xinliang, to run as an independent candidate in the 2000 presidential election (Fulda 2002: 331). Other prominent  Formosa  members  established  their  own  factions:  Zhang  Junhong founded  the New Era  faction,  Xu Rongshu organised  the New Energy  faction.    The New Energy and other smaller factions allied at the parliamentary level to form the 
Mainstream Alliance in order to support president Chen Shui‐bian in the Legislative Yuan. Chen  Shui‐bian  also  won  the  2004  presidential  election,  thereby  forcing  Lien Chan to step down as KMT chairman. In order to elect a new leader the KMT – for the  first  time  in  its history – held a  closed primary  in 2005  that  allowed all party members to participate  in the voting. Two politicians put forward their candidacy: Wang  Jinpyng  and Ma Ying‐jeou,  the  then mayor  of  Taipei.  The  primary  again  re‐flected the ideological conflict within the party. While Wang had the loyal support of the Bentupai,  Ma,  born  in  Hong  Kong  to mainland  parents,  represented  the more traditional forces in the KMT. Ma defeated Wang with a clear 72 to 28 per cent mar‐gin,  but was  forced  to  step  down  as  chairman  only  two  years  later when  he was charged over misuse of public funds during his tenure as mayor of Taipei. However, after he was found not guilty, Ma made a swift comeback and was nominated as the KMT’s candidate for the 2008 presidential election. 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Meanwhile, the DPP’s the victory in the 2004 presidential elections allowed Chen Shui‐bian  to  further  consolidate  its  power  over  the  smaller  personalised  factions. This dominance continued despite sharply dropping popularity ratings for Chen af‐ter a series of corruption and insider trading scandals involving Chen and his family became public in 2006. According to some observers, this is probably due to the fact that several faction leaders – with Chen’s knowledge – were also involved in corrup‐tion, giving Chen effective blackmail material.62 The case of Taiwan confirms one of the central theoretical foundations of histori‐cal institutionalism: Surrounded by the same external context, party internal actors have since the introduction of free and fair elections simultaneously developed very different  electoral  strategies  to mobilise  voters. Within  the  KMT,  the Mainstream faction used  its strong  links with  local  factions to  integrate voters  into clientelistic exchange  networks,  while  the  Non‐mainstream  faction  –  either  because  it  lacked similar patron‐client links or because its interpretation of the environment did not allow  the  faction  to  recognise  these  opportunities  –  developed  programmatic  ap‐peals targeting traditional KMT supporter groups. Similarly, using a resource‐based approach to explain different electoral strategies, for the DPP clientelism as an elec‐toral  strategy  was  not  an  option  either,  since  it  took  the  party  nine  years  to  be elected  into  national  government.  Therefore,  the  major  factions  within  the  DPP competed over a programmatic profile for the party: While the New Tide – at least initially – pushed  for a  rather extremist platform, openly  calling  for  independence 
                                                62 Personal communication with I‐Chou Liu, 8 May 2008. 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from  China,  the  Formosa  faction  combined  a  catch‐all  electoral  strategy  with  the charismatic qualities of its leaders. A  central  aspect  of  the DPP’s  programmatic  profile was  the  call  for  clean  gov‐ernment, whereby the party created a public discourse very hostile to clientelism. In other words, when the DPP won the presidency in 2000 the party was unable to use its access to state resources to employ a clientelistic strategy for voter mobilisation, but  it  had  to  follow  through  with  its  electoral  promises  to  implement  anti‐corruption reforms (see Göbel 2004). An  important condition  for  this discourse  to emerge was clearly the high level of socio‐economic development in Taiwan, mean‐ing  that  voters  were  not  caught  in  a  dependency  relationship  but  able  to  assess other options and defect  from  the clientelistic game. Clientelism only  continues  to play  a  role  in  local‐level  elections,  where  electoral  districts  are  small  enough  for people to know each other and voters will thus find it very difficult not to vote for their respective local faction (Mattlin 2004). Fuelled by its early electoral success at local level, even the DPP has developed extensive clientelistic linkages with the elec‐torate in county, township and village elections.63 Concerning  the  organisational  development  of  political  parties  in  Taiwan,  we should therefore expect the KMT Mainstream to invest most of its resources into in‐formal  clientelistic  networks,  while  the  Non‐mainstream  should  be  interested  in strengthening the party as a formal institution for decision‐making. Similarly, in the DPP, the Formosa faction and other smaller personalised factions heavily relying on 
                                                63 Personal communication with Chung‐li Wu, 1 May 2008. 
POLITICAL PARTY ORGANISATION IN EAST ASIA    
 – 197 – 
   
the  charisma  of  their  leaders  for  voter  mobilisation  should  have  little  interest  in strengthening the party central office. The New Tide, on the other hand, which – at least into the second half of the 1990s – campaigned on a clear programmatic plat‐form,  can  be  expected  to  push  for  strong  formal mechanisms  to  centrally  enforce party discipline.    
Party organisation 
 As will  be  shown  in  the  following  sections,  our  expectations  are  indeed met.  This means  that,  currently,  as  the Non‐mainstream  is  now  the  dominant  faction  in  the KMT, while the DPP’s New Tide has broadened its own programmatic appeals into a broad catch‐all strategy, the two major political parties in Taiwan share many simi‐larities with  their  counterparts  in  contemporary Western Europe:  Party members do not differ significantly in their rights and obligations from ordinary citizens, the procedures  of  candidate  selection  are  highly  inclusive  –  extending  participatory rights to voters outside the party – and the role of the party bureaucracy is limited to the professional administration of the party’s resources. This all translates to the party  in public office being  the dominant element of party organisation. However, parties in Taiwan arrived at this stage not through an “evolutionary leap”, but they followed  very  distinctive  paths  of  organisational  development,  constrained  by  the 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In Taiwan,  as  in  South Korea, many party members do not  join  the party because they  identify with  the party’s  ideology or policy programme, but because  they are recruited through the personal network of a politician within the party. The politi‐cian will then pay the membership fees, administer the membership IDs and instruct the members how to vote in party internal elections. However, this form of “party” membership – solely motivated through the interpersonal relationship between the member and the politician – is not the general case. While it is impossible to present figures  that would  reflect  the  exact  share  of members who  are  simply  power  re‐sources in the hands of a political boss, a number of indirect indicators can help to achieve a rough estimate. First of all, the fact that there are several words in political Taiwan  to  describe  this  type  of members  –  rentoudangyuan  (literally,  head mem‐bers) or koudaidangyuan (pocket members) – thus distinguishing them from regular party members in a more Western European understanding, shows that they are not 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Ma  M/Vb  M/Ec  M  M/V  M/E 
Total 
M/E 
1950 80,043  n/a  n/a  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
1975 1,448,106  n/a  n/a  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
1990 2,546,429  n/a  n/a  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
1991 2,570,904  42.1  17.8  24,546  1.2  0.1  17.9 
1992 2,617,651  52.0  18.6  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
1995 ‐  ‐  ‐  49,674  1.6  0.4  ‐ 
2000 2,200,000  47.2  15.7  150,000  5.1  1.1  16.8 
2005 900,000  28.2  6.4  400,000  11.5  2.9  9.3 
2008 1,000,000  18.9  7.0  250,000  6.6  1.8  8.8 
Notes: aParty membership – real figures and estimates. bMembership/voter ratio. cMembership/electorate ratio. 
Source:  Wu C.L. (1997: 236); Guo, Huang and Chiang (1998: 195); and personal communication with the political parties.  
Under the one‐party regime of the KMT party membership figures have traditionally been  relatively  high.  In  an  attempt  to  imitate  the  organisational  structures  of  the Communist  Party  of  China  (CPC),  the  KMT,  in  the  early  1950s,  started  building  a 
                                                64 The term “head members” refers to the fact that members whose membership fees are being paid by powerful bosses are nothing more than pieces in the strategic games played by these bosses. Simi‐larly, “pocket members” is used to describe the common practice of bosses keeping “their” members’ membership cards in their own “pockets” and only handing them out to the actual member before a party internal election. 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mass membership foundation that would incorporate all sectors of society into the party. Members were organised  into  about 30,000 party  cells  in  geographical  and administrative units (down to village level) as well as at the work place (such as in government  offices,  schools,  businesses  and  the  transportation  sector).  Party membership size grew from 80,043 in 1950 to more than 2.6 million in 1992. Even after the introduction of free and fair elections, the membership level remained well above the 2 million mark, which translates into more or less 14 per cent of the total electorate.  However,  these  figures  were  based  on  outdated  records  that  included people who  had  died,  changed  residence,  or  shifted  party  loyalties.  Consequently, when the KMT asked its members to re‐register in 2000 – after the devastating de‐feat  in  the  presidential  elections  –  this  resulted  in  a membership  of  900,000  –  or about six per cent of the total electorate (see Table 14). However,  the  sharp  drop  in membership  figures was  not  only  the  result  of  an update of  the official membership  records, but  the  re‐registration process  also  in‐cluded measures that were aimed at excluding pocket members – or fake members (who only existed on paper) – from the party. In order to re‐register party members had to pay their annual membership fee at a local convenience store, and then send the  receipt  together  with  the  completed  membership  form  to  the  national  KMT headquarters.  Collective  receipts  that  listed  more  than  one  membership  fee  pay‐ment were not accepted. What is more, the national party conducted spot checks to make sure that the citizens who registered did indeed exist and provided the correct contact details. 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Although  this  system still  contains  some  loopholes,  recruiting pocket members has  definitely  become  more  difficult,  as  can  also  be  deduced  from  the  smaller membership figure after 2000. In other words, we can assume that the majority of party members join the KMT because they feel psychologically attached to its ideo‐logical programme, and not due to their role as a client  in a patron‐client relation‐ship. Therefore the re‐registration process must be understood as an attempt by the Non‐mainstream  faction,  which  re‐established  itself  as  the  dominant  faction  after the disastrous 2000 presidential election, to cleanse the party membership of Main‐stream followers. While the Mainstream had been attracting the largest share of its supporters through the clientelistic distribution of material rewards, supporters of the Non‐mainstream are more  interested in collective  incentives – sharing the fac‐tion’s  goal  of  reunification with  the  Chinese mainland  in  the  long  run  –  and  thus more likely to pay regular party membership fees.   One  party  internal  group  that  has  traditionally  been  characterised  by  a  high share  of  die‐hard  ideologists  is  the  party’s Huang  Fuhsing  division.65  This  special branch  consists mainly  of military  servicemen  and  veterans  as well  as  their  rela‐tives, most of whom are mainland Chinese and still have strong  feelings  for China. The Huang Fuhsing  had  lost a  large number of  its members due  to Lee Teng‐hui’s pro‐Taiwan policy, but when the KMT returned to  its more  traditional position on the China question many re‐joined the party (particularly from the NP), bringing the 
                                                65 Personal communication with Chung‐li Wu, 1 May 2008. 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membership figure of the sub‐party grouping back to about 200,000 (Taipei Times 2001). In the DPP, because the party membership is much smaller, pocket members are a more  serious  problem. As  can  be  seen  from Table  14,  even nine  years  after  the party’s  founding  only  50,000  voters  had  registered  as DPP members.  Even before the 2000 presidential elections the figure had only risen to 150,000. The sudden in‐crease to 400,000 after Chen Shui‐bian’s historical victory was  interpreted by DPP leaders as a sign that  fears of persecution based on political affiliation still existed under the newly crafted democratic rules. However, as the DPP became the party in power,  thereby  gaining  immense  powers  of  patronage  and  government  spending, this also led to an increase of pocket members. Established figures in the DPP sud‐denly found themselves close to real political power and many saw the recruitment of pocket members  as  an  effective way  to promote  their  own  interests within  the party (Rigger 2001a: 65).  In other words,  the ballooning of  the DPP’s membership size after 2000 must be taken with a pinch of salt, since a large number of members only joined because they were paid by politically ambitious bosses. In 2006 the DPP passed a resolution stipulating that the party would expel peo‐ple who "buy" members, and that those who sell their names would not be able to join the party  for  two years. Clearly,  the New Tide  faction within the DPP must be interested in combating pocket members, since the faction’s membership has tradi‐tionally  been  highly  exclusive,  making  admission  dependent  on  ideological  com‐mitments. However, as will be shown below, the DPP is financially dependent on the 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membership dues paid  for pocket members. Moreover, a  large share of  the pocket members is recruited by local‐level politicians. Cracking down on pocket members could therefore provoke these politicians to run as independents, thereby reducing the DPP’s already small pool of candidates even further.  As a result, unlike  in the KMT,  the resolution  issued  in 2006 was not accompa‐nied by any measures that would effectively help to identify pocket members, such as  re‐registering party membership  in person. The dramatic drop of  the member‐ship size to 250,000 in 2008 thus seems to be unrelated to this measure, particularly since  in  the  same  year Wu Chin‐tai,  a member  of  the DPP’s  youth  committee  still complained that “the old system of collective voting [of pocket members] will con‐tinue and the same old faces will run the party” (Wu C.T. 2008). We can thus sum up that the majority of party members in Taiwan join a party because  they  identify  with  its  policy  goals.  However,  particularly  within  the  DPP there  is a  large share of pocket members among the rank and  file, while  the KMT, which – because of its larger membership had never been affected by this problem to the same extent – implemented fairly effective measures to exclude pocket mem‐bers  from  the  party  in  2000.  Pocket members  do  not  enjoy  any  powers  as  party members, since their membership fees are paid by the respective boss, who will also instruct them how to vote in party internal elections. The question that remains to be answered is how powerful regular members are. The requirements to become a member in one of Taiwan’s two major parties are relatively low. The only obligations that come with party membership are abiding to 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the respective party’s statutes and paying regular fees. Up until 2000, the KMT did not  even enforce  the payment of membership dues. A  strictly  enforced  fee of  200 NTD (about 3.30 GBP) per annum was only introduced in the context of the member re‐registration process66, which should be understood primarily as a strategic move by the Non‐mainstream faction to make it more difficult for the Mainstream faction to sustain their clientelistic networks. In contrast, DPP members have always been required to pay regular party dues or otherwise their party rights will be suspended. At the moment the annual fee amounts to 300 NTD (about 5 GBP).67 While the DPP relies heavily on  these  fees  for  its  financial survival,  the KMT, as will be discussed later,  has  a  number  of more  profitable  sources  of  income,  with membership  fees only  accounting  for  a  small  share  of  the  party’s  overall  budget.  In  other  words, members  in  the DPP hold  an  important  resource, which –  in  comparison – makes them more  powerful  than members within  the  KMT.  Yet,  we  should  remind  our‐selves that, often, the membership fees are paid collectively by political bosses, not by the members themselves. However,  the  fact  that  the  KMT  regularly  communicates  with  its  members (through  an  electronic  newsletter  and  a  frequently  updated  news‐section  on  the party’s website),  provides  training  to  the  heads  of  the  local  branches  (in  election campaigning,  vote monitoring et  cetera)  and holds  introductory  seminars  for new members, shows that  the party values  its members more than  just as a mere stat‐istic.  Similarly,  the  DPP  sends  a weekly  electronic  newsletter  to  its members  and 
                                                66 Personal communication with the KMT, 12 May 2008. 67 Personal communication with the DPP, 8 May 2008. 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frequently  communicates  with  the  rank‐and‐file  via  e‐mail  and  text‐messaging. Moreover,  the party also has a  training programme that  includes presentations by senior party  leaders on party  ideals as well as educative sessions on party regula‐tions and the party platform. Nevertheless, in‐between elections members in both parties are largely inactive. Before 2000, in the KMT, each local branch was required to hold a monthly meeting and report back to the national party central, but this was a mere formality to keep up the façade of a Leninist mass party.68 In the DPP, local branches enjoy a high de‐gree of independence from the party central (Rigger 2001a: 58). Therefore, the ac‐tivity of members will vary from branch to branch, with those local party chapters that  are  filled with  pocket members  usually  characterised  by  the  lowest  levels  of membership activity.  We can thus conclude that, in general, the party on the ground in both the KMT and the DPP is not a very powerful organisational element. Put in comparative per‐spective,  it  is  probably  safe  to  say  that  party memberships  in  Taiwan  show  very similar  characteristics  to  party memberships  in  contemporary Western  European political parties in terms of size and inclusiveness.69 However, the membership or‐ganisations in both the KMT and DPP have developed in very different ways, which can be explained through the different electoral strategies followed by the main fac‐tions in each of the parties. Whereas the KMT’s Mainstream, which used clientelistic 
                                                68 Personal communication with I‐Chou Liu, 8 May 2008. 69 As a matter of fact, the total membership/electorate ratio in Taiwan is even higher than in any Western European democracy in the late 1990s, with the exception of Austria and Finland (see Mair and van Biezen 2001). 
OLIVER HELLMANN   
   – 206 – 
 




   
Candidate selection 
 In both larger Taiwanese parties the procedures to nominate candidates for public elections on the national  level have gone through some considerable changes over the last two decades. Already in the late 1980s the KMT made significant reforms to its regulations of candidate selection. In order to pick candidates for the 1989 “sup‐plementary” elections to the Legislative Yuan, the regime‐party softened the highly exclusive nomination system that had been used up to that time, and held a closed primary. Soon after, the DPP announced its intention to adopt a very similar primary system, hence also leaving the selection of candidates to the rank‐and‐file. In the KMT, where the Non‐mainstream – although increasingly  losing power – was still the dominant faction, a closed primary was used to make it more difficult  for the Mainstream faction to use its strong links with local factions as a resource in the  inter‐factional  conflict.  It was  hoped  that  by  forcing  candidates  to  compete  in party  primaries,  the  party  would  not  have  to  negotiate  with  local  factions  over nominations and resources held by  local  factions could gradually be taken over by the party (Robinson and Baum 1993).  In other words,  “the party was using  inner‐party democratization as a  tool  in  its  inner‐party power struggle against  local  fac‐tions” (Fell 2006: 176). Moreover,  the  Non‐mainstream  calculated  that  conservative  party  members, particularly those grouped in the Huang Fuhsing, would be easier to mobilise than the  less  ideologically‐committed  supporters  of  the  Mainstream  faction  (Wu  C.L. 
OLIVER HELLMANN   
   – 208 – 
 
2001:  108).  Similarly,  in  the  DPP,  the  dominant  Formosa  faction  estimated  a  nu‐merical advantage over the New Tide, based on the two factions’ differing organisa‐tional structures. As Rigger (2001a: 27) points out,   [f]rom the beginning, the Formosa Faction was centred on person‐alities,  not  issues.  […] Aspiring  politicians  affiliated with  Formosa because they wanted to partake of its political resources: its power in nominations for electoral and party offices, its contacts with po‐litical  heavyweights,  and  its  connections  with  local  political  net‐works  capable of mobilizing votes  and  raising money. The  faction did not  impose much discipline on its members, nor did  it require them to embrace a particular ideology of platform. The only obliga‐tion  Formosa  imposed  upon  faction  members  was  to  support  its leaders in contest for power within the party.  The New Tide, in contrast, was characterised by strong ideological identity. Admis‐sion to the faction was based on quality, not quantity. Even grassroots‐level activists were  required  to  pay  regular  dues,  attend meetings,  and  commit  vast  amounts  of time  and  energy  to  faction  activities. Hence,  the  Formosa  faction  could be  sure  to rally more support for their candidates within the party than the New Tide. As a re‐sult, a closed primary was implemented in the late 1980s. 
POLITICAL PARTY ORGANISATION IN EAST ASIA    
 – 209 – 
   
Taiwanese democratisation took a crucial step when the regime declared to hold elections for a new National Assembly in 1991, and a new Legislative Yuan one year later.  In the run‐up to these  founding elections,  the KMT crafted considerable pro‐cedural revisions. Candidates were now selected by what the party called a “revised” closed primary.  In  the new system party members were  still  given a vote, but  the outcome did not serve as the only foundation on which the central standing commit‐tee  nominated  the  candidates.  The  evaluation  by  local  cadres  contributed  40  per cent in 1991, and 50 per cent in 1992 (Wu C.L. 2001: 109). The DPP, in contrast, re‐tained the genuine closed primary system. In  the  following years  the KMT continued  to  curtail membership participation. To select  candidates  for  the 1995 Legislative Yuan election and  the 1996 National Assembly  election,  the  former  regime party  conducted non‐binding opinion  inqui‐ries among its members.  All power to nominate candidates was now with the cent‐ral standing committee. The nomination of the central standing committee members in turn was very much centralised in the hands of the party chairman who, since the 14th party congress in 1993, appointed half of the members plus one, while the re‐maining members needed the approval of the central committee, which again was to be elected by the delegates in the national congress (Huang 1996: 112).  This increasing centralisation of the candidate selection process within the KMT can be explained by the growing dominance of the Mainstream faction. In particular, after  leading  figures of  the Non‐mainstream  left  the party  in 1993 to establish  the NP,  the  Mainstream  tightened  its  grip  on  party  internal  power.  Centralising  the 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nomination  procedure  became  necessary  to  nourish  the  clientelistic  networks  on which the Mainstream faction based its strategy of voter mobilisation. Local factions not only received material rewards in return for their electoral support70, but local faction members were themselves nominated as candidates. As a consequence, the percentage  of  legislators  with  a  local  faction  background  increased  steadily throughout the 1990s, leading some observers to estimate that about 60 per cent of KMT legislators  in the 1992 Legislative Yuan represented local  factions (Chen M.T. 1996: 189). In order to strategically allocate nominations to local factions the Main‐stream needed  to  centralise  the procedure  for  candidate  selection and abolish  the closed primary system, which did not allow for much control over the outcome. The DPP also devised new rules that curbed the power of the membership, albeit far less drastically than the KMT. In 1995 and 1996 the party selected candidates by holding  a  ballot  among  party  officers  and  elected  officials  at  the  national  level  as well as among party members, with both results contributing 50 per cent to the final outcome (Guo, Huang and Chiang 1998: 200‐201). As in the KMT, this reform of the candidate  selection  procedure  can  be  explained  by  changes  in  the  inter‐factional power balance within  the party. With  the New Tide growing  increasingly stronger vis‐à‐vis the Formosa faction, both factions were eventually locked in a stalemate by the mid‐1990s. Due to  this perfect balance of power,  the DPP adopted a system of candidate selection that pleased both major factions: While the 50 per cent through 
                                                70 Part of these material rewards was taken from the party coffers, but the largest share consisted of public resources, extracted from local monopoly and oligopoly rights and “money machines” like the credit departments of the fishermens' associations (yuhui), the water conservancy associations (shuilihui), and the farmer's associations (nonghui). 
POLITICAL PARTY ORGANISATION IN EAST ASIA    
 – 211 – 
   
membership votes satisfied  the Formosa  faction,  the adjacent 50 per cent  through party cadre votes was a concession to the New Tide, which had a numerical advan‐tage in the intermediary party‐structures. 1996 not only saw elections to the National Assembly, but also the first popular presidential elections in the history of the Republic of China. In order to select their presidential  candidate,  both major  parties  implemented  systems  that were  rather different from the ones used for the selection of candidates for parliamentary elec‐tions. According to the newly designed regulations, the presidential candidate of the KMT needed the support of the party’s national convention. Delegates included two categories: 700 ex‐officio delegates,  and 1,400 elected by  the grassroots members (Wu  C.L.  2001:  109).  The DPP,  on  its  part,  employed  a  primary  consisting  of  two stages. The first stage equalled the system used for the selection of legislative candi‐dates. In the second stage, the two winners then competed in an open primary. For this,  the DPP  carried  out  49  public meetings  at which  the  candidates  spoke,  after which votes were collected (Rigger 2001a: 78). The different selectorates for the nomination of presidential and legislative can‐didates are easy  to explain. Regarding  the KMT, although relatively democratic on paper, the system to select the presidential candidate was, in reality, still highly cen‐tralised,  as  the  national  convention  “served  as  no more  than  a  rubber  stamp  for party chair Lee Teng‐hui’s decisions” (Fell 2006: 180). In the DPP, considering that the nomination of the presidential candidate is a winner‐takes‐it‐all game, it would have  been  difficult  to  reach  an  agreement  through  inter‐factional  negotiations, 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which is why a more democratic procedure needed to be institutionalised. An open primary allows for the largest selectorate possible, thereby also making it difficult to influence the final outcome through the mobilisation of pocket members within the party. Whereas  the KMT held  on  to  the  regulations  just  described  up  until  2001,  the DPP  introduced new regulations again before the 1998 elections to  the Legislative Yuan.  Party  cadres  and  elected  party  officials  were  excluded  from  the  decision‐making process. Instead, nominations were based on a party member primary and public opinion surveys, with both results being weighted equally.71 As has been de‐scribed above, after the disastrous 1996 presidential elections, the New Tide faction, which was growing stronger and stronger, felt the need to moderate its ideological stance and move away from its unrestricted independence policy. This made it ne‐cessary  for  the  faction’s  leadership  to  gain  independence  from  the more  ideologi‐cally radical members in the intermediary party‐structures. As a matter of fact, the founding of the TAIP did not attract many pro‐independence hardliners from within the DPP (Rigger 2001b: 954) Hence, in line with the more theoretical arguments de‐veloped by Katz  (2001)  and  Scarrow, Webb and Farrell  (2000),  the New Tide de‐cided to render the selectorate more inclusive. The New Tide opted for public opin‐ion  polls  for  two  main  reasons.  First  of  all,  members‐only  primaries  would  have translated into a numerical advantage for the Formosa faction. Secondly, the experi‐
                                                71 The DPP conducts the public opinion polls through its own survey centre, which has eight full‐time staff members. Respondents are offered a list of prospective candidates, and asked to choose their first and second preferences. Party members are not surveyed. The results of the surveys are kept secret, even from the candidates, who are given only their own results and a summary of their com‐petitors’ results. 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ence  with  an  open  primary  in  the  run‐up  to  the  1996  presidential  election  had shown that far fewer ballots were cast at the mass meetings than expected (Rigger 2001a:  99), meaning  that  outcome  could  be  influenced  by  those  politicians  in  the party controlling a large share of pocket members. Moreover, the DPP redesigned the nomination process for the 2000 presidential election. Under the new rules, a candidate needed the endorsement of 40 party offi‐cials (including professional staff and elected officials).  If more than one candidate had received a recommendation, the party would have held a closed primary (Rig‐ger 2001a: 101). However, as it turned out, only one candidate was recommended. In  this  case  the  party  regulations  only  demanded  a  three‐fifths  approval  by  the national party congress, which, according to Fell (2006: 186), was merely a question of rubber‐stamping Chen Shui‐bian’s candidacy. Facing  the  2001  Legislative  Yuan  elections,  the  KMT  adopted  the  system  em‐ployed  by  the  DPP  for  the  1998  elections.  Candidates  were  chosen  on  an  equal weighting of two factors: a closed primary and public opinion surveys. The logic be‐hind  this  radical  reform can again be  found  in  the party  internal  conflict between different factions: After the humiliating defeat of Lien Chan in the 2000 presidential elections and Lee Teng‐hui’s  resignation as party  chairman, more  traditional,  pro‐grammatically oriented forces within the KMT regained power and began to destroy the Mainstream’s  capacities  to  follow a  clientelistic  strategy  of  voter mobilisation. They thus had to cut the links to local factions by making it more difficult for anyone within the KMT to allocate nominations to local factions in return for electoral sup‐
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port. Hence, rather than centralising the selection of candidates in the party leader‐ship, public opinion polls were  introduced. The basic calculation was  that because many of Lee Teng‐hui’s followers had been recruited through local factions and thus were generally associated with organised crime, corruption and other illegal activi‐ties, they were unlikely to do very well in public opinion polls. However, in order to include party members  in  the  internal decision‐making process  in  return  for  their financial  contribution,  public  opinion  polls were  supplemented with  a  closed  pri‐mary.    The  compulsory  re‐registration  of  party members  and  the  introduction  of membership  fees  meant  that  most  pocket  members  had  been  excluded,  with  the share of ideologically driven members likely to increase.  While the KMT introduced public opinion polls for the first time in 2001, the DPP decided to put more weight on the opinion polls, which now constituted 70 per cent of  the  total  result. This  ratio was  then again adopted by  the KMT before  the 2004 parliamentary elections, while  the DPP did not undertake any procedural reforms. In both parties these changes can again be explained by the respective dominant fac‐tion increasing its power even further ‐ the New Tide in the DPP and traditional for‐ces – now rallying behind president Ma Ying‐jeou – in the KMT. However, not only did  the KMT copy  the DPP’s  system  to select  candidates  for parliamentary elections, but it also took on a very similar system for the nomination of its presidential candidate in 2004. According to the newly introduced regulations, a candidate must obtain the endorsement of 50,000 party members. If only one can‐didate meets  the  required  benchmark,  voting  will  be  held  at  the  party’s  national 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congress. Otherwise a closed primary and opinion polls will be used to find the win‐ner. Yet, as in the case of the DPP, there was only one applicant, meaning that both parties  only  allowed delegates  in  the national  party  congress  to participate  in  the decision‐making process. The real decision was made behind closed doors and then merely rubber‐stamped by the delegates’ vote (Fell 2006: 183). The development of  candidate  selection  in  the KMT and DPP  is  summarised  in Figure 4. As  can be  seen, both parties began with  relatively  inclusive  selectorates, giving all party members the right to vote. However, they then moved towards more exclusive  procedures  of  candidate  selection.  The  KMT,  in  particular,  underwent  a considerable  regression  to  a  much  less  democratic  past,  when  before  the  1995 Legislative  Yuan  election  the  nomination  of  candidates was  centralised  in  a  party agency  (central  standing  committee)  that  was  half‐elected,  half‐appointed  by  the party  leader. The DPP also reached its  low in selectorate  inclusiveness  in 1995, by basing nominations on an equally weighted vote by party members and a selected party  agency  (party  cadres).  Since  then,  however,  both  parties  have  returned  to more inclusive methods of candidate selection. They now employ a rather unusual combination of binding opinion polls and closed member primaries. Binding opinion polls,  which  are  not  covered  by  the  analytical  framework  by  Rahat  and  Hazan (2001),  should  be  settled  halfway  between  open  and  closed  primaries,  since  they take  candidate  selection  outside  the  political  party,  while  choosing  the  voters through scientific sampling methods. 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While  the  two major  Taiwanese  political  parties  show many  similarities  with  re‐gards to the two organisational dimensions discussed so far, they differ substantially in  their  endowment with  politically  relevant  resources  –  particularly  financial  re‐sources: Whereas the KMT is considered by some to be the wealthiest party in the world,  the  financial  survival  of  the  DPP  has  long  been  hanging  from  a  very  thin thread,  and  to  this  day  the  party  has  to  operate  under  an  extremely  tight  budget 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(Rigger 2001a: 69). The KMT’s  financial superiority  lies  in  its business operations, which the party set up in Taiwan after fleeing the Chinese mainland from the com‐munist  forces. These enterprises,  including construction companies,  financial  insti‐tutions, computer companies, electrical appliance companies, newspapers and tele‐vision stations, were run in close association with the state and prospered with the strong  economic  development  in  Taiwan.  As  of  the  turn  of  the  century,  estimates suggest that the KMT’s accumulated assets were worth as much as 200 billion NTD (about 3.4 million GBP) (Matsumoto 2002: 360). When the democratisation process set in in the late 1980s the KMT was reluctant to give up  its organisational wealth. Although the party claims  its wealth has been accumulated  through  legal means,  there  is very  little  transparency  in  the manage‐ment of the financial resources as the KMT’s assets have never been disclosed to the public or even to party members. Before 1994 all party assets were held in accounts under the names of individual party leaders. When the party took control of the as‐sets,  a  centralised  finance  committee was  established  to  supervise  party  finances, and party regulations were developed to restrict the buying and selling of party as‐sets. Moreover, in 2005, facing increasing public accusations of corruption and dirty money politics, the KMT decided to transfer all its assets into a fund managed by a private financial management company, while the party itself would cease to engage in  any  profit‐seeking  activities.  However,  the  KMT  still  benefits  from  the  revenue generated by its assets as well as from profits made from selling assets, thus provid‐
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ing the party with a large war chest, which ensures that the KMT does not have to rely on more traditional fundraising activities for its organisational survival.72 The DPP, in contrast, has to follow a strategy of diversification and currently de‐pends on four primary sources of income: (1) government subsidies, (2) mandatory contributions  from  elected  politicians,  (3) membership  dues,  and  (4)  private  and corporate  donations  (Rigger  2001a:  67‐69).  Public  subsidies  for  political  parties, introduced in 1997, are the DPP’s main source of funding. However, as they will de‐pend on the party’s electoral performance,  they are not a very stable source of  in‐come. In the presidential election, parties receive 30 NTD (0.51 GBP) for each vote obtained above the threshold of one‐third of the votes required for election, while in legislative elections parties receive a subsidy of 10 NTD (0.17 GBP) per vote for each vote obtained above the threshold of three‐quarters of the votes required for elec‐tion. Only the former subsidy, however, is paid directly to the party. Moreover, par‐ties  that  surpass  the  threshold  of  five  per  cent  of  national  votes  in  the  legislative elections receive an annual subsidy of 50 NTD (0.86 GBP) per vote. In addition  to  the public subsidy,  the DPP requires  its elected officials  to pay a certain percentage of their income from the government to the party. The national president must contribute 8 million NTD (137,000 GBP), the vice president 5 million NTD  (86,000  GBP),  the  party  chairperson  5  million  NTD,  committee  members 500,000 NTD (8,600 GBP), national legislators 300,000 NTD (5,200 GBP), local rep‐resentatives 200,000 NTD (3,400 GBP) and party list legislators 100,000 NTD (1,700 
                                                72 Personal communication with Shiow‐duan Hawang, 15 May 2008. 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GBP).73  However,  as  with  public  subsidies,  this  source  of  income  will  again  ulti‐mately depend on the party’s electoral performance. The DPP thus also continues to rely on both membership fees as well as private and corporate donations. Yet, neither of these two latter sources of income benefits the party central office. First of all, as the party’s own regulations stipulate, ninety per cent of membership dues are to be allocated to party branches, and only the remaining ten per cent to the national headquarters.74 Secondly,  in Taiwan’s candidate‐centred electoral sys‐tem, candidates generally find it easier to raise funds than political parties (Kovick 2003). What is more, the DPP statutes rule that those financial contributions raised by the local branch are to stay with the local branch. In other words, the party cent‐ral office administers only a small proportion of the party’s income, most of which is spent on covering the expenses of the central office  itself. As a result, “the party  is almost totally without financial  leverage to use in disciplining its candidates” (Rig‐ger 2001a: 69). In other words, candidates can expect very little financial assistance from  the  party  for  their  electoral  campaigns.  Rather,  candidates  need  to  raise  the necessary funds themselves. In the KMT, on the other hand,  the national party headquarters controls a very large share of  the  funds at  the disposal of  the KMT’s candidates  (Ferdinand 2003: 60). This dependence of the candidate on the central party is further reinforced by the fact that the Taiwanese election law requires individual candidates to file a cam‐paign  spending  report, while  there  are no  restrictions  as  to  the  amount  the party 
                                                73 Personal communication with the DPP, 8 May 2008. 74 Personal communication with the DPP, 8 May 2008. 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headquarters  can  spend. Moreover,  KMT  candidates  very much  rely  on  the  party central office for the mobilisation of campaign workers and voters among the party rank‐and‐file75, whereas  in  the DPP, where the membership register  is maintained by the local branches, and – as was discussed earlier – many branches have been hi‐jacked by local bosses for their own particularistic interests, the party central office plays a much less important role in the organisation of electoral campaigns. Or put in more general terms, the party central office in the KMT seems to be a more pow‐erful organisational element than the DPP’s bureaucracy. However, interestingly, the importance of the KMT’s central office as an adminis‐trative  apparatus  does  not  automatically  translate  into  decision‐making  power within the party. Traditionally, the KMT operated according to a top‐down Leninist hierarchy in which the higher bodies appointed those beneath them and all power originated from the chairperson. Hence, the chairperson would nominate all mem‐bers of the central standing committee, who would then select the members of the central committee, who, in turn, appointed the delegates for the national assembly. While first changes to these regulations were already implemented under the lead‐ership of Lee Teng‐hui (see above), more far‐reaching reforms were only passed in 2001. According to the new rules, the delegates of the national assembly will either be elected by all party members at the local level (900 delegates) or be drawn from elected  leaders and party officials (600 delegates,  including committee and branch chairpersons). The national assembly will then elect the 210 members of the central 
                                                75 Personal communication with Szu‐yin Ho, 6 May 2008. 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committee, which  then,  finally, nominates  the 31 members of  the central  standing committee.76 In other words, there has never been a provision that guaranteed party bureaucrats a seat in the two highest executive bodies of the party, but their nomi‐nation always had to be confirmed by either the next highest or next lowest body in the party. As to be expected, the same applies to the DPP. The national congress, the high‐est  decision‐making  body  in  the  party,  is  composed  of  150  delegates  that  are  di‐rectly elected by local party members, and 150 nationally elected leaders represent‐ing the DPP in government. The national congress then elects a 31‐member central executive  committee,  which,  in  turn,  selects  10  of  its  members  to  serve  on  the party’s central standing committee.77 Therefore, as the party central office does not enjoy automatic decision‐making power  in  the  KMT  or  the  DPP,  the  distribution  of  professional  staff  between  the party bureaucracy and the party in public office as an indicator for the distribution of power within the party can be misleading. In fact, neither party allocates any full‐time  staff  to  the  party  in  public  office.  Any  assistants  to  the  legislators  are  either paid by the state or by the legislators themselves. Hence, although both parties em‐ploy around 100 members of staff in their headquarters – with the KMT employing another 700 across its local branches78 – neither of the party’s bureaucracy plays an 
                                                76 Personal communication with the KMT, 12 May 2008. 77 Personal communication with the DPP, 8 May 2008 78 Personal communication with the respective political party. 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autonomous role in party internal politics, but they are rather an administrative tool at the disposal of the party in public office. This impression is confirmed by looking at the regulations concerning the inner‐workings of  the party  in public  office.79  First  of  all,  the parliamentary  caucuses of both the KMT and DPP elect their own leadership without  interference from other bodies of the respective party. Secondly, no voting power is given to members of the party central office taking part in meetings of the caucus. And thirdly, the parliamen‐tary parties  of  both  the KMT and  the DPP make  their  own decision‐making  rules. This  in particular concerns the regulations to enforce discipline among the  legisla‐tors. Both parliamentary parties established a system of fines that penalise legisla‐tors for not attending important plenary sessions or voting against the official party line. We can  thus  summarise  that organisational  resources are highly  centralised  in the KMT, whereas in the DPP they are more evenly distributed among elected politi‐cians,  candidates and  local branches.  In  the KMT,  the party  in public office  largely depends  on  the  central  office  for  financial  support  and  communicating  with  the rank‐and‐file. In the DPP, on the other hand, candidates cultivate their own sources of income and have easy access to the party membership register through the local branches.  However,  the  vital  role  of  the  KMT’s  bureaucracy  in  administering  the profits  generated  through  the  party’s  business  assets  and  in  maintaining  the membership register do not translate into formal decision‐making power. It is thus 
                                                79 The information contained in this paragraph was collected through personal communication with the political parties. 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highly questionable whether the bureaucracy’s administrative functions amount to a qualitatively different position of the party central office within the party internal power structure, compared  to  that of  the DPP.   Rather, as  in  the DPP,  the party  in public office seems to dominate over the central office. This distribution of power between the party central office and the party in pub‐lic office is perfectly in line with the electoral strategies followed by the main actors within each of the parties. Factions adopting a clientelistic (the KMT’s Mainstream) or charismatic strategy (the DPP’s Formosa) were not  interested  in a strong party central office, because actors would have had to pool their political resources under the  party’s  centralistic  control.  Similarly,  factions  pursuing  more  programmatic strategies  –  the Non‐mainstream  in  the KMT  and  the New Tide  in  the DPP  –  also have an interest in a powerful party in public office, since they do not target clearly defined  social  groups  but  develop  broader  policy  appeals.  In  order  to  do  so  they need sufficient autonomy from the party central office. The only faction that should have  been  interested  in  a  strong,  disciplining  role  of  the  central  office  over  the party’s  legislators was  the New Tide,  in  the  early  1990s, when  the  faction  openly called  for  independence  from Taiwan. However,  neither was  the New Tide  strong enough to realise such a reform, nor did the DPP control enough resources to gain control over its local branches and elected politicians. 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Summary 
 The case of Taiwan confirms one of the central assumptions of historical institution‐alism – that agents are knowledgeable and reflexive, and thus able to develop differ‐ent  strategies  to  overcome  the  same  environmental  barriers.  During  the  KMT’s authoritarian  rule only one group within  the  ruling party,  the Mainstream  faction, developed clientelistic networks  to mobilise voters  in  the pseudo‐democratic elec‐tions. Given the top‐down process of democratisation these networks survived the introduction of  free and  fair elections, and allowed  the Mainstream to become the dominant  faction within  the KMT.  In contrast, other groupings  in  the KMT, mainly the Non‐mainstream  faction, as well as  the main opposition party,  the DPP, devel‐oped programmatic appeals as their electoral strategy. This could possibly be due to the fact that these actors held different sets of ideas to the Non‐mainstream, or due to  their  lack  of  similar  links  to  local  vote  brokers.  Assuming  the  latter,  setting  up new clientelistic networks was not an option, since both the KMT’s Non‐mainstream and the DPP remained excluded from access to public resources, while the high level of  socio‐economic development meant  that  investing politicians’ private  resources was unlikely to be successful. Instead, the DPP turned the KMT’s money politics into an  effective  campaign  issue,  ultimately  superseding  the  KMT  in  power  in  2000. However, this did not mean that the DPP could now change to a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilisation, as its “black gold” campaign had created negative public opin‐ion against vote‐buying and other particularistic means of electoral campaigning. 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The conflict between these different electoral strategies clearly reflects in the or‐ganisational development of political parties in Taiwan. In order to facilitate the im‐plementation of its clientelistic dealings, the KMT’s Mainstream centralised all deci‐sion‐making and the power to allocate politically relevant resources. As a result, the boundaries between the three faces of party organisation slowly began to fade. Only when the party lost the 2000 elections, giving the Non‐mainstream the opportunity to re‐establish  itself as  the dominant  faction, was this process reversed by making the party membership less inclusive, democratising candidate selection and render‐ing the allocation of resources more transparent. As such, the party in public office is now the strongest organisational face within the KMT. The same can be said about the DPP. However, the DPP arrived at the same stage via a very different path of organisational development. Throughout the 1990s, the increasingly dominant New Tide pushed for a stronger party central office in order to  increase  party  discipline.  However,  it  faced  opposition  by  the  Formosa  faction, which mobilised voters primarily  through  the  charisma of  its  leaders  and a broad catch‐all strategy, and was therefore interested in making the party in public office the dominant organisational face. Moreover, as the DPP has severe financial difficul‐ties,  the New Tide was unable  to  introduce more exclusive party membership cri‐teria  (particularly  higher  membership  fees)  and  make  politicians  financially  de‐pendent on  the party  central office. As a  result,  the only  significant organisational change took place in candidate selection, where decision‐making power was shifted to  the  intermediary  party  structures.  However,  this  decision  was  soon  reversed 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when the New Tide moderated  its own policy platform, making  it necessary to re‐gain  independence  from  hardcore  ideologists  among  the  mid‐level  functionaries. The faction therefore introduced binding opinion polls in 1998, which, at the same time, undermined the influence of pocket members in any voting process. As  a  result,  both major  political  parties  now  share  central  characteristics with political  parties  in  contemporary  Western  Europe:  The  inclusiveness  of  party membership  falls  somewhere  between  “indistinguishable  from  ordinary  citizens” and  “highly  selective”;  the  selection  of  candidates  is  open  to  citizens  outside  the party; and the party in public office decides about the allocation of resources.  Politi‐cal parties were able to establish the party in public office as the dominant organisa‐tional  face,  because  environmental  uncertainty  for  political  parties  in  post‐autocratic Taiwan  is  relatively  low (as  indicated by  the  low  levels of party system fragmentation and electoral volatility). Therefore, actors campaigning on a catch‐all electoral  strategy  did  not  feel  forced  to  strengthen  the  party  central  office  to  in‐crease party discipline as a means to control external uncertainty. In fact, it can be argued  that  on  the  inter‐party  level  the  two major  political  parties  exhibit  typical cartel behaviour. This  can be exemplified by  the  reform of  the electoral  system  in 2008,  which  replaced  the  single  non­transferable  vote  system with  single­member 
plurality,  thereby  considerably  reducing  the  electoral  chances  of  smaller  political parties.  In other words,  similar  to many contemporary parties  in Western Europe, the two major political parties in Taiwan work together to keep environmental un‐
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certainty at a minimum, which allows the parliamentary party to maintain its inde‐pendence from the rest of the party. However, despite these striking similarities between Taiwanese parties and their contemporary counterparts in Western, this does not mean that the former took an “evolutionary leap” as the “period effect” approach would want us to believe. Rather, as  our  analysis  has  shown,  each major  political  party  followed  its  own distinctive path  of  organisational  development,  constrained  by  the  inter‐factional  conflict within each of the parties and the particular environmental context. 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The environmental context 
 The process of democratic transition in the Philippines can primarily be character‐ised as a replacement, as it began as a society‐led upheaval. This upheaval, however, required almost no violence, since parts of the armed forces sided with the reformist civilian groups  (Wurfel 1990).  It has been argued  that an overthrow was  the only way  to  re‐establish  democratic  rule,  because  the  highly  personalistic  character  of Ferdinand Marcos’  dictatorship meant  that  there were  no  collective  interests  that could be saved once Marcos relinquished office (Thompson 1996). Hence, as there was  little  hope  he  could win  competitive  elections, Marcos  refused  to  negotiate  a democratisation of the political system but held on to power as long as he could.  Marcos  justified the declaration of martial  law in 1972 with the need for peace and order – overplaying the strength of the communist insurgency – and the prom‐ise of economic growth. Congress was closed and the two traditional parties, the Na­
cionalista Party and Liberal Party, soon withered, as their legislative functions were supplanted by presidential decrees and instructions. Thereby, Marcos put an end to the  two‐party cycle, which,  since  the end of  the American colonial period, had en‐sured  that  the  country’s  elites  would  alternate  in  government  “with  almost  me‐chanical regularity” (Thompson 1995: 15).  He thus barred the other elites from ac‐cess  to  the government‐distributed pork barrel, but  instead – after  initially  imple‐menting  a  number  of  auspicious  reforms  – Marcos’  authoritarian  rule  lapsed  into 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“crony capitalism”, which only nurtured family members and close friends with jobs in the state apparatus, operating licences, state contracts, and cheap credit. As a result of Marcos’ patrimonialists dealings, the Philippine economy deterio‐rated, real wages declined, and rural poverty increased. This and the increasing pat‐rimonialisation of  the military, which seriously undermined  its professionalisation and  fighting  effectiveness,  led  to  a  dramatic  growth  of  the  communist movement. Faced  with  a  severe  loss  of  legitimacy,  Marcos  decided  to  liberalise  the  system. Hence, in 1978, legislative “elections” were held, and, in 1981, Marcos declared the lifting of martial law and called for presidential elections. Fraud and the absence of real opposition, however, robbed the electoral process of any legitimising effect, and the dominance of Marcos’ New Society Movement (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, KBL) remained unthreatened. Moreover,  the KBL bought electoral support directly  from voters through clientelistic exchange mechanisms. In order to facilitate the monitor‐ing  of  voters, Marcos  introduced  the barangay  as  the  smallest  administrative unit (100 to 500 people), with the barangay captain usually acting as vote broker (Wur‐fel 1988: 131).  The  legitimacy  crisis  worsened  when  opposition  politician  Benigno  Aquino,  upon returning from exile in the United States in 1983 to compete in the 1984 par‐liamentary  elections,  was  shot  at  Manila  airport.  This  clumsy  assassination,  evi‐dently planned by Marcos’ wife, Imelda, and her military allies, energised the exist‐ing opposition and politicised new sectors of society (Timberman 1991: 126). The civilian coalition against Marcos – the Catholic Church, the middle class and the old 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economic elite – cooperated in forming a poll watchers group, NAMFREL (National Movement  for  Free  Elections).  Under  the  monitoring  activities  by  NAMFREL,  the pro‐democratic  opposition,  led  by  the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO)  and  the Partido  Demokratiko  Pilipino­Lakas  ng  Bayan  (Philippine  Demo‐cratic Party‐People’s Power, PDP‐Laban), performed relatively better. In an effort to, again, demonstrate his political  legitimacy, Marcos called a snap presidential election in February 1986. However, against Marcos’ strategic calcula‐tions,  the  reform  movement  united  behind  Corazón  Aquino,  widow  of  Benigno Aquino, as their single candidate. Only the Communist Party, various labour unions and  peasant  organisations  chose  to  boycott  the  elections.  When  voting  finished, Marcos was declared the winner, but NAMFREL and other poll watching organisa‐tions  reported numerous cases of electoral  fraud. Aquino responded by appearing before a Manila crowd of more than half a million to proclaim her own victory and to  launch a campaign of  civil disobedience.  It was  the  involvement of  the military, however, that tipped the scales, when a faction of young officers led by the defence minister, Juan Ponce Enrile, and the deputy chief of staff, Fidel Ramos, seized control of a building in the armed forces headquarters and declared their rebellion against Marcos  (Wurfel  1990:  119‐122).  Having  no  firepower,  the  rebels  turned  to  the Aquino  camp  for protection. The event  that  followed went down  in history  as  the “people power” revolution, as tens of thousands of civilians followed an appeal over the radio by Cardinal Sin to support the rebels with food and human shields. With the refusal of the security forces to act against civilians, the United States intervened 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Philippines  719 (1990) 1,192 (2005)  0.468 (1991) 0.445 (2005)  27.0 (1990) 48.0 (2000)  93.6 (1990) 92.6 (2005) 
Germany  29,461 (2006)  0.283 (2007)  75.2 (2005)  99.0 (2006) 
United Kingdom  33,238 (2005)  0.360 (2007)  89.7 (2005)  99.0 (2005) 
Source:  United Nations ESCAP (undated); United Nations Development Programme (undated); Solon (1996)  
Unlike in South Korea and Taiwan, the process of democratisation in the Philippines was not  accompanied by  socio‐economic development. Although  the economy has been  slowly  growing  since  the  overthrow  of  Marcos,  this  growth  has  yet  not  re‐flected  in  a  more  even  distribution  of  wealth  (see  Table  15).  In  other  words,  al‐though the democratic transition can be characterised as a complete replacement of the  authoritarian  regime,  we  should  expect  the  environment  in  the  post‐Marcos Philippines  to be  favourable  to  clientelistic  strategies of  voter mobilisation,  as  the economic elite can use their relative financial strength to invest in the establishment of new exchange networks. This is encouraged even further by the low degree of ur‐banisation,  which  helps  to  ensure  that  voters  do  not  defect  from  the  clientelistic 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Elite families in post‐Marcos Philippines 
 Most  lawmakers  in  the  post‐authoritarian  Philippines  come  from  political  clans  – that is, they are tied to a family base whose members are currently holding or once held elective posts. In the House of Representatives, two of every three congressmen are members of political clans.80 The vast majority of  these are second‐ and third‐generation  politicians  with  parents  and  grandparents  who  had  in  the  past  been elected  into  public  office  (Co  et  al.  2005:  50).  In  most  cases  they  will  also  have multiple relatives who are currently in public office. Democratic  politics  in  the  Philippines work  according  to  the  logic  that  –  once elected into public office – politicians will seek to transform the public office into a private legacy for their family. Filipino culture puts strong emphasis on the family as the basic unit of society, with families often performing a broad range of economic, social and political  functions. This politica de  familia,  conditioned by  interpersonal reciprocity and social obligations, ensures “that the Filipino is more inclined to per‐ceive the world in terms of how outside resources could be used to improve that sta‐tus of the family in socio‐economic terms” (Roces 2000: 188). As Wurfel (1988:34) explains,   [t]he family has long been the center of Filipino society. As in most 
                                                80 For instance, 80 per cent of the congressmen elected in 1987 could be classified as belonging to “traditional clans” (Gutierrez, Torrente and Narca 1992: 25). 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parts  of  Southeast Asia  kinship  is  essentially  bilateral;  that  is,  an‐cestry is traced through both the mother’s and the father’s line. Ef‐fective kinship ties are maintained with relatives of both parents. A bilateral system gives a potentially huge number of living kin, espe‐cially as five to ten children are not uncommon even today in each nuclear family of each generation.  The Filipino constitution contains explicit provisions on political clans, opening the possibility  for  a  law  that  prohibits  political  dynasties. However,  such  a  law  is  un‐likely to be passed in the near future. Similarly, the existing constitutional law that bans representatives from seeking more than three consecutive terms is not an ef‐fective  obstacle  either,  since  clans  simply  field  other  family  members  to  replace those who face term limits, or – in other cases – the place of the incumbent is taken by rival clans. Elections in the Philippines, in other words, can thus best be described as anar‐chic competition among dominant elite families.81 In order to be elected into office, politicians primarily mobilise their kinship networks and family assets. If they win, they will  repay  their  family  by  using  their  legislative  post  to  expand  the  family’s economic interests – for example through loans, monopolies, tax exemptions, cheap foreign exchange or subsidies.  In addition,  legislators will  strengthen their respec‐tive kinship network through the distribution of patronage: 
                                                81 The term “anarchic” is borrowed from the title of McCoy’s (1994) opening chapter in the book of the same title “An anarchy of families”. 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Once in office, they pave the way for other relatives to be either ap‐pointed to the bureaucracy or elected to government posts. Within a few years, a newly elected legislator will likely have kin in local of‐fice,  various  government  agencies,  and  state‐owned  corporations. Before long, the next generation takes over. (Coronel et al. 2004: 11)  However, while this explains the general reproduction of elite family dominance in the Filipino Congress,  it can neither explain how these families became the elite  in the  first place nor why some political dynasties have disappeared while new ones have emerged. There has always been a Filipino upper class, whose position is based on combined economic and political power, as Paredes (1994) points out. However, the  composition  of  this  class  –  the  actual  families  that  comprise  it  –  is  constantly changing. We must thus distinguish between different types of political clans, which use  very  different  resources  and  strategies  to  compete  successfully  in  the  demo‐cratic game. Traditionally, the national political oligarchy was composed of members of weal‐thy  landowning  families  –  particularly  those  involved  in  export  agriculture  –  that emerged in the 19th century, such as the Aranetas, the Cojuangcos, the Jacintos, the Madrigals or the Yulos. Today, these families are much less powerful, as is indicated by  the  relatively  small  percentage  of  lawmakers  in  the  House  of  Representatives who  own  agricultural  land  (Philippine  Center  for  Investigative  Journalism  2004). 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However, because of their sheer wealth the traditional landed elites are still a strong electoral  force. Moreover,  their plantations provide these families with an efficient machine  to mobilise votes among  their workers and  tenants, while  their hacienda organisation can be used to conduct the electoral campaign. The influence of landed families began to wane after 1945, as the Japanese occu‐pation of the Philippines during the Second World War had disrupted the traditional economy,  while  the  landowners’  collaboration  with  the  Japanese  weakened  their moral  hold  on  the  peasantry.  A  new  type  of  elite  swiftly  moved  into  this  power vacuum:  local warlords. Political warlordism was  the  result  of  the proliferation of arms and the weakening of the central authority in the provinces at the end of the war. Famous families that rose to power through armed violence included the Lluch‐Badelles clan of Lanao –  though they were  later eclipsed by the more violent war‐lord Ali Mohamad Dimaporo – the Remullas of Cavite and the Duranos of Cebu. Al‐though warlordism in the narrow sense is nowadays limited to very few areas, par‐ticularly Mindanao, many  clans  still  rely on violence  and  coercion  in order  to win elections  –  a  phenomenon  that  has  been described  as  “bossism”  (Sidel  1999)  and “authoritarian  clientelism”  (Franco  2001).  During  the  campaign  period  election‐related  violence  can  range  from  intimidating  and  threatening  people  with  bodily harm,  to kidnappings and murder, as well as arson and bombings. Not only candi‐dates and their campaign staff are targeted, but also their supporters as well as or‐dinary voters. On election day  itself,  the threat and use of violence also extends to poll  watchers  and  election  officials,  and  it  is  no  rarity  to  see  burning  voting  sta‐
POLITICAL PARTY ORGANISATION IN EAST ASIA    
 – 239 – 
   
tions.82 The state, on its part, is unable to enforce the rules of the democratic game, which has  led to the observation that “members of  the governing class are […] ex‐empt from the rule of law” (Rogers 2004: 116). The 1960s saw the emergence of yet another type of political clan: the nouveaux 
riches. Unlike the traditional elite, these families – among them the Enriles, Puyats, Sarmientos  and Silverios – did not have a base  in  landholdings,  but  they amassed wealth through industrial manufacturing. They then expanded their economic base after winning office,  thereby gaining access  to government credit and  licenses and government‐administered foreign aid and loans. In order to get an idea of how this business  elite  dominates  electoral  politics  in  the  Philippines,  one  can  look  at  the social composition of Congress.  In 2001, on average, each member of the House of Representatives held assets worth 22 million PHP (262,000 GBP) – according to the legislators’ own reporting and thus probably understated ‐ while  in the Senate the average net worth was 59 million PHP (704,000 GBP). In contrast, in 2000, the typi‐cal Filipino had an annual income of about 150,000 PHP (1,800 GBP) (Coronel et al. 2004). Finally,  in  the 1990s a number of new political dynasties were built  simply on popularity. While,  in  the past, popular starlets  from show business and sports had only been hired by established politicians to attract voters, celebrities  increasingly realised  that  they  themselves  had  the  potential  to  win  public  office,  thereby  –  in 
                                                82 According to different press sources, 126 people were killed and 148 others wounded in violence leading up to and during the 2007 parliamentary and local elections. In the 2004 presidential elec‐tions, election‐related violence claimed 189 lives. For older figures see Patino and Velasco (2004). 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                                                83 For instance, in 2002, Negros Occidental representative Julio 'Jules' Ledesma IV walked down the aisle with movie star Assunta de Rossi in a televised ceremony at his hacienda. Earlier, Batangas rep‐resentative and now Senator Ralph Recto wed popular movie actress Vilma Santos in 1992, a mar‐riage that helped catapult the third‐generation legislator into the Senate. Other celebrity marriages of political clans in the House include those of Negros Occidental  representative Carlos Cojuangco, son of San Miguel Corporation chairman Eduardo 'Danding' Cojuangco, to the late actress Rio Diaz, and that of Antonio 'Tonyboy' Floirendo to former Miss Universe and TV host Margie Moran. 84 Several politicians host talk shows on radio or television. For instance, Ilocos Norte representative Imee Marcos, daughter of Ferdinand Marcos, anchored an entertainment talk show on the popular radio station DZBB, and has made appearances in TV soaps and comedies. Renato Cayetano, who died in 2003, was elected to the Senate in 1998 mainly because he hosted a popular radio and TV talk show where he gave free legal advice. 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Political parties as coalitions between families 
 Political clans do not control a political party each, but parties are usually coalitions of several powerful  families (McCoy 1994: 8). However, these coalitions are highly unstable, which  is why  it  is  difficult  to  establish  personal  continuity  between  the myriad of political parties  that have emerged and died  since  the ousting of  Ferdi‐nand Marcos  in 1986. As  clans  enter  into new  coalitions with other  clans,  the old party will be dissolved and a new party will be founded in order to provide a formal framework  –  or  organisational manifestation  –  for  the  newly  forged  coalition. We can thus summarise, in the words of Coronel et al. (2004: 7), that   [l]ooking at the history of the Philippine legislatures from the 1898 Malolos Congress, it would seem that families, not parties, are their most  enduring  feature.  Regimes  come  and  go  but  the  families  re‐main. Political parties are formed and disbanded but the clans that make them up stay on.  The fluid nature of the Filipino party system reflects clearly in the relatively high ef­
fective  number  of  political  parties  and  the  high  degree  of  electoral  volatility  (see Table 16). However, despite the transient life of political parties in the Philippines, it is still possible to find parties that fulfil our criteria of case selection. The most not‐able cases are without doubt the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas, LP) and 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the Nacionalista Party (NP). Founded in 1907, when several pro‐independence par‐ties united to contest the elections to the first Filipino parliament, the NP is the old‐est party in the Philippines. It dominated Philippine politics until 1945, when the LP formed as a splinter party. From 1946 until 1972 (the year Marcos declared martial law),  these  two parties  constituted  the party  system and  regularly  shifted  control over  the presidency between them. However, after Marcos’ authoritarian  interreg‐num the fragmentation of the party system exploded, leaving the NP and the LP as two parties among many.  
TABLE 16:  PHILIPPINES – PARTY SYSTEM INDICATORSa 
  ENEPb  ENPPc  Volatility 1987  7.68  5.84  ‐ 1992  4.81  3.84  43.00 1998  3.10  2.69  48.50 2001  ‐  5.03  ‐ 2004  ‐  4.06  ‐ 2007  ‐  4.60  ‐ 
Average  5.20  4.34  45.75 
Notes: aThe voting results provided by the electoral commission COMELEC have often been incomplete in the past, hence for some years no indicators could be calcu‐lated. bEffective number of electoral parties based on the first vote in elections to the House of Representatives. cEffective number of parliamentary parties in the House of Representatives. 
Source:  Author’s own calculations based on Table 17 and Teehankee (2002; 2006).  
Of  the myriad  of  political  parties  that  have  been  established  since  the  ousting  of Ferdinand Marcos in 1987, only a few have been able to survive for longer than one election,  while,  at  the  same  time,  regularly  winning  national  parliamentary  man‐
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dates. One of them is the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (Struggle of Democratic Filipinos,  LDP),  which  was  formed  in  1988  from  a  merger  between  two  parties closely  associated with  then president  Corazon Aquino: Lakas  ng Bayan  (LABAN), the  coalition  that  had  supported  Aquino  in  the  1987  presidential  election,  and  a splinter group of Partido Demokratiko Pilipino (PDP),  led by Aquino’s brother,  Jose ‘Peping’ Cojuango. Unable  to  secure  the  LDP’s  nomination  as  presidential  candidate  for  the  1992 elections, Fidel V. Ramos, defence minister under Aquino, left the party to establish  the Partido Lakas Tao (Lakas). Only a few months later, he then merged Lakas with the National Union of Christian Democrats (NUCD), which was led by then secretary for  foreign  affairs  Raul Manglapus.  Shortly  after,  the United Muslim Democrats  of the Philippines (UMDP) joined the bandwagon, giving Ramos the necessary support to win the presidency. For  the 1998  elections,  Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP  joined  a  coalition with KAMPI  (Ka­
balikat  ng Malayang Pilipino,  Partner  of  the  Free  Filipino),  a  splinter  group of  the LPD  that  supported  the political  aspirations of Gloria Macapagal‐Arroyo. The LDP, on the other hand, formed a coalition called Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (LAMMP) with two other parties: the Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC) – founded in 1992 as a grouping of smaller parties and members of the NP (Rodriguez wing) – and  the Partido ng Masang Pilipino  (PMP) of movie star  Joseph Estrada. While Es‐trada  won  the  presidency,  Arroyo  of  the  Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP‐KAMPI  coalition  as‐sumed  the  vice‐presidency.  However,  when,  in  2001,  Estrada  was  forced  to  step 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Party  1987  1992  1995  1998  2001  2004  2007 Government Coalition  29.5  0.5  4.4  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ LABAN  14.5  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ PDP‐Laban  12.0  ‐  0.5  ‐  ‐  ‐  1.7 LP  8.5  ‐  2.5  6.8  9.0  12.0  6.6 UNIDO  8.0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ KBL  6.5  2.0  0.5  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ GAD  5.0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ NP  2.0  3.0  0.5  ‐  ‐  ‐  3.3 LDP  ‐  43.0  8.3  ‐  9.0  5.0  1.3 Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP  ‐  21.5  49.0  50.5  36.0  40.0  38.0 NPC  ‐  17.0  10.8  4.1  23.0  23.0  11.6 LP‐PDP  ‐  6.0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ LDP/Lakas  ‐  ‐  12.3  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ LAMMP  ‐  ‐  ‐  25.0  ‐  ‐  ‐ KAMPI  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  20.3 Independents  11.5  0.5  3.4  0.9  4.0  2.0  1.7 Party list  ‐  ‐  ‐  6.4  9.0  10.0  8.7 Other  3.5  6.5  7.8  6.3  8.0  10.0  6.8 
Notes: aShare of seats (in per cent). 
Source:  Hartmann, Hassall and Santos (2001); Teehankee (2006); House of Representatives (undated)  
These  parties  again  played  the  most  important  role  in  all  subsequent  elections. However, the coalition landscape has been subjected to significant changes. In 2001, the three coalition partners of LAMMP – LDP, NPC and PMP – formed a new coali‐tion, Puwersa ng Masa (Force of the Masses), along with other smaller parties. Sup‐porters  of  Arroyo,  on  the  other  hand  formed  the  People  Power  Coalition  (PPC), comprising  Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP,  the  Liberal  Party  and  a  number  of minor  parties. 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Before the 2004 election the coalitions were re‐shuffled again, with KAMPI, LP, La‐kas,  NPC  and  NP  forming  the  Coalition  of  Experience  and  Fidelity  for  the  Future (Koalisyon  ng Karanasan  at Katapatan  sa Kinabukasan,  K4)  supporting  incumbent president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, while the LDP and a number of smaller parties united  behind  opposition  candidate  Fernando Poe  Jr.  in  the  Coalition  for National Unity (Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino, KNP). Finally, in 2007, supporters of Ar‐royo  –  most  notably  Lakas,  KAMPI  and  the  LDP  –  grouped  under  the  banner  of TEAM Unity, while  those  in  favour  of  impeaching Arroyo  established  the Genuine Opposition. It can thus be summarised that with the exception of the NPC only the two tradi‐tional parties, LP and NP, and parties of former presidents, the LDP (Aquino), Lakas (Ramos) and KAMPI (Arroyo), have been able  to maintain  themselves  in  the party system. Moreover, already this short historical overview hinted at the logic of party formation in the Philippines: Political parties are established as families rally behind presidential candidates in large electoral coalitions. Political clans who support the winning presidential  candidate  can expect  to be  rewarded after  the elections. The presidential system of the Philippines is one of spoils: The president can appoint his or her choices to more than 6,000 positions in the bureaucracy. Traditionally, these are given out to political supporters. Moreover, being a presidential ally also means access to government loans, contracts, and other benefits. In  return,  the presidential  candidate will  expect electoral  support. Families are themselves  highly  efficient  political  machines  to  mobilise  votes  and  ensure  that 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these  votes  are  properly  counted  in  the  election  process,  but  families  also  extend these machines beyond family loyalties – particularly if they are aiming for office at the national level. A congressman's political machine typically includes a network of 
lider at the village or barangay level. The lider can be either the barangay captain, a council member, or any other influential person, such as a successful local entrepre‐neur or the head of a community organisation. This lider in turn mobilises a network of  supporters  for  the  candidate, who will  help with  the  election  campaign  (for  in‐stance, by putting up posters and conducting door‐to‐door canvassing), serve as poll watchers on election day, and last but not least give their vote to the candidate en‐dorsed by the lider. The lider usually gets paid for his or her work; in some cases he or  she  even  receives  regular monthly  allowances  from  the  congressman’s  payroll, while  sometimes  liders  are  bought  off  by  other  candidates  who  offer  bigger  re‐wards.85 As the influence of a family – and the effectiveness of their political machine – is usually limited to the local level and the family’s own bailiwick, families who wish to win  the presidency or a seat  in either  the Senate or  the House of Representatives, will  have  to  enter  into  coalitions  with  families  who  dominate  other  geographical areas  of  the  country.  In  return,  the  latter  will  expect  their  fair  share  of  state  re‐sources.  Political  parties  are  thus,  put  simply,  the  formal  manifestation  of  these temporary  patron‐client  networks,  in  which  the  access  to  state  resources  is  ex‐changed for organisational support during elections (voter mobilisation, campaign‐
                                                85 The information contained in this and the following paragraph was gained through personal com‐munication with Ramon C. Casiple, 19 June 2008. 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ing, poll watching). Or  in  the words of Co et  al.  (2005: 82):  “Parties  represent  the mechanism  for  rendering  and  sustaining  [the]  exchange of  political  resources  and support”.  It  thus  still  holds  true  what  Landé  (1965:  24)  observed  about  Filipino democratic politics in the mid‐1960s:   Candidates  for national office need votes, which  local  leaders with their primary hold upon the  loyalty of  the rural electorate can de‐liver.  Local  leaders  in  turn  need money  to  do  favors  for  their  fol‐lowers,  and  this  the  candidate  for high offices  can supply  […] The result  is  a  functional  interdependence  of  local,  provincial,  and national leaders which promotes a close articulation of each level of party organization with those above and below it.  Moreover,  parties  not  only  serve  as  the  formal  framework  for  coalitions  between political  clans  from different  administrative  levels,  but  there are also a number of legal provisions that encourage these elitist families to establish political parties. For instance, being a member of a political party allows a candidate to extend the legal campaign‐spending limit, as parties are allowed to spend an additional 5 PHP (0.06 GBP)  per  voter  registered  in  the  constituencies where  the  party  is  fielding  candi‐dates. Yet, most importantly, the electoral law stipulates that only the three strong‐est parties are to receive detailed copies of the certificate of canvass that is based on the  tally  of  elections  returns  from  the  different  polling  precincts.  Access  to  these 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documents provides a strong safeguard  for  the candidate against being cheated  in the vote counting process. However, despite these reasons to establish political parties, the binding power of the coalition agreements between the different families is very weak, and boun‐daries  between  political  parties  are  thus  highly  permeable.  Candidates  frequently run  for  several  different parties  at  the  same  time; political  clans  – while  affiliated with one party – often support candidates of other parties; and sometimes political party affiliation does not become clear at all.  After elections, winning candidates who supported a non‐successful presidential runner will,  in  large numbers,  flock to the party of the newly elected president. As Villanueva  points  out,  “[p]oliticians  change  party  identification  as  fast  as  they change their clothes” (1996: 180).86 However, the president will not distribute state resources  exclusively  to  his  own  party,  but  in  order  to  build  a  broad  coalition  of support in parliament resources also flow to other parties. For instance, as of 2008, president Arroyo was the chairperson of three parties, which again shows just how little  political  party  boundaries matter  as  an  organising  principle  for  the  political process.  Rather,  political  clans  and  the  coalitions  forged  between  them  –  often across parties – are the key to understanding Filipino politics. To sum up, the post‐autocratic environmental context in the Philippines strategi‐cally  selects  for  clientelism, while militating  against  programmatic  electoral  strat‐egies. Most  importantly,  the high  level of  income  inequality and  the  low degree of 
                                                86 For instance, right after the 2004 elections, 24 out of 210 legislators changed their party affiliation in the House of Representatives (Teehankee 2006: 239). 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 As can be expected from the previous discussion of electoral strategies, all major po‐litical parties  in  the Philippines are very similar  in  their organisational  structures. First  of  all,  parties  are  generally  characterised  by  the  total  lack  of  a  rank‐and‐file 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 As should have become clear from the previous discussion, the Filipino party system is  largely comprised of parties that are essentially coalitions of  influential  families, providing  a  clientelistic  network  that  links  local  political  bosses  at  the  barangay level  to  national  politicians.  Not  surprisingly  then,  the membership  base  of  these parties  is  almost  entirely  drawn  from  the  politically  active  elite,  particularly  from powerful political clans (Velasco 1999: 176). Or as Rocamora puts it, Philippine po‐litical parties are “unabashed boys clubs” (2002: para. 13).  In other words, parties do not have ordinary members who join the party because of collective incentives, but  the  party membership  overlaps  with  the  party’s  pool  of  candidates,  meaning that only those who can be expected to win a political mandate will be considered as party members. 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Although Filipino political parties claim to have ordinary members, none of the major parties maintains a membership register that would list all the members with their personal details and contact address. What is more, there is no formal proced‐ure that needs to be observed when applying for party membership, nor do parties hand out membership cards that would identify their members as such. In their con‐stitutions, political parties only list a number of criteria that members need to fulfil, ranging  from very specific requirements,  such as minimum age or Filipino citizen‐ship,  to  very  vaguely  formulated  conditions,  such  as  expressing  a  belief  in  the  re‐spective party’s  ideology and objectives.87   Hence, what Filipino parties refer  to as ordinary “members” are nothing but loyal supporters who do not differ from com‐mon citizens in any respect. Membership figures provided by the parties are there‐fore without any meaning, as are references to “members” in the parties’ formal de‐cision‐making statutes. Moreover, these supporters are not loyal to the party itself, but they are mobilised through clientelistic networks of leaders at the local level. If these local elites decide to join a different party, because the latter offers better ma‐terial returns for their political support,  the supporters will be transferred en‐bloc to the new party. However, not only is it difficult – if not impossible – to distinguish ordinary party members  from regular voters, but even on the elite  level party affiliation does not always become clear. During elections, due to the fact that the electoral law allows parties  to  nominate  candidates who  are not  party members,  often  confusing  elec‐
                                                87 Personal communication with the political parties. 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toral slates of mixed party candidates are created. And even after elections it is very difficult to identify the political party to which politicians belong, as party loyalty is generally  very  weak.  Party  defections  are  thus  a  daily  part  of  political  life  in  the Philippines. Moreover, the highly elitist nature of Filipino political parties also reflects in the parties’  local  organisational  structures.  Although  political  parties  are  by  law  re‐quired  to  establish  party  chapters  in  the  majority  of  the  country’s  regions  and, within  each  region,  in  the majority  of  provinces,  towns  and  barangays,  this  legal provision  is  rarely  enforced.  Rather,  the  common  practice  is  for  the  local  party leader’s residence or office  to serve as  the party’s  local branch (Leones and Mora‐leda 1998: 310). In‐between elections the “branch” will be dormant, and usually no full‐time members of  staff will be employed. Only shortly before elections will  the branch  become  active  and  perform  campaign‐related  functions.  Labour‐intensive campaign work that – in Western European parties – is usually carried out by party members  on  a  voluntary  basis,  such  as  door‐to‐door  canvassing,  organising mass events or posting  campaign posters, will  be delegated  to  local politicians’  clientel‐istic networks. Clients perform this role as part of their promise of political support in return for material benefits.88 Political  parties  in  the Philippines,  as  an  abstract  organisation,  do  thus not  re‐cruit  members  –  neither  as  financial  assets  (through  the  regular  payment  of membership fees) nor as free labour. Given that parties only play a negligible role in 
                                                88 Personal communication with Joel Rocamora, 26 June 2008. 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Candidate selection 
 In their constitutions, all major political parties in the Philippines make specific pro‐visions regarding the selection of candidates for public election. In most parties the respective party’s national convention is supposed to nominate the candidates (La‐kas, LDP, LP, NP and KAMPI), while in the NPC the national central committee, the party’s  highest  executive  body,  has  the  right  to  decide  on  the  selection  of  candi‐dates.89 However, given the lack of a mass party membership, it is obvious that these formal regulations are nothing but a façade to portray political parties as democrati‐cally organised institutions that effectively mediate between society and the state. A more precise description of the level of internal democratisation in Filipino political parties is provided by Leones and Moraleda (1998: 307):   Although most  political  parties may  claim  that  almost  all  sectoral groups  are well  represented  in  their  organizational  structure  and membership,  the  real  influence  –  that  is,  in  decision‐making  and control – remains largely with its elite‐dominated higher organs.  In  fact, party  conventions  in  the Philippines –  if  they are held at all90 – have been 
                                                89 Personal communication with the political parties. 90 For instance, the constitution of Lakas stipulates that a party convention should be held at least every two years. However, in practice, lack of sufficient financial resources – the party claims – has prevented the convention from meeting on a regular basis. 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compared  to Roman orgies, which are organised by  the party  leadership  solely  to entertain  the  clients with  “wine, women and song”  (Rocamora 2001: 6). As  it was discussed earlier, national politicians need the support of  local families in order to mobilise  voters  at  the  grassroots  level.  In  turn,  local  politicians  are  dependent  on national  candidates  and  their  parties  for  financial  support.  It  is  thus  at  the  party conventions where these informal exchange agreements are celebrated, and politi‐cians  from  lower  administrative  levels  are  rewarded  for  their  loyalty  towards  the national elites.91 Candidates for national elections are thus not selected by delegates to the party convention, as stipulated in most of the parties’ conventions, but rather, because of the  total  lack  of  a  party  on  the  ground,  the  party  in  public  office  selects  itself.  In other words, in order to be nominated as a candidate for a larger party, politicians need to gain access to the small elitist circle of party members. The selection of can‐didates is therefore largely non‐transparent and undemocratic, and will primarily be decided through horse‐trading and bargaining (Co et al. 2005: 95). Factors that will play  an  important  role  in  these  negotiations will  be  the  candidate’s  past  electoral performance,  political machinery,  popularity  (name  recall  and  public  acceptance), geographical base and support, and financial resources (Rocamora 1998: 6). The de‐cision  whether  a  candidate  will  be  admitted  to  the  party  is  made  by  the  highest executive body in the party, which is usually comprised of high‐ranking incumbent 
                                                91 For instance, Rocamora (2001: 6) received reports that during the Lakas convention in 1998 about 60 million PHP (716,000 GBP) was distributed to the delegates in order to secure De Venecia’s nomi‐nation as the party’s next presidential candidate – 300,000 PHP (3,600 GBP) to each member of Con‐gress, 200,000 PHP (2,400 GBP) to governors, and 100,000 PHP (1,200 GBP) to city mayors. 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Distribution of resources and decision‐making positions 
 Party membership – and hence a nomination for public elections – can thus literally be bought  from the party  leadership. This has  led Co et al.  (2005: 101) to observe that, although “there is no legal restriction to party membership, in practice the sys‐tem  excludes  those  who  cannot  afford  to  shoulder  or  attract  sufficient  campaign funds.” However, it must be noted that the resources candidates need in order to be admitted to the party are then not transferred to the party as an abstract institution, but they are distributed to other individual politicians within the party in return for political support. As Rocamora (2001: 6) explains,   [t]o  gain  the  support  of  lower  level  leaders  in  support  of  his/her nomination  by  the  party,  [and]  to  organize  the  campaign,  candi‐dates have  to  spend prodigious amounts of money. The higher up the ladder, culminating in the presidential candidate, the more you have to spend. Not just for your own campaign, but to finance those of party mates and other supporters  running  for  lower  level posi‐tions.  Put differently, it is common practice in Filipino parties for candidates at a particu‐lar administrative level to shoulder the campaign expenses of the next lower politi‐cal office. That is to say, the campaign expenses of barangay captains are funded by 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the councillor, while the councillors’ expenses are covered by the mayor, and so on, until the subsidy ladder reaches the candidate for president. The political party  itself has  traditionally not been a major source of  campaign funding in the Philippines. This is largely due to the fact that parties themselves do not cultivate their own sources of income. Since there is no public funding available for political parties, most parties (LDP, LP, NP, NPC) do  largely rely on mandatory contributions from their elected officials.92 Private – including corporate – donations are  almost  exclusively paid  to  individual  candidates,  not  to parties.  The  two main sources  for  candidates’  campaign  funds  are  ethnic  Chinese  businessmen  and  the “grey” economy (Arlegue and Coronel 2003: 231). The ethnic Chinese dominate the business sector, but because of their numerical minority status they are effectively barred  from  the  political  process,  thereby  leaving  campaign  financing  as  the  only way  to  safeguard  their  business  interests.  Grey  contributions,  on  the  other  hand, come  mainly  from  illegal  gambling,  prostitution  and  drug  smuggling  syndicates, seeking the protection of the politician.  The party central office thus completely depends on the party in public office for its  financial  survival. As  a  result,  the parties  in  the Philippines hardly have  an or‐ganisational  representation  outside  of  parliament.  Usually,  parties  do  not  have national  headquarters,  but  the  party  central  office  tends  be  located  in  the  private office of  its party  leader.  In‐between elections parties hardly employ any  full‐time staff,  and even during  campaigning periods many of  the  functions  that we usually 
                                                92 Personal communication with the political parties. 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associate  with  the  party  bureaucracy  will  be  performed  by  externally  contracted media  professionals  (Velasco  1999:  175).  In  other  words,  political  parties  in  the Philippines do not only lack a party on the ground, but also a party in central office. Those  members  of  staff  employed  to  co‐ordinate  the  election  campaign  or  fulfil other administrative roles simply serve the political ambitions of the party  leader‐ship – they do not themselves hold significant political resources and do not qualify as a distinctive organisational element within the party. The party in public office is thus the dominant – or even only – face in political parties  in  the  Philippines.  However,  again,  political  resources  are  not  held  by  the 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A deviant case: AKBAYAN!93 
 AKBAYAN! was  founded  in 1998  in order  to compete  for seats  in  the newly  intro‐duced party list system for the House of Representatives.94 The party only won one mandate  in  the  first election but  then continuously  increased  its number of repre‐sentatives – two in 2001 and three in 2004 – before suffering a setback in the latest elections in 2007, when it only won enough votes for two seats in the House of Rep‐resentatives. In contrast to the major political parties in the Philippines, AKBAYAN! has worked very hard to develop a programmatic platform, primarily targeting the socially  marginalised  with  demands  for  far‐reaching  reforms  of  the  political  and social system. This programmatic electoral strategy clearly reflects in the party’s or‐ganisation, which  is  very different  to  the  typical  elitist party described  in  the  sec‐tions above. To begin with, AKBAYAN!  is  the only Filipino party with a central membership register  and a  sophisticated membership  ID  card  system. Although  the party does not  require  its members  to  pay  regular  dues, membership  is  tied  to  a  number  of other  requirements  that  clearly  distinguish  members  from  ordinary  voters.  Most importantly, new members have to attend a basic introductory seminar where they 
                                                93 All information in the following paragraphs was gained through personal communication with AKBAYAN!, 23 June 2008. 94 Up to 52 seats (20 per cent of total seats) are allotted in a separate ballot on a national list accord‐ing to proportional representation. Parties need two per cent of the total valid votes for the PR‐lists in order to gain parliamentary representation. They obtain one seat for every two per cent of the total votes, but can only hold a maximum of three seats. Thus, only 14 of the possible 52 seats were filled in 1998, 20 in 2001, and 24 in 2004. 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learn about the party’s principles and structures. They are then assigned to a party unit – either based on geography or functionality – where members are expected to regularly participate in party activities. Typical activities of local party branches in‐clude supporting associated NGOs in their work, providing assistance to local com‐munities (such as para‐legal aid, education, basic health care) and helping to organ‐ise citizens’ protest regarding issues close to the party’s central principles. In return for their voluntary labour, party members are given extensive partici‐patory rights regarding internal decision‐making. Hence, the selection of candidates for public election is not decided behind closed doors by a small circle of party lead‐ers,  as  in  all  the major Filipino parties,  but  the procedure  is organised  in  a highly democratic  fashion.  For  instance,  the  composition  of  the  party  list  for  the  lower house of Congress must be approved by the party congress, which consists of repre‐sentatives  from  each  of  the  party’s  local  chapters. Nominations  for  local  elections are decided by vote from all members in the respective local party branch. Politically relevant resources are mobilised by the party, not by individual mem‐bers or candidates. AKBAYAN!’s main sources of income are (in descending order of importance): foreign financial support for joint projects with NGOs (as direct foreign funding for political parties is illegal), local government programmes, contributions from public officials, fund‐raising activities (such as concerts) and donations. Local branches  are  usually  financially  self‐sufficient, while  the party  central  office  is  re‐sponsible for funding electoral campaigns, membership training and education pro‐grammes. 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Given  the  important role of  the party bureaucracy  in maintaining  the member‐ship register and mobilising resources, representatives of the party central office are given ex‐officio seats on the party’s executive committee. Specifically, the executive committee  comprises  the  party’s  Congress  representatives  as  well  as  the  party president,  vice‐president,  the  general  secretary  and  five  additional members who are elected by the party’s national convention.  The party central office thus clearly has more power than the party in public office, allowing it to strictly enforce disci‐pline among the party’s elected representatives.   
Summary 
 From this descriptive analysis  it can thus be concluded that political parties  in the Philippines share many organisational similarities with the classical cadre party of 19th  century  Europe.  The  most  striking  analogy  is  the  difficulty  of  clearly  distin‐guishing between the different elements of party organisation. Rather, the party in public office  largely overlaps with the party membership, since the only criteria to separate members  from ordinary citizens  is  the party’s nomination as a candidate for public election. The procedure for candidate selection is thus highly informal and obscure,  with  the  party  in  public  office  usually  nominating  themselves.  Similarly, parties hardly maintain an organisational apparatus outside of parliament, but gen‐
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eral administrative functions and campaign strategies tend to be managed by party external professionals, who are hired at the expense of the party in public office. This  observation  is  clearly  in  line with  the  clientelistic  electoral  strategies  fol‐lowed by the major parties  in the Philippines. Parties are merely formal cloaks for more  informal  alliances  between  political  families,  linking  national  politicians  to local  bosses  through  the  exchange  of  political  support  for  material  inducements. These clientelistic channels serve as the main vehicle to mobilise votes, recruit can‐didates and allocate resources, while the political party’s primary reason for exist‐ence  is  to  provide  a  formal  label  for  the  clientelistic  alliances  between  powerful families in order to coordinate electoral campaigning efforts. Moreover, the logic of party  formation also has a  legal dimension, as only  the  three strongest parties  re‐ceive detailed copies of the official election results. Consequently, there is no need to develop a strong formal party organisation, which makes it impossible to distinguish between the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public of‐fice.  However,  while  the  environmental  context  favours  a  clientelistic  strategy  of voter mobilisation,  there  are  a  few  cases  of  political  parties  developing  program‐matic  appeals,  the most notable example being AKBAYAN!.  Similar  to  the  classical mass party in  late 19th century Europe, AKBAYAN! was established outside of gov‐ernment, with the aim of challenging elitist parties that use their access to state re‐sources to mobilise voters through patron‐client exchange relationships. Either be‐cause the party lacks the necessary resources or because party internal actors use a 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different set of ideas to map the contextual terrain, AKBAYAN! developed program‐matic appeals. This, in turn, made it necessary to develop a party organisation that aggregates social interests through strong grassroots links and articulates these in‐terests as policy proposals  through a strongly disciplined party  in public office. So far,  however,  this  strategy has not  translated  into major  electoral  success  and  the Filipino party system remains dominated by clientelistic parties without notable or‐ganisational foundations. The case of the Philippines therefore again demonstrates that actors can develop different electoral and organisational strategies within the same context. However, the neo‐democratic environment in the Philippines heavily favours clientelism over other strategies. This is because high levels of poverty mean that voters are unlikely to defect from the clientelistic exchange agreement, while low degrees of urbanisa‐tion  facilitate  the monitoring of voters’ behaviour. As a  result, political parties are generally no more than a formal façade for highly informal patron‐client networks, linking politicians to voters. Actors developing programmatic appeals, on the other hand, face enormous difficulties. It therefore seems highly unlikely that mass parties will enjoy similar electoral success compared to communist and socialist parties in late  19th  century  Europe.  Thus,  rather  than  following  the  same  path  of  organisa‐tional development as their counterparts in Western Europe, political parties in the Philippines might be able to maintain their highly elitist character for an unforesee‐able time to come. 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INDONESIA 
    Similar to the Philippines, the post‐authoritarian party system in Indonesia is domi‐nated by political parties close to the classical cadre party. These parties are heavily populated by elements of  the ancien régime, who controlled  the democratic  trans‐formation from above and were thus able to keep their influential positions within extensive patron‐client networks. However, the regime‐populated parties face seri‐ous  electoral  competition  from  parties  campaigning  on  programmatic  appeals, which were established by actors opposing the regime. The most notable example of these parties  is  the Prosperous  Justice Party  (PKS), which,  as we would  expect,  is based on a mass party membership and characterised by a strong party central of‐fice.  This  should  not  be  interpreted  as  a  confirmation  of  the  “life  cycle”  theory  of party organisation, with Indonesian parties following the same path of development as Western  European  parties.  Rather,  as will  be  explained,  party  organisations  in Indonesia are the product of strategic decisions made in the particular country con‐text. 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The environmental context 
 Classifying the end of Suharto’s “New Order” regime in Indonesia in May 1998 is not without  difficulties.  Although  the  collapse  of  the  regime  was  initiated  by  student protests and mass riots,  the pro‐democratic opposition did not have any  influence on  the  transformation  of  the  political  system.  Rather,  negotiations  over  the  new rules of  the political game took place almost entirely between soft‐liner and hard‐liner  groups  within  the  authoritarian  regime,  not  between  regime  defenders  and challengers  (Malley  2000:  153).  As  a  result,  the  transition  to  democracy  left  the statuses of many elements of  the authoritarian regime untouched, providing  these elements with the opportunity to re‐position themselves under the new democratic rules by capturing existing parties or establishing their own parties. Suharto,  then  a  major‐general  in  the  Indonesian  army,  seized  power  in  1967, through a stealthy coup d’état against the first president of Indonesia, Sukarno, who had  abolished  democracy  in  1957  to  rule  under  martial  law.  While  the  officially stated  goal  of  the  New  Order was  socio‐economic  development,  political  stability and security were declared as its necessary conditions (Vatikiotis 1998: 33‐35). The ideological centrepiece of this urge for harmony in such an ethnically and religiously diverse society as  Indonesia was the national philosophy of Pancasila.95  In accord‐ance with Pancasila, only 40 per cent of parliament was openly elected, and multi‐
                                                95 Literally the “five pillars”, or principles, Pancasila comprises: (1) belief in one God, (2) just and civilised humanitarianism, (3) a united Indonesia, (4) democracy guided by wisdom, through consul‐tation and representation, and (5) social justice for all the Indonesian people. 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party politics were virtually banned by merging all opposition parties into two lar‐ger parties. The secular‐nationalist parties had to unite under the banner of the Par­
tai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI), while the Muslim par‐ties were  forced  to  fuse  into  the Partai  Persatuan Pembangunan  (United Develop‐ment Party, PPP). The regime itself used Golongan Karya (or Golkar) as its electoral vehicle.96   Political  power  under  the  New  Order  was  initially  shared  by  four  actors:  (1) president Suharto, (2) the armed forces, (3) the bureaucracy, and (4) large business conglomerates, mostly owned by ethnic Chinese (Liddle 1985; 1999). At the heart of the regime laid a complicated system of patronage through which Suharto skilfully managed competing tensions between the elites, and which soon allowed Suharto to become the dominant player. Personal  loyalty in Suharto’s increasingly “sultanistic regime” (Chehabi and Linz 1998) was rewarded with promotions, business licences, subsidies,  loans  and  other  gifts.  This  system  worked  extremely  well,  as  the  New Order regime delivered its promise of socio‐economic modernisation, hence produc‐ing enough spoils to be distributed among the elites. In line with the arguments of modernisation theory (see Lipset 1981), however, through  the  success  of  its  economic  policies  the New Order  regime  gave  rise  to  a 
                                                96 As it was not regarded as a party in the legal sense, but rather as a “functional group”, Golkar was not restricted by government regulations on the conduct of parties. In contrast, both the PDI and the PPP were seriously constrained in their election campaigns. For instance, neither party was allowed to directly criticise the government or its policies, no campaigning was allowed in villages (where most people lived), and government permission was required for all rallies. Furthermore, party nominees for legislative office were screened by the regime for possible “extreme left” (communism) or “extreme right” (militant Muslim) connections or tendencies. And finally, neither the PDI nor the PPP was allowed to have branches below the district level. 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new middle class. Many members of this emerging urban middle class found it diffi‐cult to adjust from the collectivism in their villages to the invidualism in big cities, such as  Jakarta, and turned  from their  “statistical”  Islam towards more active par‐ticipation  in  search  for  moral  guidance  and  orientation.97  This  growing  Islamist movement  soon  became  a  hotbed  for  political  discontent  that  threatened  the  sta‐bility of the New Order (Hefner 2000: 123‐126). Suharto responded to this menace by  announcing  a  new  policy  of  openness,  or  keterbukaan.  Moreover,  he  co‐opted Muslim  leaders, such as Amien Rais,  into the regime,  through the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in 1990, and by enacting a number of conservative religious laws.  Still, several influential Islamic leaders, including Abdurrahman Wahid, the head of  Indonesia’s  largest  Muslim  organisation, Nahdatul  Ulama  (NU),  decided  not  to join  the  ICMI,  and  continued  to  publicly  debate  the  need  for  political  reforms. Meanwhile,  the PDI,  now  led by  Sukarno’s  daughter, Megawati, managed  to win  a historic 15 per cent of the vote in the 1992 legislative elections by appealing directly to the lower classes who felt marginalised by the process of industrialisation. How‐ever, as the regime soon moved to again end the era of openness, it took an external trigger to bring down Suharto. When the Asian economic crisis hit Indonesia in late 1997, students and the urban poor poured into the streets in thousands, protesting 




   











Indonesia  516 (1998) 1,824 (2007)  0.310 (1999) 0.376 (2007)  48.0 (2000)  90.0 (2000‐05) 
Germany  29,461 (2006)  0.283 (2007)  75.2 (2005)  99.0 (2006) 
United Kingdom  33,238 (2005)  0.360 (2007)  89.7 (2005)  99.0 (2005) 
Source:  United Nations ESCAP (undated); United Nations Development Programme (undated)  
At the same time, since there were no longer any economic rewards for supporting Suharto, many elites abandoned their support for the regime (Eklöf 1999: 235). Of crucial  importance  was  the  decision  by  the  armed  forces  to  refrain  from  force against the students or the rioters in Jakarta. An essential parameter in these stra‐tegic  calculations was  the  organisational  weakness  of  the  pro‐democratic  opposi‐tion. After a failed attempt by Amien Rais, who resigned from the ICMI in 1997, to unite  his Muhammadiyah with Wahid’s NU  and Megawati’s  PDI  into  a  broad  anti‐Suharto alliance,  it became clear that the opposition movement was riven by ideo‐
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Actors and their strategies 
 Indeed,  the  strategic  calculations made  by  the  former  regime  elites  held  true.  As several  observers  of  Indonesian  politics  point  out,  the  first  free  and  fair  elections conducted in 1999 did not undermine elite statuses and interests, but many mem‐bers of  the old elite were able  to  reconstitute  their positions of power  in  the new democratic  environment  (for  example  Case  2002:  69;  Ghoshal  2004:  515).  In  a widely accepted argument Slater (2004) observes that the major political parties in post‐authoritarian  Indonesia now  form a  “cartel”, which makes  it very difficult  for new parties to win parliamentary representation. The cartel is built on informal, in‐ter‐personal  networks  that  span  across  party  boundaries,  and  highly  restrictive party laws.99 The obvious evidence for the existence of such a cartel is the practice of forming oversized coalitions, which involve more parties than needed for a legis‐lative majority.100  The  “cartelised  elite  sees  politics  to  a  great  extent  as  business” (Ufen 2006: 29), and a large government coalition is the mechanism with which to 
                                                99 To participate in the 1999 parliamentary elections parties had to have branches in at least 9 out of the 27 provinces of the country, and within them, at least in one‐half of the respective administrative sub‐units. Only those parties conquering at least two per cent of the seats in the People’s Representa‐tive Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) or at least three per cent of the seats in local legisla‐tures were then allowed to run in the 2004 election. Similarly, only parties or coalitions of parties that obtained a minimum of three per cent of the seats or five per cent of the votes in the 2004 par‐liamentary election were allowed to nominate candidates for the presidential election. For the 2009 presidential election, the minimum will be 15 per cent of the seats and 20 per cent of the votes. 100 While Megawati Sukarnoputri  formed a Kabinet Pelangi  (Rainbow Coaliton),  including her party (PDI‐P), Golkar, PPP, PAN and other parties, her successor Yudhoyono  formed  the so‐called Koalisi 
Kerakyatan (People’s Coalition), which allied his PD with six other parties, giving him the support of 73.6% of representatives in the DPR. 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ties (the PPP and PDI‐P101), and the parties of religious leaders Wahid and Rais, the National  Awakening  Party  (PKB)  and  the  National  Mandate  Party  (PAN)  respec‐tively. These five parties emerged as the winners in the 1999 elections, but then lost electoral strength in the 2004 elections, which translates into an increasing level of party system fragmentation (see Table 19). All five parties follow clientelistic strat‐egies for voter mobilisation, which is clearly reflected in the fact that conflict within the parties is not driven by ideological differences, but party internal factions group around  individual  politicians who  control  patronage  and other politically  relevant resources.   
TABLE 19:  INDONESIA – PARTY SYSTEM INDICATORS 
  ENEPa  ENPPb  Volatility 1999  5.10  4.68  ‐ 2004  8.55  7.07  28.55 
Average  6.86  5.88  28.55 
Notes: aEffective number of electoral parties calculated on the share of votes in elec‐tions to the People’s Representative Council. bEffective number of parliamentary parties in the People’s Representative Council. 
Source:  Johnson Tan (2006) and author’s own calculation based on Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata (2005)  
This pattern of party  internal  conflict  is particularly obvious  in  the  former regime party,  Golkar, where  no  single  politician  has  so  far  been  able  to  establish  him‐  or herself as the dominant leader. Rather, the ousting of Suharto left a power vacuum 
                                                101  The PDI‐P was established as a splinter party from the PDI in 1998. 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in the party, with several individuals competing for the position at the top.102 When then  vice‐president  Habibie  took  over  from  Suharto  in May  1998,  Golkar was  di‐vided  into  two  groups:  one  led  by  Habibie  himself,  consisting  mainly  of  civilians closely linked to Suharto, the other a military faction critical of Suharto. The Golkar chairman election  in  July 1998 turned  into an open contest between these groups, with Akbar Tandjung,  the  candidate of  the Habibie  group, winning over his  oppo‐nent,  and  the military  leaving Golkar – at  least  in  terms of  formal  structure. How‐ever, soon after his victory, Akbar decided that it was time to distance himself from Suharto  and Habibie.  As  the  former  chairman of  the  Islamic  Students Association, Akbar benefitted  from a strong network of supporters within  the party, and when Habibie withdrew his presidential  candidacy  for  the 1999 elections –  after his  ac‐countability speech had been rejected by parliament – Akbar became the dominant leader of Golkar. However, Akbar’s dominance was only short‐lived, as several affluent business‐men entered the party in order to be nominated as Golkar’s presidential candidate for 2004. The most powerful of  these were Aburizal Bakrie,  chairman of  the  large Bakrie conglomerate, Suryah Paloh,  the media  tycoon behind Metro TV and Media Indonesia, Agung Laksono, the founder of Adam Air and now speaker of the People’s Representative  Council  (Dewan  Perwakilan  Rakyat,  DPR)  and  Prabowo  Subianto, Suharto’s son‐in‐law. Despite these candidates’ economic power, Golkar’s presiden‐tial  nomination,  nevertheless,  went  to  General  Wiranto,  who  had  risen  to  power 
                                                102 For a more detailed analysis of inter‐factional conflict within Golkar after the fall of Suharto see Tomsa (2006) and Suryadinata (2007). 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often fanatical, loyalty from many of their grassroots supporters” (Fealy 2001: 102). In the case of the PDI‐P, this loyalty is largely based on Megawati being the daughter of Sukarno –  the  founder of modern  Indonesia – and her active  role  in opposition against Suharto. Hence, despite dramatic vote losses in the 2004 parliamentary elec‐tion (see Table 20), Megawati and her clan led by her husband, Taufik Kiemas, con‐tinue to exert immeasurable power at the top of the party.103 Critics are rigorously silenced  and  often  only  left  with  the  option  of  exiting  the  party.  So,  for  instance, Megawati opponents around leading party executive Arifin Panigoro established the so‐called  PDI‐P  Reform Movement  (Gerakan  Pembaruan)  in  December  2005.  The driving  force behind  this move, however, was not an  interest  in democratising  in‐ternal decision‐making, as the name of the new party may suggest. Rather, because the differences between Megawati and the Yudhoyono government seemed irrecon‐cilable, Arifin and his cronies were effectively barred from access to lucrative state resources. Similarly, in the PKB, Abdurrahman Wahid has been able to fight off any serious internal opposition against his leadership. As the grandson of the founder of Nahda­
tul Ulama (NU), Wahid enjoys extraordinary support among modernist Muslims, al‐lowing him to maintain his powerful position within the party despite challenges by Matori Abdul Djali,  in 2001,  and Alwi Abdurrahman Shihab and Saifullah Yusuf  in 2004‐5, which both eventually had to be settled in court as each side claimed to be the true representative of the PKB. Between 2006 and 2007, some local party chap‐
                                                103 Personal communication with Ignas Kleden, 14 July 2008. 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ters refused to follow directions from the leadership in Jakarta, resulting in the clos‐ure of 40 party branches, but Wahid remains in strong control of the party, as is re‐flected in the fact that Saifullah left the PKB in January 2007 to join the PPP. More‐over, the PKB split once again in May 2008 when Wahid ousted Muhaimin Iskandar as party chairman, who then claimed to lead the real PKB – thus leading to the cur‐rent situation where there are two PKBs. Albeit  less  powerful  than Wahid,  Amien  Rais,  the  former  leader  of  Indonesia’s second‐largest Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah, also plays a strong role within his own party, PAN. Although he relinquished formal control of  the party after the 2004  election, Amien Rais  is  still  ensured  influence within  the PAN,  after pushing through the election of a close confidant, businessman Sustrino Bachir, as new party chairman.104 Amien  also  retains  the  influential  position of  chairman of  the party’s advisory council. The strongest opponent of Bachir is Hatta Rajasa, the current gen‐eral secretary of PAN and cabinet minister for transportation. Unlike Wahid, Amien Rais is unable to extinguish party internal opposition, largely because Muhammadi­
yah,  in contrast  to NU,  is not a personalised but an abstract organisation, meaning that Amien Rais does not enjoy unconditional grassroots support.105 In fact, the con‐nection between Muhammadiyah  and PAN has become  increasingly  loose over  the years, eventually ending in a statement issued by the Muhammadiyah leadership in 2006 that explicitly allowed the rank‐and‐file to vote for any party they wanted. 
                                                104 Personal communication with Rizal Sukma, 15 July 2008. 105 Personal communication with Ignas Kleden, 14 July 2008. 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 Internal conflict within  the major political parties  in  Indonesia  is  therefore almost exclusively  about  the  distribution  of  patronage  and  other  politically  relevant  re‐sources.  Ideological  issues,  on  the  other  hand,  are  very  rarely  sources  of  internal 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conflict, since actors within the major parties are not interested in developing policy platforms.  Interestingly,  this seems to contradict  the electoral behaviour of voters, who show strong religious, regional and social affiliations, leading to a striking con‐tinuity in voting patterns (Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata 2004; King, Baswedan and Harjanto 2005). In other words, although parties have done very little in the way of developing  clear  policy  directions  that  would  relate  to  the  interests  of  the  social groups who  support  them,  electoral  studies have  revealed  long  lasting  allegiances between the major parties and the various religious, class and regional groupings in Indonesian society. To maintain these allegiances parties build connections with local notables who have a strong influence over the cultural, economic and public life in the region, and who will then either implicitly endorse the party or explicitly instruct their follow‐ers how to vote (Sherlock 2004: 22‐23).  If voters see a party as well‐connected  to the leaders of a particular social group, the party is considered to be able to repre‐sent the interests of that social group. Moreover, parties not only build networks of local notables  to establish  themselves as  representatives of well‐defined segments in Indonesian society, but some of them – especially the PDI‐P, the PAN and the PKB – rely heavily on the personality of their respective leader.106 Hence, while Megawati still  embodies her  father’s vision  for  social  justice,  thus making  the PDI‐P particu‐larly  popular  among  rural  and  urban workers,  both  the  PAN  and  the  PKB  benefit 
                                                106 For a more detailed analysis of party leaders as an important factor to explain voting behaviour in Indonesia see Liddle and Mujani (2007). 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from the personification of religious traditions in their respective leaders – modern‐ist Islam in Amien Rais, traditionalist Islam in Wahid. In short, the major political parties in Indonesia all follow a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilisation, which in some cases is supported by the charisma of the party leader.107 However, very little trickles down to the voter through these clientelistic networks, as the phenomenon of vote‐buying is almost unheard of in the Indonesian context  (Hadiwinata 2006). Rather,  citizens vote according  to  their  religious,  class or  regional  identity.  Therefore,  as  van  de Walle  (2003:  313)  observed  for  African party systems,      it is more useful to think of clientelistic politics as constituting pri‐marily a mechanism for accommodation and integration of a fairly narrow political elite than as a form of mass party patronage. Most of  the material gains  from clientelism are  limited to  this elite. The stronger  link  between  political  elites  and  the  citizenry  is  through the less tangible bonds of ethnic identity.  In other words, voter mobilisation in Indonesia is organised through intra‐elite net‐works  based  on  clientelistic  exchange  relationships  between  politicians  at  the national level and local notables. These networks survived the democratic transition and allowed elements of the old regime to maintain their positions of power in the 
                                                107 Moreover,  several  local politicians used  their  considerable  financial  resources  to hire organised gangs of thugs (preman) to intimidate both voters and other candidates (Wilson 2006: 270‐5). 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electoral market. However, the patron‐client relationships inherited from Suharto’s regime do not  reach down  to voter  level. This  is  because,  in  the  regime’s pseudo‐elections, votes were bought through the local branches of the state administration, which  is why voters  in  Indonesia  today are not used  to  receiving money  for  their votes from parties.108 Instead, the connection between the politician and the voter is made as common people adopt local notables as their babak, or father, based on re‐ligious,  ethnic  or  class  identities  (see  Cederroth  2004).  That  is  to  say,  there  is  no need  for  politicians  to  extend  the  clientelistic  network  beyond  local  notables,  be‐cause voters will vote for the party endorsed by their respective babak, irrespective of material incentives. The context  in post‐Suharto Indonesia thus favours actors who have the neces‐sary  resources  to  integrate  local power holders  into a  clientelistic network. These actors  are  –  as  the  examples  of  Golkar  and  PAN  illustrate  in  particular  –  mostly members of Indonesia’s economic elite. Moreover, other actors, especially elites who belonged to the close circle around Suharto’s regime, were able to the transfer the clientelistic connections they had been developing through decades of authoritarian rule into the democratic arena, such as Hamzah Haz, the leader of the PPP, Wiranto and  Akbar  of  Golkar,  or  current  president  Yudhoyono.  Finally,  some  actors  base their electoral strategy not only on clientelism, but also benefit from their personal charisma  – most  notably Wahid  and Megawati.  However, whatever  actors’  source for clientelistic power,  these actors  form a close cartel based on personal relation‐
                                                108 Personal communication with Anies Baswedan, 17 July 2008. 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ships  that ensures government participation, while excluding smaller parties. This thereby allows all elites access to public resources as an additional source to further consolidate their clientelistic networks. Yet, while the contextual environment clearly selects for clientelistic strategies of voter mobilisation, it is important to point out that not all relevant political parties follow a clientelistic strategy, hence confirming our argument that social agents can develop alternative  strategic  responses  to  the  same  context. The most notable  ex‐ample of a programmatic party  is  the PKS, which was established under  the name Justice Party in July 1998 by activists of the Islamist student movement. Whilst not openly pushing  for an  Islamic state or  the adoption of sharia  law,  the party’s plat‐form focuses on the need to educate the masses on sharia through da’wah (inviting people to learn about the Qu’ran and other Islamic sources), which implies that the PKS sees the  incorporation of  Islamic  law into the constitution as a  long term goal (Baswedan 2004). The party only achieved 1.8% of the votes in the 1999, failing to achieve the two‐per cent electoral threshold that was legally required to compete in the  2004  legislative  elections.  It was  thus  reconstituted  as  the  Prosperous  Justice Party, and this time managed to win 7.3% of the votes and 45 out of 550 seats, mak‐ing the PKS the seventh‐largest party in parliament.  The PKS’s search for a policy platform clearly reflects in the conflict between its party internal factions. For a long time the party had been able to contain its internal differences and prevent a dividing schism. However,  factional  tensions surfaced  in the  run‐up  to  the  2004  presidential  election,  deriving  from  the  tension  between 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Islamist goals and a commitment to democracy. While the party mainstream around then party leader Hidayat Nur Wahid wanted PKS to support Amien Rais as a presi‐dential candidate, a hardline faction around the party’s general‐secretary Anis Matta argued  that  the PKS should put  its weight behind Golkar‐nominee Wiranto, who – although a  less devout Muslim  than Amien Rais – was considered as having much better chances of winning the election. Factionalism in the PKS is thus not driven by patronage and clientelism. Rather, the party is split between moderates committed to  Islam  and  democracy,  and  more  radical  forces  who  seek  power  in  order  to achieve Islamist goals.109 The driving motivations behind actors’ strategic calculations are again difficult to identify and not part of this analysis. Taking a more resource‐focused approach, we could argue that – as the PKS was formed externally  to the party cartel – the party lacked the necessary means to develop a clientelistic strategy for voter mobilisation and  thus  had  to  focus  on  programmatic  appeals  instead.  Alternatively,  we  could build an argument based on ideas, arguing that agents within the PKS hold certain views about their environment, which do not allow them to realise the opportunities for  clientelism  presented  by  that  environment.  More  precisely,  actors  in  the  PKS could  genuinely  be  interested  in  introducing  sharia  law  through  da’wah,  leading them to reject clientelism as particularistic relationships not conducive  to  the uni‐versal extension of Islam. 
                                                109 Personal communication with Rizal Sukma, 15 July 2008. 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 The clientelistic strategies of the major Indonesian parties clearly reflect in their or‐ganisation, as all internal decisions are made informally, while the formal elements of the party organisation are impossible to distinguish. Rather, as in the Philippines, the party membership  largely overlaps with  the party  in public office  and a party bureaucracy is almost non‐existent. Actors invest heavily in the maintenance of in‐
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 In  accordance  with  the  amended  Law  on  Political  Parties,  which  was  ratified  in December 2007, a political party in Indonesia must have branches in 60 per cent of the provinces, 50 per cent of  the districts  in each province, and 25 per cent of  the sub‐districts  in  each  district.  These  requirements  were  put  into  effect,  as  it  was feared that – in the multicultural society that is Indonesia – political parties could be used to promote racial, religious or ethnic hatred, or to encourage the secession of certain  regions  from  the  Indonesian  state.  In  accordance  with  these  legal  regula‐tions, all major Indonesian parties have established formal representative offices in most  provinces  and  in many  districts  across  the whole  archipelago.  For  instance, Golkar, which  as  the  former  regime  party  enjoyed  a  considerable  head  start  con‐cerning the construction of an organisational apparatus, claims to have 30 provin‐cial branches, around 380 district and 3,900 sub‐district branches.110 
                                                110 Personal communication with Golkar, 2 July 2008. 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However, in general, the quality of these offices and their ability to communicate with the people at the grassroots level is very poor. In fact, party branches are usu‐ally only organised as an empty shell in order to meet the legal requirements set out in the party law. In‐between elections Indonesia’s party organisations wither away and  party  activities  are  almost  non‐existent  (Johnson  Tan  2006:  107).  Given  the little interest national party leaderships have in organising and maintaining a strong local organisation, party branches have, in most cases, been “hijacked” by local not‐ables  –  such  as  wealthy  businesspeople,  well‐connected  bureaucrats,  traditional noblemen,  or  violent  gangsters.  The politicians  then use  the  local  party  branch  to contest for public offices at lower administrative levels, which through the process of  decentralising  administrative  governance  and  fiscal  governance  –  initiated  in 1999 – have become increasingly interesting (Hadiz 2004; Choi 2004a). Local  party  branches  are  thus  highly  independent  from  the  central  party (Buehler  and  Tan  2007).  This  independence  goes  so  far  that  in  order  to mobilise support for the election campaign, candidates for national elections will have to pay the  party  branches  in  their  respective  constituency  for  their  loyalty.111  In  other words, a dyadic patron‐client relation connects the national politician to the head of the local party branch. The latter will then use this money to reimburse party work‐ers for their services during the campaign (such as canvassing, putting up posters or participating in a mass rally). The payment is made either in cash or through other 
                                                111 Personal communication with Benny Subianto, 3 July 2008. 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gifts,  such as a  free meal,  vouchers  for  local  transport or entertainment  through a music show. Ordinary party members, who would perform these campaign‐related tasks on a voluntary basis – as is the common practice in most West European parties – do not exist  in  Indonesia.  Political  parties  provide  membership  figures  on  request,  but without a party membership register and a sophisticated system of membership ID cards, these figures are without value, since distinguishing party members from or‐dinary voters becomes impossible. The parties’ statutes merely list a number of very general requirements members need to meet – with Golkar making a distinction be‐tween members and cadres112 – not  including the payment of regular membership fees.113 Instead, party “members” are paid by the party – or rather, the local politi‐cian – to put their labour force into the party’s service. The only notable exception to this pattern is the PKS, which “has provided Indo‐nesia  with  an  alternative  model  of  grassroots  party  building  centred  around  re‐cruitment”  (Fionna 2008:  para.  1).  To  start with, members  are  required  to  attend weekly party meetings, which  take  the  form of Qur’anic  study  sessions  (tarbiyah), covering  the  main  topics  of  Islam:  God,  the  prophet,  and  Islamic  regulations.114 Moreover, while there  is no fixed membership fee, party members are expected to donate part of their income to the party through obligatory infaq – a donation bene‐
                                                112 Golkar claims to have about 14 million cadres and ordinary members. The eligibility criteria  for ordinary membership include age, literacy, acceptance of the party’s platform et cetera, while cadres, in addition, have to pass a political training and education programme. 113 The PAN envisioned regular membership fees when it was founded in 1998, but this requirement was soon dropped as the enforcement proved very difficult. 114 The author gained the information contained in this paragraph through personal communication with the PKS on 9 July 2008. 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ficial to Islam, repeatedly mentioned throughout the Qu’ran. As will be shown later, the PKS  relies heavily on  the  financial  contributions of  its members.  It  is  thus not surprising that the party actively engages in the recruitment of new members, such as through “open houses” – Qu’ranic study sessions open to non‐members. The suc‐cess of Islam as a recruitment tool reflects in the party’s membership figures: As of 2008, the PKS claims to have 2 million members, which translates into 24 per cent of the party’s electorate or 1.4% of the total electorate.115 This  is a relatively  impres‐sive  figure – particularly  if we consider that other major parties do not attach any requirements to party membership at all. We can thus conclude that in most of the major Indonesian parties a party on the ground  is non‐existent,  since what  the parties describe as  “members” are  indistin‐guishable  from  ordinary  voters.  Rather,  party  “members”  are  recruited  as  clients through  the  clientelistic  networks of  local  notables who have  taken  control  of  the party branches. Hence, in the Indonesian context, the real strength of a party is not measured by the sheer number of its offices and members, but rather in its ability to accommodate  informal  local power holders  into  the party’s patronage network.  In contrast, the PKS defines itself to great extent through its mass grassroots organisa‐tion with ideologically committed members. However, as will be shown in the next section,  this  membership  commitment  does  not  equate  a  powerful  party  on  the ground – as in the traditional West European mass party – but all decision‐making power is highly centralised in the party leadership.   
                                                115 The calculation is based on the results of the 2004 legislative elections. 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Candidate selection 
 All political parties in Indonesia make reference to the nomination of candidates for public election in their official statutes, but these procedural guidelines are usually very general, leaving ample room for interpretation by the party leadership. In fact, the actual practice of candidate selection  in  the major  Indonesian parties  is a very obscure process, with  the  final decision made by  the highest  strata of party  elites behind closed doors (Haris 2005). Even in the PKS, which differs considerably from the  other  major  parties  regarding  its  grassroots  organisation,  the  nomination  of candidates for public elections is highly centralised at the top of the party.116   Despite the of candidate selection in the major political parties in Indonesia, ob‐servers  of  Indonesian  politics  have  identified  a  number  of  factors  that will  play  a role in the nomination process. The most important of these appears to be the con‐trol over financial resources. As Mietzner (2007: 251) explains,   Political parties  in  Indonesia  […] have  in an  increasing number of cases  sold  the  nominations  for  legislative  and  executive  office  to wealthy individuals who had no particular connection to the party or  its beliefs, but who could afford  to pay  large sums of money  to the party. 
                                                116 For a more general critique of the elitist decision‐making structures in the PKS and the very lim‐ited opportunities for participation by the rank‐and‐file see Wanandi (2007). 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For  national  legislative  elections  the  prices  for  nominations  are  usually  staggered according  to  the ranking on  the party  list, with high rankings  that virtually secure election  into  parliament  being  significantly  more  expensive  than  lower  positions that do not come with a similar guarantee of success. For instance,  in 2004, candi‐dates who wanted to be nominated for the highest list places in Golkar were asked to pay up to 100 million IDR (about 5,840 GBP) (Tomsa 2008: 64).  However, as this is precisely the amount of money a private individual is legally allowed to donate to a political party, it can be assumed that the price for a place on the party list was in fact much higher. Moreover, candidates are not only required to pay their respective party for the candidacy, but, in addition, candidates need to prove that they will be able to shoul‐der  the  financial  costs  of  their  own  personal  election  campaign  (Ufen  2008:  27). Given the explosion of campaign costs since 1999, this sum is much larger than the “donation” to the party, resulting in a growing influx of wealthy businesspeople into the  political  parties,  as  is  best  exemplified  by  Jusuf Kalla  and  Sutrisno Bachir,  the party leaders of Golkar and PAN respectively. Conversely, less affluent party politi‐cians have found themselves increasingly marginalised, since the party itself is usu‐ally not a source of campaign funding (Choi 2004b: 342). In general, parties will fi‐nance the national media campaign, while candidates are expected to fund the cam‐paign  “on  the  ground”.117  The  only  exception  to  this  rule  is  again  the  PKS, where money does not seem to influence the candidate selection process and the party al‐
                                                117 Personal communication with Marcus Mietzner, 28 June 2008. 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locates  a  large  share  of  its  budget  for  campaign  purposes  (Manikas  and  Emling 2003: 123).    However, money  is not the only  factor that will decide who gets nominated for public  election.  Candidates  will  also  have  to  demonstrate  to  the  party  leadership that  they  are  able  to  mobilise  voters  in  their  respective  constituencies.  Broadly speaking, this involves proving two things. First, that one is well‐connected to local power  brokers,  such  as  religious  leaders,  key  bureaucrats  and  traditional  aristo‐cratic elites. Second, that one has the support of the constituency’s local party chap‐ters, which – as was discussed earlier – have in most cases fallen prey to the inter‐ests of local bosses and enjoy a high degree of autonomy from the party central.118 Both  of  these  informal  norms  require  the  candidate  to  span  a  dense  clientelistic network across the constituency that can then be used as a vote mobilising machine. Finally, in addition, party leaders also take into consideration the candidate’s popu‐larity with the electorate, with parties making increasing use of public opinion polls in order to identify the candidates with the highest popularity rating (see Mietzner 2009a). As a general rule can be formulated that the better candidates score on these lat‐ter factors, the less they will have to contribute in terms of financial resources.119 In fact, parties usually reserve around ten per cent of the places on the party list for big “vote‐getters”,  such  as  popular  artists  and  show‐biz  celebrities,  whose  campaign 
                                                118 Personal communication with Rainer Heufers, 14 July 2008. 119 Personal communication with Benny Subianto, 3 July 2008. 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costs will  be  fully  covered by  the  respective political  party.120  For  instance,  in  the 2004 election the PDI‐P recruited the actresses Desy Ratnasari, Marissa Haque and Deddy  Sutomo  and  singer  Franky  Sahilatua,  while  the  PKB  enlisted  actors  Rieke Dyah  Pitaloka  and  Ayu  Azharia,  and  Golkar  nominated  actress  Nurul  Arifin.  This trend  is  interpreted by Ufen (2006: 18) as one  indication of an  increasing  “Philip‐pinisation” of the Indonesian party system. While this process is thus highly undemocratic, the nomination of the presiden‐tial candidate tends to be even more elitist: Usually, the party leader will be selected automatically  without  any  serious  opposition.  Only  in  parties  that  are  not  domi‐nated by a single leader can the nomination process turn into serious competition. The  only  significant  example  of  such  a  case  is  Golkar, which  –  as was mentioned earlier – plunged into a power vacuum after the ousting of Suharto, leaving several strong contenders competing for the party’s presidential nomination in 2004. How‐ever, this process was only democratic in a formal sense, as the race was in fact de‐cided  by whichever  candidate  “bought”  the  support  of  the majority  of  local  party chapters (Tomsa 2008: 88).  To sum up, the selection of candidates for national elections  in the major Indo‐nesian political parties  is both a highly centralised and highly  informal process. As there is no party on the ground, candidates are recruited from outside the party. In order to be admitted as a candidate, politicians need to contribute financially to the respective  party’s  electoral  campaign,  control  an  effective  clientelistic  network 
                                                120 Personal communication with Marcus Mietzner, 28 June 2008. 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 The previous section identified an important source of income for Indonesian politi‐cal  parties:  the  “auctioning”  of  nominations  for  public  elections. Once  elected  into parliament,  legislators  will  then  be  asked  to  make  regular  contributions  to  their party – sometimes reaching up to 40 per cent of their salary.121   Moreover, cabinet members will be put under intense pressure to use their access to state resources to syphon off public money into party coffers, mostly by offering projects to businesses and individuals closely associated with the party. Two exemplary cases of this prac‐tice  that  became  public  were  the  Baligate  scandal  in  1999,  when  Golkar  officials managed  to extort 546 billion  IDR (about 32.5 million GBP)  from the state‐owned Bali Bank for questionable consultancy services, and the Buloggate scandal in 2000, in  which  then  president  Wahid  was  accused  of  diverting  substantial  amounts  of money belonging to the national food agency, Bulog, to foundations close to the PKB. 
                                                121 On this and the rest of the paragraph see Mietzner (2007). 
OLIVER HELLMANN   
   – 294 – 
 
Finally,  parties  also  rely  heavily  on  external  contributions,  particularly  from busi‐nesspeople. These donations are usually handed to senior party leaders, who often keep the money for  themselves. Only during election time, when most party  funds are  pooled  in  a  number  of  central  accounts  to  coordinate  the  financing  of  the national  campaign,  do  entrepreneurs  use  the  official  party  treasury  as  their main entry point for donations. Party financing laws – setting a maximum limit for dona‐tions – exist, but violations are hardly ever punished (Hadiwinata 2006: 106). The  financial  survival  of  the major  political  parties  in  Indonesia  thus  strongly depends on the parties’ candidates and representatives in public office. State subsi‐dies for parties, it should be noted, are insignificant. Money, as the example of exter‐nal  donations  shows,  is  generally not  channelled  through  the party  as  an  abstract organisation, but through individual party leaders. This is supported by the observa‐tion  that  Indonesian parties are only weakly bureaucratised. Even Golkar,  the  for‐mer  regime  party,  which  had  decades  to  establish  a  bureaucratic  apparatus,  only employs about 100 permanent members of staff in its headquarters.122 Rather, man‐agerial and administrative functions are largely performed by external professionals without political  links  to  the parties  (Mietzner 2007: 255). As  Johnson Tan (2006: 107) explains,   due to the strong concentration of decision‐making authority at the party centre and the magnetic role of party  leaders, other arms of 
                                                122 Personal communication with Golkar, 2 July 2008. 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the organization do not develop: this is rational in that other parts of the organization are neither wanted nor needed.  The only party that deviates from this pattern is once again the PKS. Although – like other Indonesian parties – the PKS withholds parts of the salary of  its elected offi‐cials (25 per cent), the majority of funding comes from party member contributions (Manikas  and  Emling  2003:  124).  Furthermore,  the  PKS  also  receives  funding through  infaq  and  shadaqh  (voluntary  charity  for  the  cause  of  Allah)  from  non‐members. Party politicians who  receive  such donations must  transfer  them  to  the official party treasury. Finally, the party also benefits from wakaf – property or land endowed  for  public  use  –  a  tradition  highly  encouraged  through  the  teachings  of Muhammad. The  importance  of  the party  central  office  in  administering  financial  resources clearly reflects in the party’s decision‐making structures. All members of the party’s central  executive  council  (referred  to  within  all  Indonesian  parties  as  the  dewan 
pimpinan pusat or DPP) are selected by the consultative council (majelis syuro) – the highest executive authority within  the party,  composed mainly of  Islamic  teachers and  clerics.  The  consultative  council  also  nominates  the  members  of  the  sharia council, whose main duty is to ensure that the party’s policies and platform conform to basic Islamic laws and principles.123 
                                                123 Personal communication with the PKS, 9 July 2008. 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In all Indonesian parties the DPP has more power than the party in public office. The most powerful mechanism of control is the right to recall parliamentarians – as stated in Article 12 of the political party law – i.e. to withdraw their party member‐ship, through which they will automatically be dismissed from the legislature, since independent lawmakers are not permitted. Moreover, the DPP will usually also ap‐point the leadership of the parliamentary party group (fraksi), thereby severely cur‐tailing the latter’s freedom of decision‐making.124 We can thus conclude that in all major parties – with the exception of the PKS – the party in central office is only weakly developed. Resources are not mobilised by the  party  as  an  abstract  organisation,  but  the  organisational  survival  largely  de‐pends on financial contributions by candidates for public elections. Under these cir‐cumstances,  the  function of  the party bureaucracy  is  largely  reduced  to managing the funds for the national election campaign, leaving the party in public office as the dominant – and probably only  –  face of  the party organisation.  In  the PKS,  in con‐trast,  the party  central  office  is much more powerful. Although  the party’s  official rules deny bureaucrats a vote in party internal matters, all decision‐making power is monopolised in the consultative council – the party leadership. 
 
 
                                                124 Personal communication with Frank Feulner, 28 June 2008. 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Summary 
 As we would expect in a “third wave” democracy, the sudden arrival of democracy in Indonesia  did  not  leave  actors much  time  to  develop  programmatic  strategies  for voter mobilisation. As a result, the winners in the country’s first two elections were those  political  parties with  significant  links  to  parties  that  dominated  Indonesia’s first democratic party system in the 1950s (Mietzner 2008: 439). While the PDI‐P is perceived  as  continuing  Sukarno’s  legacy  of  socialist  secularism,  several  religious parties have strong historical roots in different groups within the Muslim population – Wahid’s  PKB  represents Nahdatul  Ulama,  Rais’  PAN  is  closely  connected  to Mu­
hammadiyah and the PPP claims succession to Masyumi, the largest modernist Mus‐lim  party  in  Indonesia’s  post‐independence  democracy.  In  addition  to  these  four “historical” parties, Golkar was able to maintain its support base through the demo‐cratic  transition,  allowing  the  former  regime party  to  finish  first  in  the 1999 elec‐tions. However, voters do not only vote for these parties on the basis of historically in‐formed psychological attachments, but political parties need to strengthen their tra‐ditional links with the respective communities by gaining the endorsement of local notables  representing  these  communities.  Accordingly,  the  context  favours  actors who  already  control  clientelistic  networks  that  integrate  a  large  number  of  local power holders, or who possess the necessary financial resources to establish such a network in a short period of  time. That  is  to say,  the contextual environment stra‐
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tegically selects clientelism as the dominant strategy for voter mobilisation. It must be noted, however,  that  the patron‐client relationships rarely reach down to voter level, but they are primarily a mechanism to accommodate elites from the national and local level. Nevertheless,  very much  like  the  classical  cadre  party  in  early  democratic  Eu‐rope, political parties in Indonesia do not invest in a formal party organisation. Party leaders want maximum  freedom  in  the management  of  their  intra‐elite  networks and are therefore not interested in a formal party membership and a powerful party bureaucracy. Rather, the formal party organisation only serves as a cloak to conceal the clientelistic dealings. All functions usually associated with political parties, such as the recruitment of candidates, the mobilisation of funding and the organisation of electoral campaigns, are performed by the informal networks within that cloak. As a result,  the  three  formal  faces of party organisation –  the party on  the ground,  the party  central  office  and  the  party  in  public  office  –  are  indistinguishable.  Instead, there is a strong personal overlap between the three faces, as party membership is restricted  to  actors who  have  the  necessary  resources  to  run  their  own  electoral campaign, while functions usually associated with the party bureaucracy are mainly performed by external professionals. However, while clientelism is the outcome strategically selected by the context, agents  have  developed  alternative  strategic  reactions  to  the  environment  around them. The most notable example of such political parties  is the PKS, which tries to mobilise voters through Islamist policy ideas. Finding itself in a similar situation as 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socialist  and communist mass parties  in  late 19th  century Europe –  that  is,  having been  established external  to  government  –  the PKS  combines  these programmatic appeals with a mass membership organisation. The mass membership provides the PKS with  financial resources and connects  the party to the social milieu whose  in‐terests  it claims to represent. However,  in contrast  to  the classical mass party,  the PKS  is  not  democratically  organised,  but  decision‐making  is  controlled  by  a  small group  of  religious  preachers  and  scholars.  The  party  central  office  therefore  pos‐sesses  powerful  means  to  enforce  discipline  among  the  members  of  the  party  in public office in order to push forward the party’s ideological programme. Despite  the  similarities  to  party  systems  in  19th  century  Europe,  the  case  of Indonesia  should not be viewed as evidence of political parties  in  the  country  fol‐lowing the same path of organisational development as parties in Western Europe. Rather, as has been shown, party organisations in Indonesia are the product of stra‐tegic decisions taken within a context that favours clientelism over other strategies for  voter  mobilisation.  Unlike  in  South  Korea  or  the  Philippines,  clientelistic  net‐works  in  Indonesia do generally not provide material  incentives  to voters, but  the exchange  relations  tend  to  be  limited  to  the  intra‐party  level.  The  connection  be‐tween voters and politicians is made as the established political parties benefit from their traditional images as representatives of certain social communities. However, as the results for the 2009 legislative elections suggest, this pattern of voter mobilisation  could  slowly be  changing,  since  all major parties  lost  consider‐
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                                                125 All five parties that emerged as the major players in the 1999 elections suffered significant losses compared to the 2004 elections. Two of the biggest losers were Golkar and the PDI‐P: Golkar’s vote fell by 7% to 14.5%, while the PDI‐P lost 4.5% to 14%. The Islamic parties were also hit by a major decline in vote share: The PKB only won 5.0 % of the vote (‐5.6), the PPP 5.3 (‐2.9) and the PAN 6.0 (‐0.4). The PKS, on the other hand, following a programmatic strategy of voter mobilisation, was able to slightly increase its vote to 7.9% (+0.6). 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Towards a new framework for party organisation analysis  The starting point of this piece of research was the observation that the literature on party  organisational  formation  and  change  is  divided  along  an  agency‐structure spectrum.  Although  several  scholars  of  party  politics  have,  in  the  past,  implicitly hinted  at  the  division  between  theories  stressing  the  explanatory  power  of  struc‐tures and those arguing for a more agent‐centred approach to the study of party or‐ganisation, nobody has fully recognised yet the implications of the conflict between these  two  theoretical  strands  for  our understanding of  party  organisation.  In  fact, the first section of this paper offers the first ever review of the relevant party litera‐ture based on how much significance authors attach to either structural variables or political actors as autonomous and reflexive agents. Within  the  structural  strand we  then  distinguished  between  three  further  ap‐proaches, depending on whether they put more emphasis on either  internal or ex‐
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ternal factors – or both. While the “life‐cycle” approach believes that each party fol‐lows the same evolutionary pattern in its development as a consequence of a largely endogenous  process  of maturation  and  institutionalisation,  the  “period‐effect”  ap‐proach gives sole attention to the external environment, arguing that parties need to evolve with changing political and social  circumstances or otherwise  they will not survive in the “survival of the fittest”. Finally, the “generation effect” approach com‐bines these two approaches, maintaining that the formation of a party will be driven by external circumstance, whereas the further development will then be determined by internal dynamics. Subsequently, we argued that the hardened stand‐off between structuralist and voluntarist approaches seriously weakens our comprehension of how political par‐ties establish and change their organisations. This argument has both an empirical and a meta‐theoretical dimension. Using examples from established democracies in Western Europe, we showed how the strength of one approach is the weakness of another,  and vice versa. Moreover, on a more abstract  level, we argued  that  there exists a dialectical relationship between structures and agents, rather than a linear causal  link in only one direction – depending on whether one takes a structural or an  actor‐centred  approach.  Following  the  basic  propositions  of  historical  institu‐tionalism, we argued that social actors are knowledgeable and reflexive, which gives them the ability to develop different strategies within a context that favours certain strategies over others. In other words, if we only focus on structures to explain dif‐ferent  types of party organisation we  ignore  the ability of  actors  to develop  strat‐
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egies that will help them overcome the problems posed by structures around them. On  the  flipside,  only  focussing  on  agents  means  neglecting  the  context  as  a  con‐toured terrain which selects for certain outcomes.  It is important to note that this does not mean that we need to refuse all existing theories  of  party  organisation  – we  only  need  to  revise  the  relationship  between them. Fortunately, historical  institutionalism not only offers a medium for critique but also a framework for how to integrate explanatory factors from different levels of  analysis  into  a  single  theoretical model. More  specifically,  historical  institution‐alism  helps  us  understand  that, within  a  given  context,  there  is  not  a  single  ideal type of party organisation, but political actors can develop different organisational strategies to deal with the problems presented to them by the environment. At the same time, however, the environment is strategically selective, meaning that actors are not totally free in designing party organisations. Instead, they will have to orien‐tate  themselves  towards  the environment  in which  their party  is  to  compete with other  parties.  Moreover,  historical  institutionalism  provides  us  with  a  convincing mechanism to explain the reproduction of party organisations, which also carries in itself an explanation for the disruption of this reproductive process: that is, the dis‐tribution of power among party internal actors. Put briefly, party organisations re‐produce over time as different factions often push for different types of organisation and space for agency to change the organisational structures of the party will only open up if the inter‐factional power configuration is significantly altered. 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As the defining function of political parties is to compete in public elections, or‐ganisational  strategies  are  inseparably  linked  to  strategies  of  voter  mobilisation. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish two basic electoral strategies: clientelistic ex‐change  relationships  and  programmatic  appeals.  Politicians who  follow  a  clientel‐istic strategy will invest the largest share of their resources into the construction of patron‐client  networks,  in  which  political  support  will  be  exchanged  for material goods, such as money, jobs or services. The political party will thus only be rudimen‐tarily organised, merely serving as the formal shell for these networks. Very similar to the classical cadre party in 19th century Europe, the three faces of party organisa‐tion – the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office – will be indistinguishable. In contrast, a programmatic strategy requires an invest‐ment into the party as an abstract organisation, which will have to be open for wider popular participation and provide formal mechanisms for conflict resolution. Parties will  thus  be  characterised  by  (1)  a  strong  party  central  office,  if  politicians  target clearly identifiable social milieus, or (2) be dominated by the party in public office, if the electoral appeal is targeted at the median voter. Newer  democracies  of  the  “third wave”  are  generally  selective  towards  either clientelism or catch‐all strategies, because the typical abruptness of the democratic transition does not  leave  actors  enough  time  to  develop  clearly  focused program‐matic  platforms. Moreover,  unlike  in  the  “first wave”  of  democratisation,  in many younger democracies processes of industrialisation and nation‐building did not pre‐
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cede the democratisation of the political system, meaning that electoral cleavages on which to mobilise voters around ideological programmes have not emerged.  Whether the particular context favours either clientelistic or catch‐all strategies will then depend on a number of other factors at the polity level. Broadly speaking, the structural environment selects  for clientelism under either, or both, of  the  fol‐lowing  two  conditions:  (1)  The  outgoing  autocratic  regime  legitimised  its  non‐democratic rule through the clientelistic distribution of goods and had at least par‐tial  control  of  the  democratisation  process;  or  (2)  the  level  of  economic  develop‐ment is so low that clientelism can be set up as a new game, without a high risk of either of the two sides defecting. Conversely, catch‐all strategies are the strategically selected  outcome  if  –  under  conditions  of  high  economic  development  –  (1)  the democratic transition was controlled “from below”, completely removing the regime from power, or (2) the autocratic regime did not use clientelistic mechanisms to le‐gitimise its non‐democratic power. However,  this does not mean  that we should expect only  two  types of political parties  to  emerge  in  new  democracies  (i.e.  parties  with  no  formal  organisational faces and parties dominated by the party in public office). In fact, under conditions of high environmental uncertainty, actors following a catch‐all electoral strategy will suffer difficulties in enforcing party discipline, which could force them to strengthen the party central office over the party in public office. Environmental uncertainty, in turn, is largely the product of properties of the party system, particularly fragmenta‐tion  and  volatility.  That  is  to  say,  strengthening  the  party  central  office  could  be‐
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come necessary under conditions of high party system fragmentation and high elec‐toral volatility.   
Asian contexts and actors’ strategies  In most newer democracies in East Asia, the contextual environment is highly selec‐tive  towards clientelism. This  is not a new phenomenon – clientelism as a mecha‐nism to secure political power has deep historical roots in many East Asian societies and all autocratic regimes that preceded the “third wave” of democratisation used, in  one way  or  the  other,  clientelistic  incentives  to  legitimise  their  dictatorial  rule. This was most obvious in the Philippines, Indonesia and South Korea: Although dif‐fering widely in terms of power structures – the more sultanistic regimes of Marcos and Suharto on one side, and the military‐bureaucratic regime in Korea on the other side  –  all  three  regimes  used  public  money  to  “buy”  voters  in  the  regularly  held pseudo‐elections. In South Korea, even the pro‐democratic opposition relied on cli‐entelistic practices to mobilise electoral support, while in Indonesia clientelistic in‐centives  were  distributed  through  the  state  administration,  not  political  parties. Finally,  in Taiwan,  the KMT regime, after retreating to the  island from the Chinese mainland, did not develop patron‐client  linkages with  the  local population, but  in‐stead  integrated  society  into  an  extensive  network  of  party  cells  and  branches. 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However,  after  higher  party  ranks  were  opened  to  sub‐ethnic  Taiwanese  in  the 1970s, the emerging Mainstream faction of Taiwanese politicians used their connec‐tions  to  local  factions  to  mobilise  voters  in  local  and  supplementary  elections through clientelistic means. This eventually allowed the Mainstream to become the dominant  force within  the KMT,  sidelining  the more  traditional  groups within  the party. In the Philippines, the democratic transition completely removed Marcos’ sultan‐istic regime, which also resulted in the destruction of existing patron‐client linkages. However, the low level of socio‐economic development meant that clientelism could be established as a new game without a high risk of either the politician or the voter defecting. Moreover, Marcos had left institutional structures very favourable to set‐ting up clientelistic networks by introducing the barangay as the smallest adminis‐trative unit.  These  conditions  strongly  benefit  the  country’s  economic  elite, which can use its private wealth as clientelistic incentives, while the impoverished mass of the population see these incentives as a means of improving their everyday lives. In some cases,  politicians  combine  clientelism with  charisma –  either  their own cha‐risma or charisma by association, by marrying a celebrity. Some politicians  even use violent  coercion,  particularly  in  Mindanao,  where  the  Filipino  state  struggles  to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. In contrast, in Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan, the clientelistic networks es‐tablished  under  autocratic  rule were  largely  left  untouched  by  the  process  of  de‐mocratisation, meaning that political actors could continue using them in elections 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under  the  newly  implemented  democratic  rules.  In  Indonesia,  democracy was  in‐stalled  through a palace  coup against  Suharto, which gave  central  elements of  the regime the opportunity to re‐position themselves in the electoral market by hijack‐ing existing parties or establishing their own political vehicles. Regarding the mobi‐lisation of voters, the major parties in post‐Suharto Indonesia benefit from their his‐torical linkages with the specific social milieus whose interests they claim to repre‐sent. However, the linkage between politicians and voters is not made through a pol‐icy platform that aggregates the interest of the politician’s specific constituency. In‐stead, politicians provide  clientelistic  incentives  to  local notables exercising moral authority  over  their  respective  constituency  in  return  for  their  endorsement  in national elections. Hence, clientelism in Indonesia is best described as a mechanism to accommodate political  elites  from  the national  and  local  level, with only a very small share of material gains trickling down to the voter.  In South Korea, on the other hand, clientelism is a direct exchange relationship between the politician and the voter, in which material goods and services are pro‐vided  in  return  for  electoral  support.  Somewhat  unusually,  under  the  military‐bureaucratic regime, the regime party was not the only party to employ clientelistic strategies, but the pro‐democratic opposition also mobilised voters through clientel‐istic  incentives.  It  is thus no surprise that these clientelistic networks survived the negotiated  transition  to democracy and continue  to be used under  the new demo‐cratic rules. What is more, clientelism persists despite a growing level of economic development  in  South  Korea,  which  shows  that  the  prisoner’s  dilemma  does  not 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arise  when  clientelism  is  embedded  in  social  structures.  However,  the  nature  of electoral clientelism  in South Korea has recently been changing, as younger politi‐cians are pushing into the major political parties. This younger generation of politi‐cians  is  not  integrated  into  the  existing  clientelistic  networks  and  has  thus  re‐introduced public economic incentives into the regional cleavage, rather than distri‐buting private goods. Put in more abstract terms, this is therefore an example of how social agents can develop alternative strategic responses to the same structural ter‐rain. An even stronger case for the argument that actors are strategically reflexive can be made by looking at political party competition in Taiwan. Even before the arrival of democracy, the KMT had been divided over the best electoral strategy: While the Mainstream faction used its links to local factions to mobilise voters through clien‐telistic  practices,  the  Non‐mainstream  followed  a  strategy  of  party  organisational penetration into society, based on an ideology of Chinese nationalism. As the KMT – or rather the Mainstream faction – remained in tight control of the democratisation process, the clientelistic networks established by the Mainstream under authoritar‐ian  rule  were  successfully  transferred  into  the  new  democratic  arena.  The  Non‐mainstream,  on  the  other  hand,  continued  to  campaign  of  programmatic  appeals, demanding reunification with  the Chinese mainland. The reasons  for  this strategic choice are beyond the scope of this analysis, but two possible explanations could be the Non‐mainstream’s lack of relations to local factions or its diverging understand‐ing of the environment through a particular set of ideas. For similar reasons, actors 
OLIVER HELLMANN   
   – 310 – 
 
within the  largest opposition party,  the DPP also developed programmatic appeals rather than patron‐client relationships. Whereas the New Tide faction built a policy platform promoting independence for Taiwan, the Formosa faction followed a wider electoral agenda, supported by the personal charisma of its leaders. Both the KMT’s Non‐mainstream and the DPP’s New Tide faction thus opted for relatively  narrow  programmatic  strategies,  which we  should  theoretically  not  ex‐pect in newer democracies. They are therefore good examples of how social actors can develop  strategies  that  deviate  from  the  outcome  strategically  selected  for  by the  structural  context.  Even  clearer  cases  of  politicians mobilising  clearly  defined social groups through ideological platforms can be found in South Korea, the Philip‐pines and Indonesia. Although in all three countries the environment is highly selec‐tive towards clientelism, political parties have emerged that aggregate the interests of  certain  constituencies  in  detailed  policy  agendas:  The  Korean  DLP  targets  the working class; the Indonesian PKS represents the interests of conservative Muslims; and, in the Philippines, AKBAYAN! serves as a voice for the poor. Again, the motivat‐ing  factors behind  these programmatic  strategies are not part of  this analysis, but actors could hold specific sets of values that do not allow them to realise the oppor‐tunities for clientelism provided by the context – Marxist ideas of social equality in the KDLP and AKBAYAN!, and Islamic values of piety and belief  in God  in the PKS. Alternatively,  these  parties  might  have  developed  narrow  programmatic  appeals because  they  do  not  control  the  necessary  resources  for  a  clientelistic  strategy  of voter mobilisation.  In order  to make up  for  the  lack of  resources,  the parties’ pro‐
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grammatic  platforms  provide  citizens  with  collective  incentives  to  join  the  party, and contribute money and/or labour.  Although the electoral success of these three parties has so far been limited, they are nonetheless excellent  examples of  the ability of  agents  to make  strategic deci‐sions  in  a  strategically  selective  context. Moreover,  factional  conflict  in  the major parties in Korea and particularly in Taiwan shows that social actors with diverging strategic responses to the same environment can also co‐exist within the same po‐litical party. Since electoral strategies feed directly into preferences regarding party organisation,  political  parties  are  therefore  best  described  as  constellations  of power between different party internal actors. Accordingly, party organisations re‐produce and change, as actors will push for those organisational structures that will best allow the implementation of their electoral strategy. That is to say, by favouring certain electoral strategies over others, the environmental context will strategically select for a certain type of party organisation. However, given actors’ ability to de‐velop different electoral strategies within the same context, this outcome is not in‐evitable.  Indeed,  as we  have  seen,  the wide  variety  of  electoral  strategies  used  to mobilise voters  in  the younger democracies of East Asia  translates  into an equally large variety of party organisations in the post‐autocratic party systems. 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Party organisation in East Asia  As the post‐autocratic environments in East Asia are generally selective towards cli‐entelism, most political  parties  are  characterised by  their  lack of  formal  organisa‐tional faces. Instead, as in the classical cadre party, there is an almost complete over‐lap between the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office. However, since actors are able to develop alternative electoral strategies, we can also find parties that have translated the distribution between party internal ac‐tors  into  formal  norms  and  regulations.  Taiwanese  parties,  which  have,  since  the introduction of democracy, been deeply fragmented with factional conflict over the best  electoral  strategy,  are  now  dominated  by  actors  following  catch‐all  electoral strategies, resulting in the party in public office as the most powerful organisational element.  Moreover,  party  systems  in  South  Korea,  Indonesia  and  the  Philippines contain single parties that mobilise voters on narrowly focused programmatic strat‐egies, which means actors within these parties have developed the party central of‐fice as  the dominant  face as a means to  increase party discipline among the mem‐bers in public office. 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Party membership 
 Most political parties in East Asia are very vague about the conditions they attach to party membership. The constitutions of the dominant parties in South Korea, Indo‐nesia and the Philippines only list general requirements, such as nationality, age and identification with  the  party’s  principles.  In  addition  to  these  basic  criteria,  party membership does usually not carry any other obligations. In particular, party mem‐bers are not required to attend regular party meetings or pay regular membership fees.  Moreover,  there  is  no  formal  procedure  that  needs  to  be  followed  to  join  a party  as  a member:  There  is  no  application  process,  no  ID  cards  are  given  out  to party members and no centrally administered membership register exists by which to record the personal details of members. As a result, it is impossible to distinguish party members from regular voters, which, in turn, means that it is also impossible to provide meaningful membership figures for these parties. The only criterion  to  identify party members  is whether  they have been nomi‐nated as candidates  for a public election by  the respective party – although  in  the Philippines even this criterion  is not  free  from problems, as candidates often cam‐paign under the banner of more than one party. There is therefore a strong overlap between  the  party  on  the  ground  and  the  party  in  public  office.  Admittance  as  a party member/candidate will depend on whether the individual can contribute re‐sources to undertake a successful electoral campaign. Given that these parties follow clientelistic electoral  strategies,  relevant  resources  tend  to  include money, patron‐
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client networks, personal charisma, and (in Indonesia and the Philippines) militant organisations  to  intimidate  candidates  and  supporters  of  other  parties.  Ordinary members, on the other hand, have no value to these parties, as parties do not have to rely  on  membership  fees  for  their  financial  survival.  Moreover,  campaign‐related functions  traditionally performed by party members on a voluntary basis,  such as canvassing or attending rallies, are carried out by clients of powerful politicians in return for material incentives. Finally, members are not even valued as mere statist‐ics: Since voters are mobilised through clientelistic practices, parties do not need to create the impression that they are strongly rooted in society. In short, the organisa‐tional  strength of  these parties  should  therefore not be measured as a  function of their  membership  size,  but  on  their  ability  to  integrate  resourceful  politicians  as candidates for public elections.  Party membership is more exclusive in Taiwan in the sense that party members can be distinguished from ordinary voters. Most notably,  in both major Taiwanese parties, the KMT and the DPP, there is an official membership register and members are issued with membership cards. Currently, the two parties enjoy a membership‐electorate ratio of roughly seven and two per cent respectively, which is comparable to many parties  in contemporary Western Europe. However,  in both  the KMT and the DPP a large share of the party membership are so‐called “pocket members”, who do not  join the party because they identify with the party’s policy programme, but because  they  have  been  recruited  through  the  personal  network  of  a  local  boss. These politicians will then use “their” members to influence party internal voting. In 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the KMT, the Non‐mainstream faction, which became the dominant faction after the disastrous  2000  presidential  election,  cracked  down  on  the  problem  of  “pocket members”  by  enforcing  stricter  registration  procedures  and  introducing  a  small membership fee.  In the DPP, members have had to pay regular fees since the party’s founding, but “pocket members” remain a more serious problem than in the KMT, because of the party’s  smaller  overall  membership.  However,  the  dominant  New  Tide  faction  – which has traditionally been characterised by a strong ideological identity and thus strictly opposes  the  recruitment of  “pocket members”  – has  so  far been unable  to implement efficient measures against “pocket members”, because the DPP is highly dependent on collective membership  fees paid by  local bosses. For the DPP, mem‐bers’  financial  contributions  are  therefore  an  important  reason  for maintaining  a formal party membership.  In  the KMT, on  the other hand,  financial  considerations were  not  an  important  motivating  factor  when  introducing  membership  fees  in 2000.  Instead,  the decision to make party membership more exclusive was  largely driven by factional rivalries and calculations by the dominant Non‐mainstream that this  would  exclude  large  numbers  of  “pocket  members”  controlled  by  the  Main‐stream faction. As in the DPP, however, members are valued for their free labour – particularly during campaign  times – and as  statistic,  thus giving  the party a  sem‐blance of social representation. While party membership in Taiwan is thus more exclusive than in the dominant parties  in  other  newer  democracies  of  East  Asia,  membership  criteria  are  even 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stricter  in  the  Korean  DLP,  the  Filipino  AKBAYAN!  and  the  Indonesian  PKS. Most notably, new members need to attend introductory seminars, where they are taught about  the party’s  goals  and values. Moreover,  party branches are highly  active  in‐between elections and attendance of regular party meetings is even compulsory in the PKS (in the form of weekly Qu’ranic study sessions) and AKBAYAN!, where party members  need  to  contribute  labour  to  local  party  projects  as  a  substitute  for  not paying membership fees. Therefore, more than Taiwanese parties, these three par‐ties constantly engage their members in party related activities, thereby indoctrinat‐ing them with the party’s ideology. It is thus safe to say that, in addition to sources of financial support and free labour, these parties perceive their membership as a pool of candidates for public elections, who need to be trained and educated in all aspects of politics. Since the KLDP, AKBAYAN! and the PKS all follow narrowly focused elec‐toral  strategies,  strict  party  discipline  is  an  important  condition  for  working  to‐wards  the  implementation  of  the  party’s  clearly  defined  goals.  Educating  and  re‐cruiting candidates from within the party is an effective way of committing the party in public office to the party’s policy programme. We can therefore summarise that most parties in the newer democracies in East Asia have not developed a formal party on the ground. This is because they mobilise voters through clientelistic incentives, which means that the patron‐client networks employed  in  elections  can  also  be  used  to  recruit  campaign  supporters, while  the necessary  financial resources are provided by the electoral candidates themselves. In Taiwan, on the other hand, party members can clearly be distinguished from the 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rest of the electorate, largely because parties want to add substance to their catch‐all  strategies  by  giving  the  impression  that  they  are  strongly  rooted  in  society. Moreover,  the  DPP  is  also  highly  dependent  on membership  fees  for  its  financial survival, while in the KMT the introduction of regular dues was driven by factional rivalries.  Finally,  parties  campaigning  on  a  narrow  programmatic  platform  –  the KDLP, AKBAYAN! and the PKS –  feature the strongest parties on the ground, since members  are not  only  seen  as  sources of money and  labour,  but  also  as potential candidates for public elections.   
Candidate selection 
 As highlighted earlier, in the major parties in South Korea, the Philippines and Indo‐nesia  the  only  criterion  to  distinguish  party  members  from  ordinary  citizens  is whether they have been nominated as candidates for public elections. There is thus no party on the ground that could democratically legitimise the nomination of can‐didates  by  vote.  Instead,  candidate  selection  is  a  highly  informal  and  centralised process, controlled by the closest circle of party leaders. Nomination usually has to be “bought” with money or other politically relevant resources. In South Korea and Indonesia, where closed party list systems are used to elect national legislators, the higher one wants to be ranked on the list, the higher the financial contribution will 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have to be. Even party internal elections that seem superficially democratic – exam‐ples include the nomination of candidates in the Korean NKP in 1998, party conven‐tions held by the Filipino Lakas and the race for presidential candidate in Golkar in 2004 – are highly corrupted by money politics, as the outcome is effectively decided by who can buy the most support from lower party levels. Ultimately, this pattern of candidate selection reflects the logic of clientelism – that is, the actors with the most resources will be positioned at the top of the clientelistic network, channelling part of these resources further down the pyramid in return for political support.  Candidate selection is also highly centralised in the Indonesian PKS. Although the party would have the necessary party on the ground to conduct a democratic nomi‐nation  process,  party  leaders  use  their  religious  authority  to  legitimise  a  decision behind closed doors. However, unlike in other Indonesian parties, this decision does at least not seem to be affected by money politics. In contrast, other parties with a mass membership organise the selection of candidates in a much more democratic way: While  in  the  Filipino  AKBAYAN!  candidates  for  national  elections  get  nomi‐nated by the party congress, the Korean DLP holds closed primaries. Similar to the classical  mass  party,  both  of  these  parties  thus  give  their  members  participatory rights in return for their labour and financial contributions. In the PKS, on the other hand,  the  payment  of  regular membership  fees  is  justified  through  religious  con‐cepts in the Qu’ran, such as infaq and shadaqh – donations for the cause of Allah. In the major Taiwanese parties, the process of candidate selection has in the past been  a  frequent  target  for  party  organisational  reform,  reflecting  the ongoing  fac‐
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tional  conflict within  the  parties.  Initially,  both  the KMT and  the DPP used  closed primaries  to  select  candidates  for  parliamentary  elections.  In  the  KMT,  the  then dominant Non‐mainstream faction was hoping that this would limit the influence of local factions closely linked with the opposing Mainstream faction, while in the DPP the  dominant  Formosa  faction  calculated  that  the  “one  member,  one  vote”  rule would give it a numerical advantage over the New Tide. However, both parties then gradually curtailed membership participation: In the KMT, the increasingly power‐ful  Mainstream  centralised  candidate  selection  in  the  central  standing  committee because  the  faction’s  clientelistic  strategy demanded  special  allocation of  nomina‐tions to local factions in return for their political support, while in the DPP the New Tide succeeded in moving decision‐making into the middle tiers of the party, which is where the faction had most of its supporters. However, more recently, both the KMT and the DPP have again decentralised the nomination procedure.  In  the DPP, after  the disastrous 1996 presidential  election, the New Tide began to broaden its electoral appeal, effectively replacing its narrow programmatic strategy with a catch‐all strategy. In order to do this the faction had to  free  itself  from  ideologically  radical members  in  the  intermediary  party  struc‐tures, which, in turn, made it necessary to increase the inclusiveness of the selector‐ate.  The  New  Tide  did  this  by  introducing  public  opinion  polls,  because  a  closed primary would have translated into a numerical advantage for the Formosa faction. Similarly,  in  the KMT,  the Non‐mainstream  faction, which again became  the domi‐nant  faction after Lee Teng‐hui’s  resignation as  chairman  in 2000,  adopted a very 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similar system. This was because the Non‐mainstream anticipated that candidates of the Mainstream faction, who are generally associated with corruption and other il‐legal activities, would do relatively badly  in public opinion.  In other words,  in Tai‐wan,  the  decision  over  the  nomination  of  candidates  for  public  elections  is  now largely made outside the major political parties. In recent years, a similar trend can be observed in the major South Korean par‐ties.  As  younger  politicians,  who  are  not  integrated  into  existing  clientelistic  net‐works, are entering the two largest parties, the old pattern of candidate selection, in which nominations can be bought  through clientelistic  incentives, has come under attack. However, as  in  the  two Taiwanese parties, democratising the procedure by extending the vote to members and even non‐members is not an option, since their clientelistic  networks  would  give  the  old  guards  a  competitive  advantage  in  any election. Therefore, younger politicians have successfully pushed for the implemen‐tation of independent screening committees, which include respected personalities of  Korean  society.  Before  the  2008  elections,  these  committees  refused  to  re‐nominate many of the guards because they had been involved in corrupt activities. However,  this  new  procedure  for  candidate  selection  in  Korea  has  not  signifi‐cantly altered the party internal distribution of power. As in the dominant parties in the Philippines and Indonesia, the three faces of party organisation remain indistin‐guishable. Nevertheless, the final outcome has become more formalised and less de‐pendent from money politics. In the Taiwanese parties, on the other hand, where we can clearly distinguish between the three formal elements of party organisation, the 
POLITICAL PARTY ORGANISATION IN EAST ASIA    
 – 321 – 
   
system of public opinion polls strengthens the party in public office. This is because legislators  and  cabinet members  are  regularly  in  the  news, which  increases  their chances of people  recognising  their names  in public opinion polls.  In  contrast,  the centralised  procedure  of  candidate  selection  used  in  the  PKS  clearly  benefits  the party central office, while the highly democratic procedures employed in AKBAYAN! and  the  KDLP  are  a  power  asset  for  the  party  on  the  ground  –  more  so  in AKABAYAN!, as the open primary in the KDLP means that the membership will be atomised.   
Distribution of resources and decision‐making positions 
 In most East Asian parties, the largest share of politically relevant resources are held by politicians as  individuals, not  the political party as an abstract organisation. As discussed above, in order to be nominated as candidates, politicians usually need to contribute substantial resources for electoral campaign purposes. The party itself is hardly ever a source of financial support. In Indonesia, parties will fund the national media campaign, but candidates will have to finance the campaign “on the ground”. In Filipino parties, the general pattern is for campaign expenses at a particular ad‐ministrative level to be shouldered by the next higher political office, while in Korea candidates  maintain  their  own  political  machines  (sajojik)  outside  the  political 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party, which  are  used  to mobilise  both  voters  and  donations.  It  follows  from  this that parties do not develop a strong party bureaucracy, as a bureaucratic apparatus is neither wanted nor needed: Given that they follow clientelistic strategies of voter mobilisiation, politicians are not willing to pool their resources under the control of a party central office, while  functions usually performed by  the party bureaucracy can be carried out by externally hired professionals. In  Taiwan,  too,  a  large  share  of  politically  relevant  resources  is  controlled  by politicians and not  the political parties – particularly  in  the DPP. However,  in con‐trast to the dominant parties in South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia, both the KMT and the DPP have developed a party central office as a distinctive face of party organisation. This is, first of all, due to the fact that both parties have a party on the ground, which requires permanent bureaucratic management, such as maintaining the  membership  register  and  collecting  membership  fees.  Secondly,  both  parties have opened their own sources of income, the administration of which again needs permanent bureaucratic structures. The KMT in particular, which is often regarded as the richest party in the world, commands a huge campaign war chest. Initially, all party assets we held by individual party leaders. Only after the Mainstream had es‐tablished  itself as the dominant  faction  in the early 1990s were party  finances put under central supervision in order to facilitate a central allocation of resources for clientelistic purposes. However, these vital functions performed by the party central office do not translate into decision‐making power. As in the DPP, the party central office does not enjoy automatic  representation  in  the party’s key executive bodies 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and  the  party  in  public  office  elects  its  own  leadership without  interference  from outside. In  the KDLP, AKBAYAN! and  the PKS,  in  contrast,  the party  central  controls  all politically relevant resources. Not only do the respective party bureaucracies have their  own  sources  of  income,  but,  in  addition,  all  financial  resources mobilised by party politicians need to be transferred to the official party treasury. As a result, in all  three  parties,  the  party  in  public  office  is  completely  dependent  on  the  party central office for the financing of electoral campaigns. This puts the party central of‐fice  in a very powerful position, which also reflects  in the parties’  formal decision‐making rules: While  in  the KDLP and AKBAYAN!  the party bureaucracy enjoys ex‐officio  representation  in  all  central  executive  bodies,  in  the PKS,  the party  central office  is  itself  the  highest  authority  in  the  party  (in  the  form  of  the  consultative council),  retaining the right  to appoint all members of  the party’s decision‐making committees. To sum up, in the dominant parties of South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia we do not witness  the emergence of a party bureaucracy as an autonomous actor. This is because the largest share of politically relevant resources is controlled by in‐dividual  politicians, who  use  these  resources  to  feed  their  patron‐client  networks for mobilising  votes  in  both party  and public  elections.  The  two major Taiwanese parties, on the other hand, feature a formal party central office. This is because, most importantly, permanent organisational  structures become necessary  to administer the party membership and manage the party’s own sources of income. However, as 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in  the  other  countries  of  East  Asia,  politicians  in  Taiwan  also  control  their  own funds, which is why the party central office does not enjoy automatic representation in  any  of  the  executive  bodies  within  either  the  KMT  or  the  DPP.  In  the  KDLP, AKBAYAN!  and  the  PKS,  in  contrast,  all  resources  are  controlled  by  the  party  bu‐reaucracy,  which  ultimately  translates  into  ex‐officio  decision‐making  powers  for the party central office.    
Summary 
 Since  most  contextual  environments  in  the  newer  democracies  of  East  Asia  are highly selective towards clientelism, most political parties are no more than a formal cloak around patron‐client networks used to mobilise votes in public elections.   As a result, when described according to their formal properties, these parties are char‐acterised  by  the  following  organisational  features:  (1)  there  is  no  formal  party membership  that could be distinguished  from the common electorate based on  its rights  and  obligations  towards  the  party;  (2)  the  selection  of  candidates  is  highly centralised within the party leadership, with the party leadership usually nominat‐ing  themselves;  and  (3)  politically  relevant  resources  are  held  by  the  politicians themselves, not by the party central office as an abstract institution. Accordingly, as in the classical cadre party of 19th century Europe, we can observe a large personal 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overlap between the three elements of party organisation, making  it  impossible  to distinguish between the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office. The only context  that does not  favour clientelistic over programmatic electoral strategies can be found in Taiwan. Instead, as can be expected in younger democra‐cies of the “third wave”, the environment is strategically selective towards catch‐all strategies. As  a  result,  the  two major parties  in Taiwan –  the KMT and  the DPP – share many  central  characteristics with  the dominant party  type  in  contemporary Western Europe – the cartel party: Requirements for party membership are not very demanding, candidate selection is highly inclusive, and the parliamentary party con‐trols its own resources and decision‐making. All this amounts to the party in public in office being the dominant face of the party organisation. The resulting autonomy for  the parliamentary party has allowed both parties  to work closely  together  in a cartel  to exclude minor parties  from government participation, as  is best exempli‐fied by the introduction of a single‐member plurality electoral system for Legislative Yuan elections in 2008. However, against our theoretical expectations, we can also find political parties who have developed narrow programmatic appeals. The most notable examples are the Korean Democratic Labour Party (KDPL), the Filipino AKBAYAN! and the Indo‐nesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Since the implementation of clearly defined programmatic  goals  requires  strong  party  discipline,  all  three  parties  have  devel‐oped  the  party  central  office  as  the  dominant  organisational  element.  The  party 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central office performs  two central  functions. First of all,  an effective bureaucratic apparatus is required to perform essential functions related to a mass membership. These parties do not only value members as a source of income (except AKBAYAN!) and providers of free labour, but they also perceive them as a pool of potential can‐didates for public election. Recruiting candidates from within the party is an effec‐tive mechanism  to  increase party discipline,  and  the party  central  office plays  the key role in setting up training programmes and keeping the members engaged with the  party’s  ideology.  Secondly,  party  discipline  is  also  strengthened by  pooling  all resources  in  the party bureaucracy, which gives  the party central office an  instru‐ment  to  impose effective  sanctions on noncompliant  legislators. Most  importantly, lawmakers will  be dependent  on  the party  central  office  for  the  financing of  elec‐toral campaigns. In  short,  it has become clear  that political parties  in  the newer democracies of East Asia are not  following the same path of development as Western Europe, nor have they taken an “evolutionary leap” towards more contemporary types of party organisation. Instead, we find very different types of party organisation within envi‐ronmental  contexts  that  are  very  similar.  The  analysis  has  therefore  shown  that party organisation  is  the product of  strategic  choices made by knowledgeable and reflexive  actors  within  a  context  that  favours  certain  strategies  over  others.  This demonstrates  again  that  the  hardened  stand‐off  between  structuralist  and  actor‐centred  approaches  to  the  study  of  party  organisation  seriously  limits  our  under‐standing  of  party  formation  and  change,  as  the  strength  of  one  approach  is  the 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weakness  of  another  and  vice  versa.  This  does  not mean  that  existing  theories  of party organisation need to be refused all together, but we need to rethink the rela‐tionship between  them. Hopefully,  the analytical  framework offered here  is  a  first big step into that direction, offering scholars around the world a new perspective to think about party politics in their geographical area of specialisation.    
The implications for the study of party organisation in 
Western Europe  As the development of party organisations in Western Europe is the empirical basis for the largest share of existing theories of party formation and change, it seems ne‐cessary to discuss what the analytical framework developed here will mean for the study of party politics in Western Europe. First of all,  it must be noted that the de‐velopment of political parties in Western Europe is neither unique nor the only pos‐sible path of organisational development. Rather,  it should be understood in terms of  strategic  decisions  and  strategically  selective  contexts. While  strategies  can  be distinguished  along  a  clientelistic‐programmatic  spectrum,  the  context  should  be described according to factors favourable to either of these strategies. In fact, the context in 19th century Europe featured many characteristics we can also observe in the younger democracies of South Korea, the Philippines and Indo‐
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nesia. Most importantly, as only a small minority was eligible to vote under the elec‐toral rules of  the régime censitaire, voters could easily be mobilised through  inter‐personal networks, thereby eliminating the need for a strong party organisation. In‐stead, political actors invested the largest share of their resources into patron‐client relationships, which resulted in the emergence of the classical cadre party, charac‐terised by an almost complete overlap of the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office. Meanwhile, political actors excluded from gov‐ernment  and  lacking  the  necessary  resources  to  establish  similar  clientelistic  net‐works developed programmatic appeals targeted at clearly defined social groups. By providing collective incentives and opening decision‐making to wider participation, these  parties  successfully  recruited  large  groups  of  fee‐paying  members,  thereby making up their lack of resources through mass memberships. As the management of the membership and the enforcement of discipline in the parliamentary party re‐quired effective party  internal control,  these mass parties were characterised by a strong party central office. However,  both  cadre  and mass  parties were  soon  forced  to  rethink  their  elec‐toral strategies: While the lifting of the régime censitaire meant that clientelism was far  less efficient now, as a growing number of voters had to be  integrated  into the patron‐client networks,  the rising  level of socio‐economic development meant that targeting  specific  social  groups  through  narrow  programmatic  platforms  had  be‐come more difficult too, since less and less voters would feel like members of these groups. Hence, both types of parties began campaigning on programmatic appeals, 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aimed  at winning  the  vote  of  the median  voter.  As  a  result,  both  types  of  parties transformed into the same party type: the catch‐all party. The trend became to make party membership more inclusive and extend participatory rights to a wider group, thereby making the party in public office more autonomous from the rest of the ex‐tra‐parliamentary  party.  This  development  has  now  reached  its  temporary  peak with the emergence of the cartel party, in which the party in public office clearly is the dominant organisational element. However, as politicians are becoming more and more professionalised, the prob‐lem with catch‐all electoral strategies is that they fail to differentiate political parties in the electoral market: If all parties position themselves as responsible managers of the  state,  this  will  not  set  them  apart  from  their  competitors.  In  the  future,  we should therefore expect political parties in Western Europe to increasingly supple‐ment  their  catch‐all  strategies with  secondary  electoral  strategies.  One  such  com‐plementary strategy that will help parties to differentiate themselves from the com‐petition is charisma. Although recent empirical evidence suggests that political par‐ties still have a more significant  influence on voting behaviour than leadership ap‐peals, it is clear that “in an age of increasingly competitive elections, electorally ap‐pealing  leaders may make  all  the  difference”  (Webb  and  Poguntke  2007:  346).  A second strategy political parties can use to separate themselves  from the competi‐tion is patronage. However, unlike in the newer democracies of East Asia, patronage will not be directed at the electorate as a clientelistic mechanism of voter mobilisi‐ation  (since  this will  be  difficult  to  realise  in  the  highly  developed  context  that  is 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Western Europe), but it will be used as an instrument of governance. Political par‐ties will make  increasing use of patronage  to build organisational networks  in  the state  (and  semi‐state)  sector  that  will  combine  political  loyalty  with  technocratic expertise.  These  networks  will  facilitate  the  implementation  of  public  policies, thereby  helping  parties  to  boost  their  image  of  efficient  managers  of  the  state (Kopecký and Mair 2006). Although  not  targeted  at  the mass  electorate,  patronage  in  the Western  Euro‐pean  context will  have  a  similar  effect  on  party  organisation  as  clientelistic  strat‐egies of voter mobilisation in the newer democracies of East Asia. More precisely, it will accelerate a process that is already under way. First of all, political parties will be more interested in membership quality than quantity, with quality measured in terms of technocratic expertise. Secondly, the decreasing size of party memberships will make it necessary to open candidate selection to the wider electorate, thereby making  it  even more  difficult  to  distinguish  between  party members  and  normal citizens. Thirdly,  this will  further weaken  the party central office as  the mediating link between the party in public office and the party on the ground, while the party in public  office will  be  strengthened as  the  coordinating body  in  the  growing pat‐ronage network. In short, the party in public office will further consolidate its posi‐tion as  the dominant party organisational  face, until  it may eventually become  im‐possible to distinguish between the three formal faces of organisation. Instead, the function of political parties could be reduced to no more than that of a formal cloak around inter‐personal networks that connect the party leadership to appointed par‐
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tisans at different levels of governance. The growing focus of electoral campaigns on the  charismatic  qualities  of  single  political  leaders  –  as  already  addressed  by  our analytical framework – will stimulate this process even further. However,  it must be noted  that predictions about  the  future of party organisa‐tion, such as this one, will always be limited to strategically selected outcomes. They thereby  deny  actors  the  ability  to  develop  organisational  strategies  that  deviate from  the  expected  outcome.  As  our  analysis  of  political  parties  in  East  Asia  has shown, this is neither empirically or theoretically a fair assumption. Rather, we must acknowledge the fact that – although the strategic selectivity of a context will throw up regularities over time – single organisational decisions are always unpredictable. In fact, the prediction described above rests on the premise that parties have access to certain resources (most  importantly, government spoils and charisma). Political parties lacking these resources will therefore be forced to take alternative routes of organisational  development. Moreover, we have  certainly  not  reached  “the  end  of history”  (Fukuyama 1992) – and we probably never will – but political actors will always  hold  diverging  sets  of  ideas  through  which  to  interpret  the  environment around them. As intepretations of the opportunities provided by a context will differ between actors, so will strategic responses to this same context. Similarly,  although phrased  in  terms of  strategic decisions and strategically  se‐lective  contexts,  the  brief  historical  summary  of  political  party  development  in Western Europe above cuts out the many historical cases of political parties that do not fit into a generalised narrative. However, it is precisely these cases that deviate 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from  the  general  pattern  of  structured  outcomes  that  can  help  us  gain  a  better understanding of  the relationship between structure and agency, and processes of party  formation and  change more  specifically. There are,  for  instance, many party systems  in  which  the  cartel  party  has  not  emerged  as  the  dominant  party  type. While several authors have made this observation in democracies outside of West‐ern Europe (such as Young (1998) in Canada or Yishai (2001) in Israel), Detterbeck (2002; 2005), studying political parties in Denmark, Germany, Britain and Switzer‐land, claims that the emergence of cartel parties depends on a number of contextual factors: (1) the institutional setting, (2) political culture and (3) the level of political professionalisation. This heterogeneity across polities, combined with homogeneity within polities, shows that external structures matter. Approaches to party organi‐sation  that  focus either on  the causal power of  internal  structures  (“life  cycle” ap‐proach) or the role of agency therefore struggle to account for these cases. However,  heterogeneity  of  party  organisation  cannot  only  be  observed  across countries but also within countries. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Italian party sys‐tem is a good example  in this regard, since, at any point  in time, different types of party organisation have existed side by side – catch‐all and mass parties up until the 1990s, and modernised mass and “business firm” parties more recently. Thus, theo‐ries of party organisation emphasising  the  importance of external  structures  (“pe‐riod effect” approach) run into severe difficulties when trying to account for differ‐ent types of party organisation within the same polity, as there are obviously factors below the systemic level with a strong influence on how parties organise. The only 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theory that integrates factors from different levels of analysis is Panebianco’s “gen‐eration effect” approach, which argues that the formation of a party will be driven by  external  circumstances,  while  its  further  development  will  be  severely  con‐strained  by  internal  dynamics.  However,  this  approach  underestimates  actors’ ability to drastically reform the organisation of a political party, as can be exempli‐fied by the  fact  that  the  Italian communist and socialist parties have gone through considerable organisational change. Even clearer examples of party change are par‐ties of the new right. The French FN and the Austrian FPÖ, for example, have both gone through a continuous process of institutionalisation, making themselves much less dependent on their respective charismatic leader. In other words, no existing theory of party organisation has yet been able to ac‐count for both systemically structured outcomes and the numerous cases deviating from these regularities. Existing theoretical frameworks can only do so on an ad‐hoc basis  by  borrowing  from  other  approaches:  While  structuralist  approaches  need help  from  voluntarist  approaches  to  explain  diversity,  actor‐focused  approaches need to turn for support to structuralist theories when facing homogenously distri‐buted outcomes. The analytical framework developed here is therefore the first at‐tempt to integrate factors from different levels of analysis into a single model by ac‐knowledging  a  dialectical  relationship  between  structure  and  agency.  Future  re‐search might  show that  the contextual  factors  included  in  this  framework are  less meaningful  in  the  context  of  established  democracies,  and  actors  might  develop strategies never observed before, but the basic relationship between structures and 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Interviews   Abaya, Joseph E. A. (17 June 2008, Makati City, Philippines) Member of the House of Representatives, Liberal Party (LP). Azwar,  Rully  Chairul  (2  July  2008,  Jakarta,  Indonesia)  Secretary  General,  Party  of Functional Groups (Golkar). Baswedan, Anies (17 July 2008, Jakarta, Indonesia) President of Paramadina Univer‐sity. Casiple, Ramon C. (19 June 2008, Quezon City, Philippines) Executive Director of the Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER). Cha,  Young  (24 April  2008,  Seoul,  South Korea) Chief  Press Officer, United Demo‐cratic Party (UDP). Cho, Soo‐Yeon (15 April 2008, Seoul, South Korea) External Relations Unit Director, Korean Democratic Labour Party (KDLP). Chung, Jin‐Min (16 April 2008, Seoul, South Korea) Professor at the Department of Political Science, Myongji University. Co, Edna E. A. (23 June 2008, Makati City, Philippines) Professor at the National Col‐lege of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines. Feulner,  Frank  (28  June  2008,  Jakarta,  Indonesia)  Parliamentary  Adviser,  United Nations Development Programme. 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Hawang, Shiow‐duan (15 May 2008, Taipei, Taiwan) Professor at the Department of Political Science, Souchow University. Herberg, Mirko  (18  June 2008,  Pasig City,  Philippines) Resident Representative  of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Hermanns,  Heike  (16  April  2008,  Seoul,  South  Korea)  Professor  at  the  College  of Social Sciences, Inha University. Heufers,  Rainer  (14  July,  Jakarta,  Indonesia)  Project  Director,  Friedrich  Naumann Foundation. Ho, Szu‐yin  (6 May 2008, Taipei, Taiwan) Professor at  the Department of Political Science, National Chengchi University. Im, Hyug‐Baeg  (3 April  2008,  Seoul,  South Korea)  Professor  at  the Department  of Political Science, Korea University. Kamppeter, Werner (15 April 2008, Seoul, South Korea) Resident Representative of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Kim, Wook (17 April 2008, Seoul, South Korea) Associate Professor of Political Sci‐ence at Pai Chai University. Kim, Yong‐Ho (12 April 2008, Seoul, South Korea) Dean of Graduate School of Public Administration, Inha University. Kim, Young In (17 April 2008, Seoul, South Korea) Head of Communications Office, Grand National Party (GNP). Kleden,  Ignas  (14  July 2008,  Jakarta,  Indonesia) Chairman of  the  Indonesian Com‐munity for Democracy (KID). 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Kuo, Yun‐Kuang (12 May 2008, Taipei, Taiwan) Director of the Department of Over‐seas Affairs, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). Kwon, Hyeok Yong (7 April 2008, Seoul, South Korea) Assistant Professor at the De‐partment of Political Science, Korea University. Lai,  I‐Chung  (8 May 2008,  Taipei,  Taiwan) Director  of  the Department  of  Interna‐tional Affairs, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Lee, Eun‐Jeung (15 April 2008, Seoul, South Korea) Professor at the Department of Political Science, Martin‐Luther University Halle Wittenberg. Lin, Jih‐wen (7 May 2008, Taipei, Taiwan) Research Fellow at the Institute of Politi‐cal Science, Academia Sinica. Liu,  I‐Chou  (8 May 2008, Taipei,  Taiwan) Professor  at  the Department  of  Political Science, National Chengchi University. Mandan, Arief Mudatsir (10 July 2008, Jakarta, Indonesia) Deputy Chairman, United Development Party (PPP). Mangahas,  Mahar  (16  June  2008,  Quezon  City,  Philippines)  President  of  Social Weather Stations. Manglapus, Francis Xavier (13 June 2008, Mandaluyong City, Philippines) Secretary General, Lakas Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas‐CMD). Mietzner, Marcus (28 June 2008, Jakarta, Indonesia) Lecturer in Indonesian Studies at the Australian National University. Moon, Chung Sang (11 April 2008, Seoul, South Korea) Program Officer at The Asia Foundation. 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Pranowo, Gandjar (9 July 2008, Jakarta, Indonesia) Member of the House of Repre‐sentatives, Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (PDI‐P). Refrizal (9 July 2008,  Jakarta,  Indonesia) Member of the House of Representatives, Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Rocamora, Joel (26 June 2008, Quezon City, Philippines) Director of the Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD). Rowland, W. Paul  (2  July 2008,  Jakarta,  Indonesia) Resident Representative of  the National Democratic Institute (NDI). San Juan, Chyn (12 June 2008, Makati City, Philippines) Senior Project Coordinator, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). Santos, Arlene (23 June 2008, Quezon City, Philippines) General Secretary, Citizens’ Action Party (AKBAYAN!). Subianto, Benny (3 July 2008, Jakarta, Indonesia) Consultant to the Netherlands In‐stitute for Multiparty Democracy  (NIMD). Sugiarto, Bima Arya (8 July 2008, Jakarta, Indonesia) Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Paramadina University, and consultant to the National Mandate Party (PAN). Sukma,  Rizal  (15  July  2008,  Jakarta,  Indonesia)  Deputy  Executive  Director  of  the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Susanti, Bivitri (1 July 2008, Jakarta, Indonesia) Executive Director of the Indonesian Centre for Law and Policy Studies. 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Wang,  Yeh‐li  (29  April  2008,  Taichung,  Taiwan)  Professor  of  Political  Science  at Tunghai University.  Weck,  Winfried  (3  July  2008,  Jakarta,  Indonesia)  Resident  Representative  of  the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Wu, Chung‐li  (1 May 2008, Taipei, Taiwan) Associate Research Fellow at  the Insti‐tute of Political Science, Academia Sinica. 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ON THE ORGANISATION AND FACTIONALISATION OF 
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political 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title 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  Other.   Total number of members:    
Q6  Which, if any, of the above has changed since the party was founded?        







































































































SECTION 4: Internal Distribution of Resources  










Q29  How many professional staff does the party employ? Provide an estimate of the total number and indicate how they are allocated between the central party bureaucracy and the party in the national parliament. Year  Party bureaucracy  Parliamentary party  Total                                     
Q30  Which, if any, of the above has changed since the party was founded?        
SECTION 5: Status of Parliamentary Party  
Q31  Are there procedural rules to select the decision­making body of the parliamentary 
party? If yes, describe in more detail. 
  Yes, formal rules.        
  Yes, informal rules.        
  No.    
Q32  Are there formal rules for decision making in the parliamentary party? If yes, describe how these rules are made. 









SECTION 6: Factionalisation  
Q35  What are the main factions within the party? For each faction please indicate the main functions of the faction (multiple answers are possible) and specify these, and rate the faction’s degree of institutionalisation. 
Name of faction  Function 
  Articulate specific policy idea:     Allocate posts and resources:    Represent specific social group: 1  Institutionalisation     No routinised procedures.    Informally routinised rules.    Formally routinised rules. Name of faction  Function     Articulate specific policy idea:     Allocate posts and resources:    Represent specific social group: 2  Institutionalisation     No routinised procedures.    Informally routinised rules.    Formally routinised rules. Name of faction  Function     Articulate specific policy idea:     Allocate posts and resources:    Represent specific social group: 3  Institutionalisation     No routinised procedures.    Informally routinised rules.    Formally routinised rules. Name of faction  Function     Articulate specific policy idea:     Allocate posts and resources:    Represent specific social group: 4  Institutionalisation     No routinised procedures.    Informally routinised rules.    Formally routinised rules. Name of faction  Function     Articulate specific policy idea:     Allocate posts and resources:    Represent specific social group: 5  Institutionalisation     No routinised procedures.    Informally routinised rules.    Formally routinised rules.  
Q36  Outline the development of the inter­factional power relations.  Identify the dominant faction, and describe significant changes in the distribution of power among factions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
